MARC T. TREADWELL, District Judge.
The Plaintiff has filed a two-page document with the Court. Doc. 16. Excluding headings, the document reads as follows in its entirety:
Id. The Court must liberally construe the filings of the Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728, 731 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016) ("Given Mays's motion to vacate and supplemental notice were filed pro se, we construe them liberally." (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Court construes the document as a motion for reconsideration of its order adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that several Defendants be dismissed from the case without prejudice (Doc. 14) and a motion for injunctive relief. See Doc. 16 (stating "I object to the dismissal of any defendants in this case" and requesting that the Defendants be suspended without pay, the Defendants be ordered to pay the Plaintiff $20,000, and the Plaintiff be released from jail).
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.6, "Motions for Reconsideration shall not be filed as a matter of routine practice." M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.6. "Reconsideration is appropriate only if the movant demonstrates (1) that there has been an intervening change in the law, (2) that new evidence has been discovered which was not previously available to the parties in the exercise of due diligence, or (3) that the court made a clear error of law." Bingham v. Nelson, 2010 WL 339806, at *1 (M.D. Ga.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the Plaintiff states an objection "to the dismissal of any defendants in this case," he has not set forth any argument that such dismissal was wrong because of an intervening change in law, newly discovered evidence not previously available, or clear error. Doc. 16 at 1. Also, the Plaintiff had the opportunity to object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation but failed to do so; he waited to contest the dismissal of some of the Defendants until two and a half months after the Recommendation and nearly a month after the order adopting the Recommendation. Compare Doc. 7 (Recommendation, dated August 31, 2017), with Doc. 14 (order adopting Recommendation, dated October 16), with Doc. 16 (Plaintiff's motion, dated November 13). The motion for reconsideration must be denied.
As to the motion for injunctive relief, a preliminary injunction is a drastic remedy and is only appropriate if a party demonstrates that (1) there is a substantial likelihood he will succeed on the merits of his claim for injunctive relief, (2) relief is necessary to prevent irreparable injury, (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm that would be caused to the non-moving party, and (4) granting relief would not be averse to the public interest. Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1034-35 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The Plaintiff has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the necessity of his requested relief to prevent irreparable injury, that his threatened injury outweighs harm caused to the non-moving party, or that granting relief would not be averse to the public. The motion for injunctive relief therefore also must be denied.
Finally, to the extent the Plaintiff contests evidence that he anticipates opposing counsel will attempt to use at trial, he will have an opportunity to move to exclude such evidence closer to trial. At this time, resolution of such a dispute is premature.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 16) is