NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
MAZE, JUDGE.
Sheila Farmer appeals from a judgment of conviction on counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, fourth-degree assault, driving under the influence, criminal mischief, various traffic offenses, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. She argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to excuse two jurors for cause and in several of its evidentiary rulings. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
At approximately 1:00 am on the morning of October 1, 2012, Farmer crashed her truck through the home of Gary Johnson in Ohio County, Kentucky. The truck went through the front of the house, passed through the living room where two children were sleeping, and burst through a wall into the bedroom where Johnson and his girlfriend were sleeping. One of the children, seven-year-old Ashlynn Willoughby, suffered injuries to her leg and face. In addition, Johnson suffered an injury to his leg. After the crash, Farmer got out of the truck, approached Ashlynn and told her, "You're not hurt. Insurance will pay for everything."
The first officer to arrive on the scene was Deputy Adam Wright of the Ohio County Sherriff's Office. Kentucky State Trooper Jeremy Baker arrived shortly thereafter. Deputy Wright states that Farmer smelled of alcohol and had admitted to drinking two beers. Trooper Baker took over the interview. He conducted several field sobriety tests, the results of which he later testified were indicative of intoxication. Trooper Baker also noted that Farmer was slurring her words and unsteady on her feet. Farmer also told Trooper Baker that she had drunk "a couple" of beers and taken medication. Both officers testified that Farmer was belligerent and uncooperative. Based on these observations, Trooper Baker placed Farmer under arrest. Subsequently, another officer, Sergeant Chet Gentry, transported Farmer to the Ohio County Hospital for a blood test. However, she declined to submit to a blood test, and consequently no test was conducted.
Based upon this incident, an Ohio County grand jury returned an indictment charging Farmer with three counts of wanton endangerment in the first-degree, three counts of assault in the second degree, and one count each of assault in the first degree, operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, criminal mischief in the first degree, failure to produce an insurance card, and possession of an open alcohol beverage in a motor vehicle. The grand jury also charged Farmer with being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The matter proceeded to a jury trial in July of 2014. At the conclusion of that trial, the jury found Farmer guilty on all of the counts except the second-degree assault counts. The jury instead found Farmer guilty of two counts of assault in the fourth degree. The jury fixed her sentence at a total of ten years' imprisonment, plus fines totaling $1,000. On August 28, 2014, the trial court entered a judgment imposing the jury's sentence. This appeal followed.
Farmer raises three allegations of error. She first argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to strike two jurors for cause. During voir dire, the trial court asked the panel if anyone knew the witnesses in this case. Two prospective jurors, Jurors # 31 and # 47, replied that they knew Deputy Wright. Juror # 31 stated that his wife is Deputy Wright's first cousin. He added that he occasionally speaks to Deputy Wright at family gatherings. Juror # 47 stated that she knows Deputy Wright through her husband, who is a retired Kentucky State Police Trooper. Juror # 47 admitted that she and her husband socialize with Deputy Wright, and that Deputy Wright had been to their house within the past month. However, both jurors stated that their relationship would not affect their impartiality or the views of Deputy Wright's credibility. Based on these responses, the trial court denied Farmer's motion to strike them from the panel for cause. Subsequently, Farmer used two of her peremptory challenges to strike these jurors from the panel.
A trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine whether a prospective juror should be excused for cause. Gabbard v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W.3d 844, 853 (Ky. 2009). The court must weigh the probability of bias or prejudice based on the entirety of the juror's responses and demeanor. Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 338 (Ky. 2007). The prevailing rule is that a juror should be disqualified when the juror has a close relationship with a victim, a party, or an attorney, even if the juror claims to be free from bias. See Butts v. Commonwealth, 953 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Ky. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. McCombs, 304 S.W.3d 676 (Ky. 2009); Marsch v. Commonwealth, 743 S.W.2d 830 (Ky. 1987); and Ward v. Comonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Ky. 1985).
But in this case, Farmer has not established such a close relationship between the prospective jurors and Deputy Wright as to compel their exclusion from the jury. Juror # 31 was related to Deputy Wright by marriage and only had occasional social interaction with him. While Juror # 47 had a more established social relationship with Deputy Wright, she expressly testified that this relationship would not affect her view of his credibility. While Juror # 47 presents a closer question than Juror # 31, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to excuse her for cause. See Turner v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 823, 833 (Ky. 2005), overruled on other ground by Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2010) (Prospective jurors are not disqualified merely because they may have a "friendly" relationship with a police witness).
Farmer next argues that the trial court erred when it permitted Sergeant Gentry to testify that she refused to submit to a blood test. We disagree. KRS1 189A.105(2)(a) expressly permits the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that a person refused to submit to a blood test as evidence of DUI. Farmer does not suggest that Sergeant Gentry failed to comply with the statute's notice requirements prior to her refusal. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Ky. 2004). Rather, she only argues that the police were required to obtain a search warrant following her refusal to submit to a blood test.
In Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), the United States Supreme Court held that the natural metabolization of alcohol does not, by itself, constitute an exigent circumstance allowing the police to take a blood test without a person's consent or a search warrant. Id. at 1561-63. But in this case, no blood test was taken, and the Commonwealth never attempted to introduce evidence of a blood test taken without consent or a warrant. Moreover, Farmer does not challenge the admissibility of her refusal on self-incrimination grounds. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that implied-consent statutes do not violate the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565-66, 103 S.Ct. 916, 923-24, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Farmer's motion in limine to exclude Sergeant Gentry's testimony.
Finally, Farmer argues that the trial court improperly allowed the Commonwealth to present KRE2 404(b) evidence without sufficient notice. Approximately two days before trial, the Commonwealth filed a notice stating its intent to introduce evidence of Farmer's conduct after the accident. In particular, the Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence concerning her belligerent and uncooperative behavior toward the police, as well as Farmer's statement to and behavior toward victim Ashlynn Willoughby. Farmer argues that the Commonwealth's disclosure was untimely, and the trial court failed to consider whether the evidence was relevant or whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value.
With respect to the timeliness issue, the Commonwealth notes that RCr3 7.26 required it to produce any relevant witness statements "not later than forty-eight (48) hours prior to trial. . . ." Farmer does not suggest that the notice was untimely under the rule. She primarily argues that the evidence was not offered as proof of "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident" as required by KRE 404(b)(1).
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence by the trial court are not disturbed on review in the absence of an abuse in discretion. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 94, 9451 (Ky. 1999). Here, the evidence regarding Farmer's statements and demeanor immediately after the accident was "inextricably intertwined" with the evidence of the accident itself as to render its introduction unavoidable. Major v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700, 707 (Ky. 2005), citing Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1993). Furthermore, the evidence was relevant to establish Farmer's wanton mental state. And while the evidence cast Farmer in a bad light, we cannot say that it was so unfairly prejudicial as to outweigh its probative value. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the testimony.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Ohio Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
