RUDOLPH T. RANDA, District Judge.
John F. Simmers, a former employee of Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc., suffers from a neurological disorder known as Idiopathic Central Nervous System Hypersomnia. The defendants, collectively referred to as Hartford, initially approved Simmers' claim for long-term disability benefits but eventually discontinued his benefits. Simmers brought a 17-count complaint in state court, alleging primarily state law claims but also a federal RICO claim. Hartford removed on the basis of complete ERISA preemption and now moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, this motion is granted.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as true, and draws reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). The complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, a complaint must "describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant `fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests;'" additionally, the complaint's allegations must "plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a `speculative level.'" EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). A party may "plead itself out of court by pleading facts that establish an impenetrable defense to its claims." Tamayo at 1086.
Simmers argues that his state law claims are not preempted because the Mitsubishi plan is not an ERISA plan. ERISA is a "comprehensive and reticulated statute" of "general application, one that envisions inclusion within its ambit as the norm." Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 1989)(citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981)). Accordingly, ERISA's definition of an "employee welfare benefit plan" is expansive: "any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer . . . to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, . . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A). It is well-established that courts "must construe the definition of `welfare benefit plan' broadly." Fiene v. V&J Foods, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1172, 1178 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
The plan at issue in this case
Simmers requests leave to re-plead so he can "proceed to the merits of his claims as they exist under ERISA." Hartford argues that the Court should deny this request because Simmers' claims would be time-barred. For purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that the applicable limitations period is three years and that Simmers' claim accrued on June 29, 2006. However, Simmers might be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling in light of his neurological disorder. Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1141 (7th Cir. 1992) (equitable tolling applies to ERISA claims). Hartford argues that Simmers cannot prove that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he "requested reinstatement" during the applicable limitations period, thus demonstrating that his condition
Finally, Hartford moves to dismiss Simmers' RICO claim. Simmers alleges that the defendants denied his and other long-term disability claims as part of a concerted effort to increase its profits through conversion of funds from its disability reserves. Simmers is suing three separate Hartford entities in this case: Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, Hartford Life Insurance Company, and The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. Hartford Life and Accident is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hartford Life, and Hartford Life is the wholly owned subsidiary of Hartford Financial. Under RICO, a "firm and its employees, or a parent and its subsidiaries, are not an enterprise separate from the firm itself." Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 178 F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1999). Moreover, as in Zalesiak v. UnumProvident Corp., No. 06 C 443, 2007 WL 1280646, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2007), the allegation that the defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by mailing fraudulent denials of disability claims is insufficient to state a RICO claim. RICO liability "depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the `enterprise's affairs,' not just their own affairs." Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993)).
1. The defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 8] is
2. Simmers has