TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE.
Anthony McClister brings this appeal from a January 14, 2010, final judgment of the Adair Circuit Court sentencing him to eighteen-years' imprisonment and ordering him to pay $4,050 in restitution. We affirm.
McClister was indicted upon the offenses of second-degree burglary, theft by unlawful taking over $300, and with being a first-degree persistent felony (PFO) offender. While McClister was jailed awaiting trial, he physically struck a jail employee, threatened jail employees, and repeatedly kicked the door to his cell. Consequently, McClister was indicted upon the offenses of third-degree assault, third-degree criminal mischief, third-degree terroristic threatening, and for being a first-degree PFO.
McClister and the Commonwealth entered into a plea agreement as to both indictments. Thereunder, McClister pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary, theft by unlawful taking over $300, first-degree criminal mischief, third-degree assault, third-degree criminal mischief, third-degree terroristic threatening, and with being a second-degree PFO. In exchange, McClister was sentenced to a total of eighteen-years' imprisonment. In a separate restitution order, McClister was also ordered to pay $4,050 in restitution. This appeal follows.
McClister argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay restitution. Specifically, McClister claims that the trial court failed to comply with Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.033 as the restitution order did not set forth the amount and frequency of restitution payments. In reliance upon Rollins v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.3d 462 (Ky. App. 2009), McClister maintains that the trial court's restitution order is invalid for such oversight. We disagree.
KRS 532.033 provides:
KRS 532.033(4) requires the trial court to either specify the amounts and frequency of restitution payments or set forth a lump sum amount of restitution.
In its restitution order, the circuit court specifically held:
From the above order, it is clear that the trial court ordered McClister to pay $4,050 restitution within a reasonable time. We interpret the restitution order as requiring McClister to pay the lump sum amount of $4,050 and to pay said lump sum amount within a "reasonable time." As mandated by KRS 532.033(4), the restitution order set forth both the amount to be paid ($4,050) and set forth the time period for such payment (reasonable time). Consequently, we cannot say that the restitution order contravenes KRS 532.033.
Additionally, we do not view Rollins, 294 S.W.3d 462, as dispositive. Therein, the circuit court failed to set forth the exact amount of restitution but rather left the restitution amount open for future determination. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court's restitution order violated KRS 532.033(4) by not setting forth a specific restitution amount and was invalid. Id. By contrast, in our case, the restitution order set forth the amount of restitution and a time period for payment, thus complying with KRS 532.033.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that the restitution order is valid.
For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment of the Adair Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.