NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

TAYLOR, JUDGE.

James Jointer brings this appeal from a February 14, 2012, judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court following a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and sentence of one-year imprisonment probated for a period of three years. We affirm.

The material facts are undisputed. On March 1, 2011, Officer James Dellacamera of the Lexington Division of Police pulled into a parking lot near the corner of Sixth Street and North Limestone in Lexington, Kentucky. Officer Dellacamera observed a black automobile drive into the parking lot, stop briefly, and then immediately drive out of the parking lot. Officer Dellacamera recognized the driver of the vehicle as appellant, who had been arrested the previous week for driving without an operator's license. Officer Dellacamera followed the vehicle out of the parking lot and initiated a stop of the vehicle.1

As Officer Dellacamera approached appellant's vehicle, appellant began to exit the vehicle. Officer Dellacamera gave loud verbal commands for appellant to get back into the vehicle and place his hands on the steering wheel. Appellant did get back into the vehicle but did not put his hands on the steering wheel. Rather, appellant reached for something in the passenger seat which Officer Dellacamera observed to be an unidentified black object. Officer Dellacamera then pulled his weapon out of its holster, pointed it toward appellant, and moved laterally toward the vehicle while telling appellant to drop the object and get out of the vehicle. Appellant exited the vehicle, dropped the object, and went down on the ground as instructed. Appellant was then placed in handcuffs.

Another police officer was on the scene and stayed with appellant near the police cruiser. Appellant had left the driver's side door of the vehicle open when he exited the vehicle. Officer Dellacamera approached the driver's side of the vehicle where he then observed in plain view a small corner of a plastic baggy in an open compartment of the vehicle containing what he suspected was cocaine. The baggy was specifically located in an open compartment between the steering wheel and the driver's side door. The baggy was clearly observable from Officer Dellacamera's visual perspective. Officer Dellacamera seized the bag, and the contents later tested positive for cocaine.

Appellant was subsequently indicted upon first-degree possession of a controlled substance and upon operating a motor vehicle on a suspended/revoked operator's license. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle by police. Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion to suppress was denied. A plea agreement with the Commonwealth was reached. Therein, appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance.2 Appellant preserved his right to appeal denial of the suppression motion. In accordance with the plea agreement, appellant was ultimately sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment, which was probated for three years. This appeal follows.

Appellant contends that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence as the baggy of cocaine was not seized through a warrant and no exception to the warrant requirement was applicable.

We begin our analysis with the appropriate standard of review where a motion to suppress evidence has been denied. The circuit court's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78; Adcock v. Com., 967 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1998). And, we review the circuit court's conclusions of law de novo. Id. As the facts in this case are undisputed, we shall engage in a de novo review to determine whether the circuit court's conclusions of law were correct.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees an individual the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure carried out by the state. Com. v. Wood, 14 S.W.3d 557 (Ky. App. 1999). To secure this fundamental constitutional right, the state is generally required to obtain a search warrant before undertaking a search or seizure. Id. There are limited exceptions to this general rule, including the plain-view exception. Chavies v. Com., 354 S.W.3d 103 (Ky. 2011).

The plain-view exception to the warrant requirement requires that the evidence seized "is plainly visible, the officer is lawfully in a position to view the object, and the incriminating nature of the object is immediately apparent." Chavies, 354 S.W.3d at 109 (citing Horton v. Calif., 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990)).

In this case, it is uncontroverted that the cocaine was plainly visible and the incriminating nature was immediately apparent from Officer Dellacamera's visual perspective. Thus, the dispute before this Court centers upon whether Officer Dellacamera was "lawfully in a position to view" the baggy of crack cocaine.

According to Officer Dellacamera's undisputed testimony at the suppression hearing, appellant was placed in handcuffs and was detained by another officer near the police cruiser. At this time, Officer Dellacamera approached appellant's vehicle on the driver's side. The driver's side door had been left open by appellant when he exited the vehicle. While standing between the open door and the passenger compartment of the vehicle, Officer Dellacamera noticed a small corner of a plastic baggy containing what he suspected was cocaine in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Officer Dellacamera had not yet engaged in a security sweep or search of the vehicle. Rather, Officer Dellacamera was simply standing between the open door and passenger compartment of the vehicle. From these undisputed facts, we conclude that the officer was in a lawful position outside of the vehicle when he viewed the bag of cocaine. The driver's side door had been left open by appellant; hence, any passerby could freely peer into the vehicle's passenger compartment and see the bag of cocaine. Accordingly, we hold that the bag of cocaine was lawfully seized under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement and the circuit court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress. In light of our conclusion, we view appellant's remaining argument as moot.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.