Filed: May 06, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-3820 Singh v. Lynch BIA Nelson, IJ A087 768 657 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA
Summary: 14-3820 Singh v. Lynch BIA Nelson, IJ A087 768 657 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT..
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14-3820
Singh v. Lynch
BIA
Nelson, IJ
A087 768 657
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 6th day of May, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT:
JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
SATPAL SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 14-3820
NAC
LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights,
New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting
Assistant Attorney General; Edward
E. Wiggers, Senior Litigation
Counsel; Aimee J. Carmichael,
Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Satpal Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a September 12, 2014, decision of the BIA
affirming a June 18, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Satpal Singh, No. A087 768 657 (B.I.A. Sept.
12, 2014), aff’g No. A087 768 657 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June
18, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
the IJ’s decision, including the portions not explicitly
discussed by the BIA. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review
are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng
v. Holder,
562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
For asylum applications governed by the REAL ID Act,
like Singh’s, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of
the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on
inconsistencies between the applicant’s statements and other
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evidence, “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart
of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008).
“We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless,
from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse
credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia
Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination, which was based on
inconsistencies among Singh’s testimony, his asylum
application, and his documentary evidence. For instance,
Singh testified that he joined his political party on May 5,
2005, but his asylum application gave the date as October
2005. Singh’s explanation for the inconsistency, that he is
not mentally well and he forgets things, would not compel a
reasonable fact-finder to credit his testimony. He
remembered a precise date at the merits hearing, and his
claim of memory problems is not supported by the medical
evidence he introduced. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77,
80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the agency need not
credit an applicant’s explanation for inconsistencies unless
the explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do
so).
3
Singh also testified that he saw a doctor on the day
that he was beaten, and was later hospitalized. His asylum
application omitted reference to any medical treatment.
This omission is significant because it relates to the sole
instance of alleged persecution. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at
166 n.3 (“An inconsistency and an omission are . . .
functionally equivalent.”); Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec.,
446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
that an “inconsistency afforded substantial evidence to
support the adverse credibility finding” where it related to
“an example of the very persecution from which [the
applicant] sought asylum” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Singh’s testimony further contradicted his documentary
evidence with respect to when documents were sent to him.
When asked why he submitted documents late, he stated that
they were initially sent to the wrong address five or six
months before the June 2013 merits hearing; he later
clarified that the documents were first sent to him in
January 2013. However, an affidavit from Singh’s father,
which was included in this set of documents, was dated
either March or May 2013. Singh was unable to provide any
explanation for this inconsistency.
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Finally, the IJ reasonably found that Singh’s lack of
corroborating evidence further undermined his credibility.
“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony
may bear on credibility, because the absence of
corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to
rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into
question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d
Cir. 2007). Nor was the IJ required to give weight to the
evidence Singh did submit. A letter from Singh’s political
party did not include any details about him, despite Singh’s
statement in his asylum application that he spoke with the
president of his party’s unit after he was beaten. Letters
from his wife and father did not include any details
regarding the problems Singh had faced in India, were not
properly notarized, were prepared for purposes of
litigation, and were written by parties not available for
cross-examination. These findings were not erroneous. See
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d
Cir. 2006) (holding that the weight accorded to evidence
“lies largely within the discretion of the IJ” (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Y.C. v. Holder,
741 F.3d
324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to the agency’s decision
to afford limited weight to a relative’s letter).
5
Given the inconsistencies and lack of corroboration,
substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
credibility determination, which is dispositive of the
claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Paul v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d
148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). Because the credibility
determination is dispositive, we do not reach the agency’s
alternative finding that Singh had otherwise failed to meet
his burden of proof. See INS v. Bagamasbad,
429 U.S. 24, 25
(1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not
required to make findings on issues the decision of which is
unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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