SAM A. LINDSAY, District Judge.
Before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Additional Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54), filed November 1, 2017. For the reasons herein explained, the court
This is a premises liability lawsuit. On October 23, 2015, Plaintiffs Marta Garcia ("Mrs. Garcia") and Oscar Garcia ("Mr. Garcia") (sometimes collectively, "Plaintiffs" or the "Garcias") filed this lawsuit in state court in Indiana, alleging negligence and seeking damages for injuries Mrs. Garcia contends she sustained on October 24, 2013, when she slipped and fell in the bathtub of the Garcia's hotel room at a LaQuinta Inn in Laredo, Texas. Mr. Garcia brings a claim for loss of consortium. On December 3, 2015, Defendants removed this action to federal court in the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal (Doc. 1). Following removal, Defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. On June 20, 2016, the district court, after concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendants, transferred the case to this court in the "interest[] of justice." See Opinion and Order 2 (Doc. 22).
On January 13, 2017, the court issued a Scheduling Order (Doc. 35), setting the case for trial on its four-week docket beginning February 5, 2018. Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, the deadline for Plaintiffs to designate experts was July 5, 2017, the deadline for Defendants to designate experts was August 5, 2017, and the deadline for completion of discovery was October 2, 2107.
On August 25, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to vacate the trial setting, extend the discovery deadline, and allow them to designate an expert witness after the deadline had passed and allow Defendants to also have additional time to designate an expert witness. See Pls.' Mot. to Vacate (Doc. 45). Defendants opposed the relief sought, arguing that Plaintiffs had failed to exercise diligence in prosecuting their case. Plaintiffs filed a reply detailing the back and forth between the parties with respect to trying to meet the discovery deadlines, as well as the logistical issues encountered by Plaintiffs, who are approximately seventy-five years of age, having to travel from Indiana to Texas, and problems encountered by Plaintiffs' counsel, a solo practitioner in Indiana. See Pls.' Reply (Doc. 48) and Appendix thereto (Docs. 48-1 through 48-4).
While Plaintiffs' motion to vacate the trial setting was pending, Defendant LQ Management L.L.C. ("LQ Management"), who will be the only remaining Defendant in this action,
Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to motions to continue summary judgment responses. Rule 56(d) provides:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). To obtain a continuance under Rule 56(d), the party opposing summary judgment must file a motion, along with an affidavit or declaration, setting forth why he or she cannot present, by affidavit or declaration, evidence necessary to justify his or her opposition to the summary judgment motion. Id.; see also Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 719 (5th Cir. 1999). The party moving for the continuance must show why he needs the additional discovery and how the additional discovery will demonstrate that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). A party may not "rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified facts." Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 162 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Finally, the party requesting the additional discovery or extension must show that relevant discovery has been diligently pursued. Wichita Falls Office Assocs. v. Banc One Corp., 978 F.2d 915, 919 (5th Cir. 1992).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) allows a district court to grant extensions of time prior to the expiration of a deadline for "good cause." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). When a deadline has expired, Rule 6(b)(1)(B) allows a court to consider a motion for an extension of time for excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Plaintiffs' Motion for Additional Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) was filed before Plaintiffs' summary judgment response deadline. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(A)'s good cause standard, therefore, applies to Plaintiffs' request to extend their summary judgment response deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A).
Having carefully considered Plaintiffs' Motion for Additional Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54), the Rule 56(d) Affidavit of Wanda E. Jones filed in support, and exhibits thereto (Doc. 54-2 through 54-9), Defendant's response, and Plaintiffs' reply, as well as the previously filed motions and briefs, under applicable law, the court
For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs are entitled to a continuance of their summary judgment response deadline under Rule 56(d) or Rule 6(b)(A)(1) to conduct additional discovery or designate experts. Plaintiffs have also shown good cause for the court to modify the scheduling order and for their failure to meet the scheduling order deadline under Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See S & W Enters., L.L.C. v. Southwest Bank of Alabama, 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003). A scheduling order "may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The good cause standard requires the "party seeking relief to show that the deadlines [could not] reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension." S & W Enters., 315 F.3d at 535 (citation omitted). "Only upon the movant's demonstration of good cause to modify the scheduling order will the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a) apply to the district court's decision to grant or deny leave." Id. at 536. In deciding whether to allow an untimely amendment, a court considers "(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice." Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). For the reasons previously stated, Plaintiffs have satisfied this four-part test. The court will allow a four-month extension of time for discovery for both parties. Given the reopening of discovery, the court, exercising its discretion to control its docket, will deny without prejudice Defendant's pending motion for summary judgment. The court will issue an Amended Scheduling Order separately, setting forth the new deadlines for discovery and for Defendant to file a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' response and Defendant's reply, if any, shall be filed in accordance with the local civil rules of this district.
For the reasons herein stated, the court:
The court apologizes for the delay in resolving the pending matters. As the parties may be aware, the Dallas Division is short two judges, creating a backlog of pending matters. Further, under the Speedy Trial Act, criminal matters take precedence. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. As the court is allowing Defendant to refile its motion for summary judgment and allowing further discovery and expert designations, the court does not believe any party has been legally prejudiced. Finally, upon reflection, once the matter was transferred to this court, the parties did not allow sufficient time for discovery (see Jt. Status Report, Doc. 30), and perhaps did not anticipate the logistical problems associated with conducting discovery in Texas while Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel reside in Indiana.