Filed: Jul. 22, 1997
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: Attorney Peter D. Prevett appeals from the, Per Curiam.monetary sanction.to deter Mr. Prevett from further abuse.court's management of its docket.Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir.reasonably required to deter the abusive behavior.district court's alternative ground: deterrence.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 97-1343
SPECIALIZED PLATING, INC. AND PETER D. PREVETT,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
Peter D. Prevett on brief pro se.
October 14, 1997
Per Curiam. Attorney Peter D. Prevett appeals from the
Per Curiam.
imposition of a sanction in the amount of $5,250, payable to the
court.1 In a previous unpublished opinion, Specialized Plating,
Inc. v. Federal Environmental Servs., Inc., No. 97-1343, slip op.
(1st Cir. July 22, 1997) (per curiam), we retained jurisdiction
and remanded for a more detailed explanation of the basis for the
monetary sanction. In response, the district court filed a
Report dated August 25, 1997. In the Report, the district court
identified two purposes underlying the monetary sanction: "to
reimburse the taxpayers for the abuse of the judicial system" and
"to deter Mr. Prevett from further abuse." Prevett filed a
supplemental memorandum challenging the district court's
reasoning and findings in various respects.
We do not dwell on the merits other than to say that we
credit the findings contained in the Report and conclude that a
monetary sanction is appropriate to deter repetition of the
conduct which the district court found to be unacceptable. See
supra note 1. We turn, then, to the size of the sanction.
Appellate review of the size of a monetary sanction is
for abuse of discretion. In that regard, "When the district
court settles upon a monetary sanction and fixes a dollar amount,
a reviewing tribunal should defer, within broad limits, to the
1The district court apparently imposed the sanction pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). The incident giving rise to the
sanction occurred when the attorney failed to appear for a
scheduled bench trial (without any satisfactory excuse). The
court sanctioned him as a condition of vacating the ensuing
dismissal.
2
district court's exercise of its informed discretion.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals must be careful not merely to
`rubber-stamp the decisions of the district court.' Appellate
review of the appropriateness of a sanction cannot be allowed to
deteriorate into a perfunctory ritual." Navarro-Ayala v. Nunez,
968 F.2d 1421, 1426 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
A monetary penalty payable to the court is a suitable
sanction for a Rule 16(f) violation that interferes with the
court's management of its docket. See Jones v. Winnepesaukee
Realty, 990 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1993). Still, we think that
Prevett raises a valid question as to the amount of the impost in
this instance.
In assessing the reasonableness of a sanction,
"proportionality is often a proxy for appropriateness." Navarro-
Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1427. In such purlieus, it is important that
"the punishment should be reasonably suited to the crime."
Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir.
1990). With due respect for the district court's considerable
discretion, we find the imposition of a $5,250 fine in this case
to be substantially disproportionate and, therefore, excessive.
We explain briefly.
We believe that we must evaluate the sanction
principally from the standpoint of deterrence.2 It is settled
2While a district court may sometimes tie a monetary
sanction to specific non-court costs that bear a direct
relationship to sanctionable misconduct, see, e.g., Eash v.
Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
banc), the district court here used an approach to such costs
3
that a "monetary sanction aimed at deterrence is appropriate only
when the amount of the sanction falls within the minimum range
reasonably required to deter the abusive behavior." Navarro-
Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1427; accord In re Kunstler,
914 F.2d 505, 523
(4th Cir. 1990). Here, given Prevett's representations about the
extent of his law practice, there is no reason to believe that a
sum somewhat smaller than $5,250 would not be a fully effective
deterrent. As in Navarro-Ayala, "[t]he violation deserved
punishment, but the sting of the lash could have been
communicated emphatically through a more modest penalty." 968
F.2d at 1428.
Where, as here, a monetary sanction, viewed as a
vehicle for deterrence against the backdrop of the record as a
whole, is excessive in amount, we have a choice of anodynes. We
may, of course, remand to permit the district court to refigure
the amount of the sanction, but we are not constrained to follow
such a course. See id. (citing Coats v. Pierre,
890 F.2d 728,
734 (5th Cir. 1989), and Cheek v. Doe, 828 F.2d 395, 398 (7th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). In this instance, the record on appeal
is reasonably complete and too much judicial time has already
been spent on counsel's regrettable lapse. Accordingly, this may
properly be classified as a case in which an appellate court,
rather than remanding, ought simply to recast the amount of the
sanction. Believing, as we do, that an amount of $1,000 "stands
that we find problematic. We therefore concentrate on the
district court's alternative ground: deterrence.
4
at the outer periphery of permissible sanctions in this case,"
Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1428, we reduce the amount of the
sanction from $5,250 to $1,000.
We need go no further.3 We affirm the imposition of a
monetary sanction payable to the court, but reduce the amount of
the sanction to $1,000.
Affirmed as modified. No costs.
Affirmed as modified. No costs.
3Prevett's request for rescission of the so-called
"answering service" sanction is moot because that requirement is
no longer in effect.
5
