JAMES S. MOODY, Jr., District Judge.
Petitioner was charged by Indictment with two counts of felon in possession of a firearm (Counts One and Four), conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine (Count Two), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (Count Three) (CR Dkt. 19). On November 20, 2012, Petitioner pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to Counts Two and Three of the Indictment
Petitioner signed his motion on March 4, 2014 (CV Dkt. 1 at p. 13). Petitioner challenges his conviction on Count Two of the Indictment, and raises two grounds for relief:
1) he was entrapped; and 2) there was insufficient evidence that he intended to distribute the cocaine.
First, Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted because they were not raised on direct appeal. A proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is to challenge the validity of a sentence, not evidentiary issues that should have been resolved on direct appeal. Williams v. U.S., 365 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 981 (1966). Petitioner is therefore barred from raising these claims in the instant motion because he should have raised them on direct appeal. See Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[A] defendant generally must advance an available challenge to a criminal conviction or sentence on direct appeal or else the defendant is barred from presenting that claim in a § 2255 proceeding. . .This rule generally applies to all claims, including constitutional claims.").
Moreover, these claims were waived by Petitioner's guilty plea. A knowing and voluntary plea of guilty waives any and all defenses, including entrapment, see United States v. Baxley, 402 F. App'x 461, 462 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), and any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Torres, 504 Fed. Appx. 810, 814 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument" is "not a jurisdictional argument" and therefore waived by guilty plea) (citation omitted).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner seeking a motion to vacate has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a certificate of appealability (COA). Id. "A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. at § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, Petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that "the issues presented were `adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n. 4 (1983)). Petitioner cannot make the requisite showing in these circumstances. Finally, because Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
Accordingly, it is
1. Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (CV Dkt. 1) is
2. The