NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

NICKELL, JUDGE.

Michael Jaber was convicted following a jury trial in Campbell Circuit Court on two counts of Trafficking in a Controlled Substance in the First Degree.1 The jury recommended a sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment. Jaber timely appealed to this Court and now contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to act as his own counsel and represent himself throughout the criminal prosecution. Having reviewed the record, the law and the briefs, we disagree with Jaber's argument and affirm the trial court.

The historical facts leading to Jaber's arrest and subsequent conviction are mostly unnecessary for our resolution of this matter. Suffice it to say that on two different occasions, Jaber sold quantities of Oxycontin to a confidential informant who was conducting controlled buys for the Northern Kentucky Drug Strike Force (NKDSF). The transactions were tape recorded.

Following his arrest, Jaber underwent two competency evaluations. On March 15, 2010, the trial court entered an order finding Jaber was competent based on the report of Dr. Steven Sparks. Dr. Sparks' report indicated he believed Jaber was competent but cautioned that he exhibited signs of paranoia, grandiose ideologies, skewed perceptions of prior abuses by the legal system, self-confessed persecution complex, and controlled substance addiction which could mimic the symptoms of mental illness. Jaber was re-evaluated in August of that year by Dr. Timothy Allen, a staff psychologist from the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC). He diagnosed Jaber as having narcissistic personality traits. Dr. Allen testified during Jaber's second competency hearing and was informed of Jaber's expressed desire to act as his own counsel. Dr. Allen stated his view that Jaber had an inflated view of his ability to adequately represent himself. Jaber was again found competent to stand trial.

Based on Jaber's requests for permission to act as his own counsel and to represent himself, the trial court conducted a Faretta2 hearing on October 27, 2010. Jaber informed the court that his request to represent himself was based on his view that his private counsel had failed and refused to file numerous motions he had requested, such as for a speedy trial, to reinstate bail, dismiss the charges, and to proceed as an indigent defendant with the assistance of an appointed public defender. Although he had hired counsel, Jaber believed he qualified to receive the services of a public defender, but indicated he would rather represent himself. Upon being placed under oath, he was questioned about his belief that he qualified for a public defender. In response, Jaber stated that when he was on "the outside" he had access to a law library and other resources, but that since he was incarcerated, accessing those resources and representing himself was going to be more difficult. As a result of his present situation, he believed he qualified because he "was broke."

The trial court embarked upon a series of questions designed to determine whether Jaber was aware of the consequences of representing himself and was competent to act as his own counsel. He indicated he was aware of the charges against him and the potential penalties he faced, he had previously studied the philosophy of jurisprudence, had done some citation work, had prepared arguments for other pro se defendants in state and federal courts, and had been in "this position" a few times before because of his political activism. He stated his understanding that he was "on his own" and no one could help him if he represented himself. Jaber indicated that while he was familiar with some of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr), he was unfamiliar with the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE). Nevertheless, he believed he could adequately learn them before his trial.

The trial court informed Jaber of its feeling that he would be better off being represented by a licensed attorney and its opinion that he was incapable of representing himself. Jaber agreed but stated his feeling that all of his prior attorneys and their representation of him had been compromised by the prosecution. He believed he had never been to court on a "legitimate" charge. At the conclusion of the questioning, the trial court relieved Jaber's private counsel, denied his request to proceed pro se, and appointed a public defender to represent him.

On November 24, 2010, Jaber raised the issue of representing himself once again during a court appearance. It was discussed that Jaber believed the court had earlier ruled that he was to act as lead counsel and the appointed public defender was there as co-counsel or "shadow counsel." The trial court could not immediately recall its earlier ruling but questioned Jaber about numerous subpoenas he had requested for what the court believed were irrelevant witnesses. Jaber notified the trial court that the public officials named in the subpoenas were part of a wide-ranging conspiracy against him. He indicated the named public officials had signed warrants authorizing snipers to target his children with laser sights; break-ins and raids at his home; and choke holds being placed on his family members. He indicated he had attempted to get federal officials to investigate the rampant corruption in Campbell County to no avail. When the trial court expressed its disbelief of the allegations, Jaber proceeded to give a narrative regarding the alleged conspiracy emanating from officials in Frankfort and proceeding through local officials and police officers. His counsel advised him to not speak further when he began admitting the prior uncharged criminal act of cultivating marijuana.

Throughout the remainder of the hearing, Jaber continued to inject statements regarding the conspiracy, at one point accusing the trial court of "not wanting the corruption to see the light of day," and stating he had filed the numerous subpoenas to "light a fire" under the named officials to expedite getting the charges against him dropped. The majority of his allegations were nonsensical and incomplete. Ultimately, the trial court indicated that although Jaber was competent to stand trial, it did not believe he was competent to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, especially in light of his proffered defense.

A jury convicted Jaber of the charged offenses and recommended a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. Due to an error during the sentencing phase, the jury was recalled and dismissed. A new jury, impaneled for the sole purpose of sentencing, recommended Jaber serve fifteen years in the penitentiary. The trial court entered its judgment on May 20, 2011, sentencing Jaber in conformity with the jury's recommendation. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in rejecting Jaber's requests to represent himself and act as his own counsel. Jaber contends the trial court's finding that he was competent to stand trial, coupled with the answers he provided during the Faretta hearing, required the trial court to permit him to act as his own counsel and its failure to permit him to do so constituted a violation of his constitutional right of self-representation under the Sixth Amendment. We disagree and affirm.

The determination that a person is competent to stand trial is not the equivalent of a finding that the person is capable of representing himself in court proceedings. See Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108, 75 S.Ct. 145, 99 L.Ed. 135 (1954) ("[o]ne might not be insane in the sense of being incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand trial without benefit of counsel."). If the two were equal, Faretta would have no bearing on requests for self-representation and the requirement of a hearing on the matter would be rendered useless. Rather, the two determinations rely upon answers to two fundamentally different questions. Competency to stand trial refers to whether a defendant has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him and whether he has a present ability to meaningfully participate in his defense. Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 411, 422 (Ky. 2011) (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993); Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 162-63 (Ky. 2003)). Competency to self-represent looks to whether a defendant can "knowingly and intelligently" waive his right to assistance of counsel. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171-72, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2384-85, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008). The second determination may well hinge on the defendant's mental capacity and ability to effectively present a defense, so that the proceedings may be fair and have the appearance of fairness to all observers. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988).

Jaber insists Godinez controls the determination and that once he was found competent to stand trial, his waiver of counsel was necessarily voluntary and intelligent. However, in Edwards, the Supreme Court was presented with a situation much like the one at bar. There, the Court held unequivocally that Godinez did not answer the pertinent question of whether a state court could deny a defendant's request for self-representation based on the trial court's belief that the defendant suffered from a mental defect or incapacity that would prevent him from adequately presenting a defense to the charged offenses. It noted Faretta and its progeny did not make self-representation automatic nor the right absolute. The Edwards Court further held the capacity needed to proceed to trial without counsel was substantially different from that necessary to assist in one's own defense.

Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177-78, 128 S. Ct. at 2387-88.

The trial court here was aware of the results of Jaber's two competency examinations and the concerns raised by the physicians who conducted them. The trial court was able to witness first-hand the extent of Jaber's paranoia and inflated idea of his ability to represent himself. Jaber was given multiple opportunities to explain his actions and theories of defense. In response, he perpetuated his theory of a grand conspiracy spanning many years and involving a great many attorneys, judges, police officers, and other public officials. His grandiose ideas of rampant corruption and intimidation aimed at him and his family were sufficient to persuade the trial court to determine he could not adequately present a meaningful or rational defense to the charged offenses.

Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court properly considered Jaber's "irrational behavior, his demeanor in court, and [the] prior medical opinion[s] on competence to stand trial" before prohibiting Jaber from representing himself. Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 486 (Ky. 1999). The trial court was clearly in the superior position to observe Jaber's conduct and demeanor from the outset of the proceedings, and to evaluate the circumstances during the course of the prosecution. Therefore, its evaluation of the significance of Jaber's mental capacity and lucidity is entitled to substantial deference. The trial court's conclusion that Jaber was not capable of "knowingly and intelligently" waiving his right to counsel was well within the bounds of reasonableness. Thus, considering the trial court's advanced position to evaluate whether reasonable grounds existed to believe Jaber was competent to represent himself, and because under the totality of the circumstances its conclusion is reasonable, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in denying Jaber's requests to represent himself.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.