REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

REONA J. DALY, Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is the Defendant John Coe's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 32.) Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections at Lawrence Correctional Center. On March 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff now proceeds on a single claim under the Eighth Amendment, which alleges that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference toward his serious medical needs in relation to his collarbone by refusing to refer Plaintiff to an orthopedic surgeon. (Doc. 13.)

Defendant now moves for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not submit a response. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the Court grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.

I. BACKGROUND

From February 7, 2014 to the present date, Plaintiff has been incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center. (Doc. 33-3 at 15.) Defendant worked as a physician at Lawrence Correctional Center. (Doc. 33-1 at 1.) In March 2013, Plaintiff, who was not incarcerated at the time, fell from his wheelchair and injured his collarbone. (Doc. 33-3 at 20.) Plaintiff received medical treatment, including pain medication, X-rays, physical therapy, and a sling. (Id. at 22-24.) Orthopedic surgeons informed him that Plaintiff might require surgery but that they would wait to see if the injury would heal on its own. (Id. at 23.)

Sometime thereafter, Plaintiff was taken into the custody of the Department of Corrections and assigned to Lawrence Correctional Center. (Doc. 33-2 at 1.) On August 1, 2014, as Dr. Coe examined Plaintiff in the diabetes clinic, Plaintiff complained of collarbone pain. (Doc. 33-1 at 2.) Dr. Coe ordered an X-ray, which revealed arthritis at the acromioclavicular joint but no fracture or fracture callus. (Id.; Doc. 33-2 at 7.) On September 12, 2014, Dr. Coe examined Plaintiff and observed forward displacement of the collarbone at the manubrium and that the collarbone could be moved. (Doc. 33-2 at 7.) Dr. Coe prescribed Motrin for pain. (Id.)

On October 27, 2014, Plaintiff complained to Dr. Coe of pain and popping due to his collarbone and requested a referral to an orthopedic surgeon to repair the collarbone. (Id. at 11; Doc. 33-1 at 3.) Dr. Coe assessed that Plaintiff's use of a wheelchair had caused the issues with the collarbone. (Id.) Dr. Coe offered to assign an individual to assist Plaintiff by pushing his wheelchair and a change in medication. (Id.) However, Plaintiff refused, threatened to sue Dr. Coe, and left the examination room. (Id.) On December 2, 2014, Dr. Coe believed he had observed an upward shift of Plaintiff's collarbone. (Doc. 33-1 at 3; Doc. 33-2 at 13.) Dr. Coe again recommended a wheelchair assistant, which Plaintiff accepted. (Id.) Dr. Coe also ordered another X-ray and indicated that he would consider submitting the case for collegial review once he received the results. (Id.) However, as Dr. Coe explained to Plaintiff on January 13, 2015, the X-rays revealed no change in position since the August 2014 X-ray, and Dr. Coe found no need to change the treatment plan. (Doc. 33-1 at 3; Doc. 33-2 at 15.)

On February 27, 2015, Plaintiff complained to Dr. Coe that the collarbone made swallowing difficult and that he was never assigned a wheelchair assistant. (Doc. 33-2 at 16.) Dr. Coe noted that the X-rays had shown no change in position. (Id.) On April 2, 2015, Plaintiff again complained to Dr. Coe that he was never assigned a wheelchair assistant. (Id. at 19.) Dr. Coe observed no change in the collarbone and noted that Plaintiff could adequately move himself in a wheelchair. (Id.) On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff complained to Dr. Coe about collarbone issues. (Id. at 22.) Dr. Coe observed that the collarbone was unstable and easily moved. (Id.) He ordered X-rays and indicated that he would consider collegial review. (Id.) The X-rays revealed arthritis but no change in position. (Id.) On June 29, 2015, Dr. Coe learned that Plaintiff received a permit for a wheelchair assistant on February 27, 2015. (Id. at 23.) On August 29, 2015, Plaintiff complained again that he had not been assigned a wheelchair assistant. (Id. at 24.) Dr. Coe informed Plaintiff that he had been assigned a wheelchair assistant and instructed Plaintiff to use the wheelchair assistant. (Id.) Dr. Coe also prescribed Motrin and analgesic balm. (Id.) Dr. Coe examined Plaintiff from November 2015 to February 2016 for other medical reasons, during which Dr. Coe observed Plaintiff using a wheelchair assistant, and Plaintiff did not complain of collarbone pain. (Doc. 33-1 at 4.)

At Plaintiff's deposition, he testified that Dr. Coe told Plaintiff on three occasions that treating the collarbone's injury was outside of Dr. Coe's area of expertise but that Dr. Coe believed he could adequately treat the injury. (Doc. 33-3 at 17-18.) Plaintiff testified that he seeks a referral to an orthopedic surgeon rather than a specific type of medical treatment. (Id. at 38-39.)

In Dr. Coe's affidavit, he attests that Plaintiff's condition did not constitute a medical emergency or indicate the need for a surgical consult. (Doc. 33-1 at 4.) He further attests that a surgical remedy may have been ineffective or worsened Plaintiff's condition considering the failure of the collarbone to properly heal after the initial injury as well as Plaintiff's tendency to not comply with medical instructions. (Id.)

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) states that the Court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the Court shall "examine the record and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment must be denied "if a material issue of fact exists that would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-moving party." Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference toward his serious medical needs by failing to refer him to an orthopedic specialist. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff's medical needs. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const., amend. VIII; see also Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). Prison conditions that deprive inmates of basic human needs, such as inadequate nutrition, health, or safety, may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); James v. Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992). Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997).

To establish deliberate indifference to a medical condition, a prisoner must show a condition that is sufficiently serious (objective component) and that an official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind in failing to address the condition (subjective component). Id. "A serious medical condition is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's attention." Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Whether an injury is serious enough is a very fact specific inquiry — seriousness may be shown if an ordinary doctor opined an injury warranted treatment, if an injury significantly impacted an individual's daily activities, or if an injury caused chronic or substantial pain, among other things. Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1373. As to the subjective component, an official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2002). If an official reasonably responds to a risk, even if harm was not averted, deliberate indifference does not exist. Id. A claim for medical negligence does not amount to deliberate indifference. Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1369.

The record reflects that, on August 1, 2014, Plaintiff complained to Defendant of collarbone pain, and Defendant ordered X-rays, which revealed arthritis but no fracture or fracture callous. On September 12, 2014, Defendant prescribed medication for pain. On October 27, 2014, Defendant opined that Plaintiff pushing himself in a wheelchair caused the pain. Defendant recommended a wheelchair assistant and different pain medication, but Plaintiff refused. On December 4, 2014, Defendant believed he saw an upward shift of the collarbone and ordered X-rays. Because the X-rays revealed no collarbone movement, Defendant found no need to change the treatment plan for the collarbone. On February 27 and April 2, 2015, Plaintiff complained that he had not been assigned a wheelchair assistant. On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff complained to Defendant about his collarbone, and Defendant ordered X-rays, which revealed no changes. On June 29, 2015, Dr. Coe learned that Plaintiff received a permit for a wheelchair assistant on February 27, 2015. On August 19, 2015, Defendant informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff had been assigned a wheelchair assistant and instructed Plaintiff to use the wheelchair assistant. Defendant also prescribed medication for pain. During the examinations that followed, Defendant observed Plaintiff's use of a wheelchair assistant, and Plaintiff did not complain of further collarbone pain.

The record further indicates that Defendant found that Plaintiff's collarbone injury did not constitute a medical emergency or indicate the need for a surgical consult. According to Defendant, a surgical remedy may have been ineffective or worsened Plaintiff's condition considering the failure of the collarbone to properly heal after the initial injury as well as Plaintiff's tendency to not comply with medical instructions.

The evidence before the Court does not support Plaintiff's claim against Defendant. No evidence suggests Defendant acted with deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff's collarbone injury. Indeed, Plaintiff takes issue solely with Defendant's decision to not refer Plaintiff to an orthopedic surgeon rather than any aspect of Defendant's course of treatment. "[M]ere disagreement with the course of the inmate's medical treatment does not constitute an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, Defendant took measures to alleviate Plaintiff's collarbone pain by prescribing pain medication, ordering X-rays, and assigning a wheelchair assistant. When Plaintiff complied with Defendant's instructions and began using a wheelchair assistant, Plaintiff's complaints of collarbone pain ended. In sum, the record reflects that Defendant acted reasonably in treating Plaintiff's collarbone injury.

Because the record contains insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff's collarbone injury, it is recommended that the Court grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference against Defendant.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Defendant John Coe's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 32) be GRANTED. Because no other claims remain, it is further RECOMMENDED that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant John Coe and against Plaintiff Mark Heyer.

SO RECOMMENDED.