ORDER

M. CASEY RODGERS, Chief District Judge.

The Defendant is charged in a one-count indictment with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). The matter is before the court on the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on May 20, 2013. Having carefully considered the testimony, evidence, and arguments of the parties, the court finds that the Defendant's motion should be granted.

BACKGROUND

While on patrol on the evening of September 3, 2012, Deputy Pawal Wieszadlo of the Escambia County Sheriff's Office observed a tan Dodge Caravan with a crack in the lens cover of the left rear taillight through which white light emitted.1 After following the vehicle for approximately one block, Deputy Wieszadlo initiated a traffic stop.2 When he approached the vehicle, Deputy Wieszadlo asked the Defendant for his driver's license. Rather than produce a driver's license, the Defendant handed Deputy Wieszadlo a Florida Identification Card. When Deputy Wieszadlo inquired further, the Defendant admitted he did not have a valid driver's license. Deputy Wieszadlo returned to his patrol car and ran a check on the Defendant, which revealed that the Defendant's license had been revoked. Deputy Wieszadlo thus asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle, and as he did, Deputy Wieszadlo observed a firearm on the left side of the driver's seat.3 After learning that the Defendant was a convicted felon, Deputy Wieszadlo placed him under arrest for driving with a suspended license and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The Defendant seeks to exclude evidence of the firearm and ammunition, as well as all statements he made during the course of his arrest,4 arguing that the seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the traffic stop was not supported by probable cause and therefore was invalid. For the reasons set forth below, the court agrees.

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). "To satisfy constitutional concerns, a traffic stop requires either probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." United States v. Parker, No. 12-14142, 2013 WL 1104098, at *1 (11th Cir. March 18, 2013). "A determination of probable cause rests on objective factors, and the officer's subjective motives in making the stop are irrelevant." United States v. Peguero, No. 11-13043, 2013 WL 1909036, at *1 (11th Cir. May 9, 2013) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813); United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304 n.3 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that "a police officer's subjective motivations for conducting a stop have no bearing on the objective inquiry into whether the stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment") (emphasis in original); United States v. Harrelson, 465 Fed. Appx. 866, 868 (11th Cir. 2012) ("To determine whether the officer had probable cause, we do not focus on the officer's subjective motives; rather, we focus on whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justified the stop."). "`[A] traffic stop based on an officer's incorrect but reasonable assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment.'" Peguero, 2013 WL 1909036, at *1 (quoting Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003)). "As the Supreme Court has explained, `what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.'" United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990)). "This rule provides law enforcement officers broad leeway to conduct searches and seizures regardless of whether their subjective intent corresponds to the legal justification for their actions," so long as the legal justification is objectively grounded. United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999). In other words, "[s]o long as a traffic law infraction that would have objectively justified the stop had taken place, the fact that the police officer may have made the stop for a reason other than the occurrence of the traffic infraction is irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. . . ." Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 173 (5th Cir.1998). A mistake of law, however, can never provide probable cause for a traffic stop, see Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279, because the "`failure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively reasonable,'" United States v. Rosvall, 651 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1276 (D. Utah 2009) (quoting United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original)).

Here, the Defendant was stopped because the vehicle he was driving had a cracked taillight lens cover that allowed for the emission of white light.5 He was cited for a violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.610, which makes it unlawful

The statute further provides that if a law enforcement officer has "reasonable cause to believe that a vehicle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair," he may "require the driver of the vehicle to stop and submit the vehicle to an inspection and such test with reference thereto as may be appropriate." Fla. Stat. § 316.610(1). In order to determine whether a stop was justified under § 316.610(1), courts should consider the Florida statutes "that delineate specific equipment requirements." Paul v. State, 991 So.2d 404, 405 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2008); see also Hilton v. State, 961 So.2d 284, 290 (Fla. 2007) (holding that "for a stop to be constitutional under the `not in proper adjustment or repair' section of 316.610(1), the equipment defect or damage must be in violation of the law"); Doctor v. State, 596 So.2d 442, 446 (Fla.1992).

The Government relies on three statutes in support of its argument that Deputy Wieszadlo's stop of the Defendant was justified under Florida law and thus was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.6 First, the Government references Fla. Stat. § 316.224, which requires that

According to the Government, a taillight that shines or reflects any color other than red violates Florida law.7 This position has no support in Florida law. Indeed, although Fla. Stat. § 316.224 requires that all rear-mounted lights display or reflect a red color, it does not require that the lens covers of such lights be free from cracks or that there be no emission of white light. See Paul, 991 So. 2d at 406. Moreover, the Government has not provided — nor has the court found — any Florida case standing for the proposition that a crack in the lens cover of a taillight allowing some white light to emit constitutes a statutory traffic violation. To the contrary, Florida courts have repeatedly found that white light emitting through a crack in a taillight lens cover does not render a vehicle noncompliant under Fla. Stat. § 316.224 and that such a defect constitutes a statutory violation only if no red light is emitted from the taillight. See Doctor, 596 So. 2d at 446-47 (holding that "a reasonable officer would have known that [Defendant's] vehicle was in compliance with the law since red taillights were visible on both ends of the vehicle" despite the emission of white light); Johnson v. State, 888 So.2d 122, 124-25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that appellant made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to challenge the legality of a stop initiated because of white light emitting through a cracked lens cover of a brake light); Frierson v. State, 851 So.2d 293, 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (noting that a cracked lens cover, as opposed to a cracked taillight, is not "violative of the law"), quashed on other grounds, 926 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 2006).

In Doctor, officers stopped the defendant's vehicle pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 316.610 because of a crack in the lens cover of the left rear taillight. Doctor, 596 So. 2d at 446. In deciding whether the stop was justified, the Florida Supreme Court considered Fla. Stat. § 316.610 in conjunction with other statutes that "delineate the specific equipment requirements for vehicles" and found only one statute applicable, that being Fla. Stat. § 316.221(1), which requires all vehicles to be equipped with at least two rear mounted taillights that emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of 1,000 feet to the rear. Id. According to the evidence in Doctor, the defendant's vehicle had two sets of rear lights, each of which was equipped with a signal light on the outside, a brake light, a reverse light, and a lens cover or reflector, one of which was cracked. One of the officers confirmed that the taillights operated as intended on each side of the rear of the vehicle, despite the crack. The court therefore found that the vehicle was in compliance with the statute and, as a result, that the stop was improper, rejecting the State's argument that Fla. Stat. § 316.610 "allows police to stop a vehicle for malfunctioning equipment, even if the equipment is not required by statute, poses no safety hazard, or otherwise violates no law." Id. at 447. According to the Florida Supreme Court, "[s]uch an interpretation of section 316.110 [sic] would allow police to stop vehicles for malfunctioning air conditioners or even defective radios, a result clearly beyond the statute's intended purpose of ensuring the safe condition of vehicles operating on our state's streets and highways." Id. The court rejected the State's position that the stop was legal because the officers "reasonably suspected" that the taillight was in violation of the law, noting that reasonable suspicion is based on an objective standard and that law enforcement officers are charged with knowledge of the law. Id. (internal marks omitted). As the court pointed out, a "reasonable officer would have known the statutory requirements for taillights as prescribed by section 316.221" and thus likewise "would have known that [the defendant's] vehicle was in compliance with the law since red taillights were visible on both ends of the vehicle."8 Id. Several years after the decision in Doctor, the United States Supreme Court considered whether "a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation," even if the police officer conducting the stop subjectively believed that an occupant of the vehicle was engaging in illegal behavior. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 809 (emphasis in original). In answering the question in the affirmative, the Court rejected the "principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred" and held that police officers' subjective intentions have no bearing on the reasonableness of a traffic stop, which hinges solely on the objective validity of the basis offered by the officer who made the stop. Id. at 811, 813. The Court noted that it has "flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal justification" for a stop.9 Id. at 812.

The Supreme Court's rejection of any consideration of subjective motivations and adoption of a purely objective test in Whren cast doubt on the continued validity of Doctor. However, in Hilton v. State, 961 So.2d 284 (Fla. 2007), a case involving a stop based on a crack in a vehicle windshield, the Florida Supreme Court confirmed Doctor's continued viability.10 In Hilton, the defendant filed a motion to suppress after being charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,11 arguing, among other things, that the stop was not justified because the crack in the windshield was barely visible and did not obstruct the driver's view.12 The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal initially held that the officers lacked justification for the stop.13 It subsequently granted rehearing en banc and vacated its prior decision, finding that although the Florida statutes do not "specify under what circumstances an officer may stop a car to perform a safety inspection of a broken windshield, . . . an officer may stop a vehicle with a visibly cracked windshield regardless of whether the crack creates an immediate hazard," even if only to investigate.14 Hilton v. State, 901 So.2d 155, 157 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("Hilton II").15 The court offered three bases for its holding. First, it noted that Fla. Stat. § 316.610(1) permits a stop when a vehicle is unsafe or has defective equipment, which the court construed as a clear indication that the legislature did not intend to "limit the authority of the police to only those cases in which the equipment created some immediate or heightened level of risk." Id. The court concluded that, because a windshield is required under Fla. Stat. § 316.2952, a windshield not in proper repair constitutes a violation of § 316.610. Id. Second, the court relied on Fla. Stat. § 316.610(2), which provides that

Finally, the court concluded that "the power extended to the police in section 316.610(1) does not violate the Fourth Amendment," noting that the statute was "intended to create a noncriminal safety stop to permit police to perform a quick vehicle-specific safety inspection that is cheaper and less intrusive, and arguably more effective, than methods of mandatory, annual vehicle inspection." Hilton II, 901 So. 2d at 157-58. The court found it "reasonable for the legislature to require all automobiles to have certain equipment and for that equipment to be in proper repair" and indicated that "[o]wners and operators of cars are expected to know these legal requirements and should not expect their sense of personal privacy to prevent the police from briefly stopping a car that reasonably appears to have an equipment violation." Id. at 158. The court further found that, "even if section 316.2952 or section 316.610 stated that a cracked windshield would be a traffic violation only if it created an unsafe condition, an officer may be reasonable in his or her belief that the crack met such criteria, even though an examination of the windshield after the stop revealed that the crack did not create an unsafe condition." Id. at 159. The court distinguished Doctor on the basis that it was decided before Whren; the vehicle at issue in Doctor was stopped based on a mistake of law; and there was no statutory violation in Doctor. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress and certified the issue to the Florida Supreme Court as a matter of great public importance. Id. at 160.

The Florida Supreme Court rejected the Second District Court of Appeal's analysis, quashed the decision in Hilton II, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 300. Again relying on principles of statutory interpretation, the court noted that Fla. Stat. § 316.610 makes it unlawful to drive a vehicle that does not contain parts and equipment required by statute and that Fla. Stat. § 316.2952 requires only that a vehicle have a windshield in a fixed and upright position equipped with safety glazing, a driver-controlled cleaning device, and windshield wipers in good working order. Id. at 289. "[A]ny other problems with windshields, such as chips, dings, or cracks, are not within section 316.2952 and do not constitute a traffic violation under that statute." Id. According to the Florida Supreme Court, "[t]o conclude that any defect or damage renders a vehicle's equipment `not in proper adjustment or repair,' and, therefore, subject to stop and inspection by law enforcement officers pursuant to section 316.610(1), would ignore the language in the introductory paragraph of the statute which provides that it is a violation for a vehicle not to have equipment that is in proper condition or adjustment `as required in this chapter.'" Id. at 289-90 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 316.610). The court therefore concluded that Fla. Stat. § 316.610(1) "does not give officers the authority to stop a vehicle for any equipment defect or damage;" rather, "for a stop to be constitutional under the `not in proper adjustment or repair' section of 316.610(1), the equipment defect or damage must be in violation of the law." Id. at 290. In other words, if a defect is not prohibited by statute, an officer may stop a vehicle based on such a defect only if it constitutes a safety hazard.16 Id.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals previously had held similarly in Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999). In that case, a law enforcement officer stopped the defendant's vehicle because of a hole in one of the vehicle's taillight lens covers that allowed both red and white light to be emitted, which the officer believed constituted a traffic violation.17 The defendant, who ultimately was charged with willfully transporting illegal aliens, moved to suppress evidence obtained as result of the traffic stop, arguing that under Texas law a broken lens cover causing a taillight to emit both red and white light does not constitute a traffic violation and thus cannot serve as a legitimate basis for a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit agreed, reversing the district court's decision denying the defendant's motion to suppress and noting that "if officers are allowed to stop vehicles based upon their subjective belief that traffic laws have been violated even where no such violation has, in fact, occurred, the potential for abuse of traffic infractions as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the costs to privacy rights excessive." Id. at 289.

Applying the decisions in Doctor, Hilton, and Lopez-Valdez to the instant case, the court concludes that Deputy Wieszadlo's stop of the Defendant's vehicle pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 316.610 violated the Fourth Amendment. Deputy Wieszadlo stopped the Defendant because the vehicle he was driving had a broken taillight lens cover from which white light emitted, something not prohibited under Fla. Stat. § 316.610. Accordingly, Deputy Wieszadlo's stop of the Defendant's vehicle was based on a mistake of law, which can never support a finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause as a matter of law. See Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279 (holding that "a mistake of law cannot provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a traffic stop"). Therefore, the court finds that no reasonable law enforcement officer in Deputy Wieszadlo's position, correctly following Florida law, would have considered the vehicle driven by the Defendant to be in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.610 based on white light emitting from the broken taillight lens cover.18 See Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d at 289; Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106; Rosvall, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 (noting that "Utah law does not . . . demand that drivers operate only vehicles that are, at all times, in full compliance with all standards in the safety inspection manual" and that such a requirement "would place onerous and unrealistic duties on drivers and car owners"); Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 288-92; Doctor, 595 So. 2d at 447.

The Government also relies on Fla. Stat. § 316.235(3) to justify the stop, which requires that backup lamps not be lighted when a vehicle is in forward motion.19 The Government argues that, with the exception of the light illuminating the license plate, white light may be emitted from the rear of a vehicle only when the vehicle is in reverse motion. Once again, Florida law does not support the Government's position. Florida Stat. § 316.235(3) does not prohibit the emission of white light from the rear of a vehicle, and the court is aware of no authority imposing such a ban.20 The court, therefore, also finds that the Government has failed to demonstrate that a reasonable law enforcement officer in Deputy Wieszadlo's position, correctly following Florida law, would have had probable cause to stop the Defendant for a violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.235(3).

Finally, the Government argues that any white light on the rear of a vehicle, other than the light illuminating the license plate, creates a safety hazard under Fla. Stat. § 316.610 by impairing the vision of other drivers and causing confusion as to whether the vehicle is moving forward or backward. According to the Government, such a condition creates reasonable cause for an officer to believe the vehicle is unsafe, justifying a stop under Fla. Stat. § 316.610 for inspection purposes. The Government is correct that a defect not prohibited by statute may constitute a traffic violation when the defect renders the vehicle unsafe such that person or property is endangered. See Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 295. Such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. Accordingly, in this case, if Deputy Wieszadlo's belief that the cracked taillight lens cover rendered the vehicle unsafe under Fla. Stat. § 316.610 was objectively reasonable, he was justified in stopping the Defendant's vehicle regardless of whether the crack in fact constituted an unsafe condition. See id. at 294 n.7; see also Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1276-77.

As noted, Deputy Wieszadlo did not testify at the hearing; as a result, there is no evidence in the record regarding Deputy Wieszadlo's observations or the reason he stopped the Defendant's vehicle except as set forth in the offense report. The photograph of the taillight, however, reveals that the upper, clear lens cover was largely missing but that the lower, red lens cover remained mostly in tact. According to Officer Lee, who did testify but did not make the decision to initiate the stop, the white light that emitted from the taillight was equivalent to the light from a Mag Lite flashlight and did not create a safety hazard when emitted along with the red light. Although Officer Lee opined that the emission of white light could create an unsafe condition by distorting the vision of a driver following behind the vehicle, he also testified that the light did not impair his vision in any way and that he had no knowledge as to whether Deputy Wieszadlo's vision was impaired.21 In short, Officer Lee, the Government's sole witness regarding the reason for the stop, did not support the Government's position that the cracked taillight lens cover supported reasonable cause to believe the vehicle was in an unsafe condition as contemplated by Fla. Stat. § 316.610.22 The court thus finds that the Government failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the stop of the Defendant's vehicle was objectively reasonable. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811; Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1276; Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 297 (holding that because the State "presented no evidence that the vehicle was in an unsafe condition to endanger person or property and, correspondingly, no evidence that would support an objectively reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was unsafe in violation of the statute," the State failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that the stop of the Defendant was objectively reasonable).23

Accordingly, the court concludes that the traffic stop in this case violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence obtained as a result of the stop must be suppressed. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (doc. 16), therefore, is GRANTED.

DONE and ORDERED.