MULLINS, J.
Plaintiff Linda Campbell appeals a jury's finding that defendant Jamiee Nicole Kinser was not negligent in getting her vehicle stuck on the railroad tracks. Campbell asserts the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence that Kinser was driving in violation of Iowa Code section 321.194 (2013) at the time of the accident. She also contends the trial court's failure to issue a jury instruction on this violation constituted error. We affirm the rulings of the trial court.
Campbell was a passenger in a train that collided with a pickup truck blocking a train crossing. Kinser was the driver of the truck who got the truck stuck after attempting to cross the tracks in deep snow several minutes before. Campbell brought suit to recover for the injuries she claimed she sustained due to Kinser's negligence.
Kinser was driving in violation of the limitations of her special minors' driver's license issued under section 321.194 at the time of the accident. Iowa Code § 321.194. The district court denied Campbell's efforts to claim Kinser's violation of her driver's license was either negligence per se or was evidence of negligence. The jury found for Kinser. Campbell has appealed.
We review errors in jury instructions for correction of errors at law. Herbst v. State, 616 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 2000). We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Clinton Physical Therapy Servs., P.C. v. John Deere Health Care, Inc., 714 N.W.2d 603, 615 (Iowa 2006).
Section 321.194 is, as argued, intended to restrict the driving of inexperienced drivers. Iowa case law on the subject of liability arising out of driving without a license is primarily in the context of contributory negligence or comparative fault issues. In automobile accident cases, our courts have consistently held that in the absence of a causal relationship between having no driver's license
See id.
Although Stumpf involved an effort by the defendant to claim an unlicensed plaintiff driver should be denied recovery because the plaintiff was not a licensed driver, the rationale behind the Stumpf decision and the cases cited in that decision are on point in this case in which Campbell seeks to use Kinser's lack of driving privileges at the time of that accident as proof of negligence. Campbell has been unable to demonstrate a causal relationship between Kinser's driving privilege status and the collision.
Accordingly, the district court correctly applied the law when it denied Campbell's request for a jury instruction based on Kinser's violation of section 321.194, and the court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow further evidence of Kinser's violation of section 321.194. We affirm the rulings of the trial court.