NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

KELLER, JUDGE.

William Shawn Sandefur appeals from an order of the Daviess Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. After careful review, we affirm.

On June 5, 2009, Appellant pleaded guilty to the following crimes: criminal facilitation to manufacture methamphetamine, criminal facilitation to possess anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, unlawful possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, tampering with physical evidence, unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. In exchange for this plea, the Commonwealth recommended a total sentence of seven years' imprisonment.

The circuit court accepted Appellant's guilty plea and on July 10, 2009, entered a final judgment sentencing him to seven years' imprisonment consistent with the Commonwealth's recommendation. Notably, at the time of the subject offenses, Appellant was on parole for prior felony convictions under Daviess County indictments 02-CR-00063 and 03-CR-00148. However, the judgment failed to specify whether Appellant's sentence was to run consecutively or concurrently with his sentences on those convictions.

On July 19, 2010, Appellant filed a motion to correct his sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42. Appellant alleged that his sentence was wrongfully being run consecutively with the sentences from his earlier convictions because the circuit court's judgment was silent as to whether it should be served consecutively or concurrently. Because of this silence, he contended that Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.110 required his latest sentence to run concurrently with the earlier ones and that the judgment should be corrected to reflect this fact. Appellant also moved for an evidentiary hearing and for the appointment of counsel.

In response, the Commonwealth argued that Appellant should have raised this issue on direct appeal and, therefore, it was not properly before the circuit court. In the alternative, the Commonwealth contended that KRS 532.110(2) and KRS 533.060(2) required Appellant's sentence to run consecutively with his prior sentences because he was on parole at the time he committed the subject offenses. On October 4, 2010, the circuit court entered an order denying Appellant's RCr 11.42 motion — without holding an evidentiary hearing or appointing counsel to represent Appellant — on the grounds proposed by the Commonwealth. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his RCr 11.42 motion because KRS 532.110 requires his current sentence to run concurrently with the sentences from his prior convictions. He further argues that the circuit court erred in denying his request for the appointment of counsel to assist with his motion. Because the circuit court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on Appellant's motion, our review is limited to determining whether the motion "on its face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction" or otherwise merit a correction of the resulting sentence. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967).

The Commonwealth first argues that Appellant's claim should be rejected because he could have raised it on direct appeal. An RCr 11.42 motion "is limited to issues that were not and could not be raised on direct appeal." Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). Generally there is no right to a direct appeal from a plea of guilty. Greer v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. App. 1986). "However, a defendant may by direct appeal challenge the legality of a sentence imposed pursuant to a guilty plea because sentencing issues are considered `jurisdictional' and cannot be waived." Elmore v. Commonwealth, 236 S.W.3d 623, 626 (Ky. App. 2007). Because of this, the Commonwealth urges this Court to disregard Appellant's argument about sentencing because he could have and should have raised this issue on direct appeal.

We note, however, that our Supreme Court has recognized that "the imposition of an unauthorized sentence is an error correctable by appeal, by writ, or by motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02." Myers v. Commonwealth, 42 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Ky. 2001), overruled on other grounds by McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010). This language suggests that a claim that a sentence is unauthorized by statute may be raised via multiple procedural mechanisms. We further note that in Myers, the appellant raised his claim of an unauthorized sentence via RCr 11.42 after pleading guilty and failing to file a direct appeal. See id. at 595. Per Myers, then, it appears that the subject issue is properly before this Court.

This being the case, however, it is apparent that the circuit court correctly determined that, by law, Appellant's sentence in this case must run consecutively with the sentences from his prior convictions. Appellant relies upon KRS 532.110 for his position, but subsection (2) of that statute provides that "[i]f the court does not specify the manner in which a sentence imposed by it is to run, the sentence shall run concurrently with any other sentence which the defendant must serve unless the sentence is required by subsection (3) of this section or KRS 533.060 to run consecutively." KRS 532.110(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that a judgment fails to specify the manner in which a sentence is to run relative to other sentences, standing alone, is not determinative of the issue. Instead, it is then necessary to consider whether one of the exceptions set forth in KRS 532.110(2) applies.

As recognized by the circuit court, "KRS 533.060(2) precludes a court from ordering a sentence for a criminal offense committed while an accused is on probation or parole to run concurrently with another sentence." Cosby v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 56, 59 (Ky. 2004). KRS 533.060(2) provides, in full, as follows:

(Emphasis added). Consequently, KRS 533.060(2) plainly requires, as a matter of law, that Appellant's sentence in this case run consecutively with his earlier sentences because he was on parole at the time he committed the instant offenses. The fact that the circuit court's judgment was silent on this point does not allow us to ignore a clear statutory requisite. Therefore, Appellant's claims of error lack merit and must be rejected. We further note that, to the extent Appellant's motion and brief can be viewed as challenging his sentences from his previous convictions on similar grounds, that challenge is also rejected because it is not properly before us.

Appellant lastly argues that the circuit court erred in denying his request for the appointment of counsel to assist him with his RCr 11.42 motion. We first note that "[t]here is no constitutional right to a post-conviction collateral attack on a criminal conviction or to be represented by counsel at such a proceeding where it exists." Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Ky. 2001). Instead, RCr 11.42(5) establishes when a judge must provide counsel for an indigent RCr 11.42 post-conviction movant. Id. at 456. That provision states:

Thus, a movant is not entitled to appointment of counsel under RCr 11.42(5) if "the allegations in his motion could be determined on the face of the record without an evidentiary hearing." Moore v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 132, 140 (Ky. 2006); see also Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 452-53.1

For the reasons discussed above, the claims raised in Appellant's motion are easily refuted on the face of the record because they are based upon an incorrect interpretation of the law. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing was not required and Appellant was consequently not entitled to appointed counsel.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Daviess Circuit Court denying Appellant's motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.