WILLIAM D. QUARLES, JR., District Judge.
Feldman's Medical Center Pharmacy, Inc. ("Feldman's") and Pharmacy Management Associates, LLC ("PMA") sued Care-First, Inc ("CareFirst") and others
The Defendants are health insurers. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3-6, 76. The Association is a national federation that licenses 39 locally operated Blue Cross and Blue Shield companies, including CareFirst, a Maryland corporation, and Independence, a Pennsylvania corporation.
Feldman's is a Maryland corporation. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. In the 1970s, it began operating a retail pharmacy that dispensed specialty drugs.
In October 2007, PMA, a Maryland limited liability company, purchased Feldman's. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 60, 69. The pharmacy became "increasingly focused" on dispensing specialty drugs to treat hemophilia,
Before dispensing factor drugs to Care-First patients, Feldman's "checked the patients' benefits" and "received [an oral] precertification for the prescription from CareFirst." Am. Compl. ¶ 315. Feldman's began "submitting [reimbursement] claims for relatively large numbers of hemophilia patients" as its "business grew substantially in a short ... time." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 71, 128.
Sometime after PMA acquired Feldman's, CareFirst stopped paying the pharmacy's reimbursement claims.
On February 6, 2008, Sneed coordinated a conference call for medical directors of the Association's licensees. Am. Compl. ¶ 154. Before the conference call, Sneed distributed a memorandum about "whether it was possible to establish coverage and/or payment restrictions on [f]actor drugs due to the high cost of such drugs." Id. On February 12, 2008, Sneed asked all Association licensees for "data relating to the amount of payments made to pharmacies dispensing [synthetic factor]." Am. Compl. ¶ 157. The request "specifically excluded patients who received factor[s] from large, national, or institutional providers." Id.
CareFirst "regularly" told other Association licensees and law enforcement officials that Feldman's was committing fraud. Am. Compl. ¶ 186. The Food and Drug Administration (the "FDA") investigated
On February 20, 2008, the FDA closed its investigation after finding "no evidence of the suspected diversion." Am. Compl. ¶ 196. CareFirst continued to assert that Feldman's was diverting synthetic factors to the gray market, and denied payments to Feldman's. Am. Compl. ¶ 197.
On March 13, 2008, CareFirst's pharmacy director, Winston Wong, told Care-First's antifraud investigators that the company "had not found any real problems with Feldman's." Am. Compl. ¶ 160.
In April 2008, the National Health Care Antifraud Association hosted its annual pharmacy conference, where an agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") asked anyone "dealing with hemophiliacs to contact him." Am. Compl. ¶ 162. Hanson, CareFirst's investigator, attended the conference and contacted the FBI agent. Id. "[T]he FBI was not impressed with [Hanson's] information," and "never pursued a formal investigation of Feldman's." Am. Compl. ¶ 163.
On June 2, 2008, Independence asked Feldman's for "information and documents," and thereafter stopped paying Feldman's claims. Am. Compl. ¶ 108.
On June 19, 2008, CareFirst "officially" opened an investigation of Feldman's. Am. Compl. ¶ 164. CareFirst, Independence, and the Association interviewed "numerous" Feldman's employees and patients, and advised patients to "consider a switch" to pharmacy services operated by CareFirst's pharmacy benefit managers.
On June 26, 2008, CareFirst investigators conducted an on-site audit of Feldman's. Am. Compl. ¶ 169. Although the audit revealed no wrongdoing, CareFirst put a "hold" on all claims for reimbursement. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 170. CareFirst did not inform Feldman's of the hold, but advised other Association licensees not to pay Feldman's. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 177, 319. On "numerous occasions," CareFirst told Independence that it was denying claims because Feldman's had "improper licensure." Am. Compl. ¶ 178.
On August 21, 2008, CareFirst refused to renew its contract with Feldman's because it lacked a Residential Service Agency license (an "RSA license"). Am. Compl. ¶ 233. An RSA license is required under Maryland law to provide health care services in a patient's home. Am. Compl. ¶ 219. On August 22, 2008, a PMA employee emailed CareFirst to explain that Feldman's did not provide services in patients' homes and, thus, did not require an RSA license. Am. Compl. ¶ 234. Care-First continued to give Feldman's precertification for factor medicine claims, but denied reimbursement claims. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 240, 317-18.
On October 6, 2008, Hanson sent an email to CareFirst colleagues about Sneed
On December 11, 2008, Feldman's obtained an RSA license because of "Care-First's insistence," but CareFirst continued to deny reimbursement claims. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 236-37, 240.
On February 12, 2009, Hanson told Independence investigators that Feldman's lacked the proper license for dispensing factor drugs. Am. Compl. ¶ 298. On February 13, 2009, Independence told Feldman's that it had been rejecting claims because of CareFirst's determination that Feldman's "did not have the appropriate licensing." Id. Independence told other Association licensees that Feldman's lacked necessary licenses. Am. Compl. ¶ 227.
On March 25, 2009, Hanson wrote a memo to Stacy Bredenstein, CareFirst's associate director of network management, requesting that CareFirst investigators "be included in the decision whether to extend a new contract to Feldman's." Am. Compl. ¶ 214. Hanson cited "`possible diversion' as the reason for the scrutiny." Id.
On April 30, 2009, Hanson told Sneed in an email that "CareFirst had decided not to offer Feldman's a new contract and ... was just looking for the strongest ex post justification for its denial." Am. Compl. ¶ 215.
On June 1, 2009, Feldman's sued Care-First in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and bad faith. Feldman's Med Ctr. Pharmacy, Inc. v. CareFirst, Inc., 723 F.Supp.2d 814, 816 (D.Md.2010). Feldman's alleged that CareFirst had violated a 1997 provider agreement
On February 1, 2010, CareFirst removed the lawsuit to this Court. Id. at 817. CareFirst argued that, to the extent that Feldman's had sued as the assignee of CareFirst members, its claims were completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq., thus "providing federal question jurisdiction." Id.
On August 20, 2010, CareFirst agreed "to pay the claims at issue." See Feldman's Med. Ctr. Pharmacy, Inc. v. CareFirst, Inc., 823 F.Supp.2d 307, 313 (D.Md.2011).
On September 9, 2009, Feldman's and others sued Independence, QCC, and CareFirst in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for wrongful denial of "at least" $1.48 million in benefits, in violation of ERISA.
By May 13, 2011, Independence and QCC had "approved the payment of the... claims" and CareFirst had "disbursed the actual payments." Id. at *2.
After PMA acquired Feldman's, accounts receivable "ballooned" from $430,000 to more than $3 million. Am. Compl. ¶ 252. In March 2009, Feldman's "began to wind down its business." Am. Compl. ¶ 72. On April 16, 2009, Hanson told other Association licensees during a conference call that Feldman's was "a problem company." Am. Compl. HI 304-05.
By July 2009, accounts receivable at Feldman's had grown to $3.95 million, and Feldman's defaulted on its bank loans. Am. Compl. ¶ 252. On August 7, 2009, Hanson told an investigator with the Association's Louisiana licensee that Feldman's had filed for bankruptcy. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 187, 188, 302. It had not. Am. Compl. 11302.
On December 17, 2009, PMA sold all of Feldman's assets "at fire sale prices." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55, 145, 253.
On December 22, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed this action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. ECF No. 44 at 2. On January 18, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging that the Defendants had "participated in a scheme" to
On February 24, 2012, Independence and QCC removed the lawsuit to this Court, arguing that "all or part of the purported state law claims" are preempted by ERISA.
On March 2, 2012, Independence and QCC moved to dismiss the complaint. ECF No. 8. On March 5, 2012, CareFirst moved to dismiss. ECF No. 9. On March 19, 2012, the Association moved to dismiss. ECF No. 36.
On April 23, 2012, the Plaintiffs moved to remand, and opposed the motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 44, 45. On May 21, 2012, the Defendants filed a joint opposition to the motion to remand. ECF No. 49. On May 25, 2012, the Defendants filed a joint reply in further support of thenmotions to dismiss. ECF No. 51. On June 19, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a reply in further support of the motion to remand.
The Plaintiffs argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction — and must remand
The Defendants counter that the Court has jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs' claims "are based on allegations that [the] [Defendants improperly processed reimbursement requests for ERISA benefit claims." ECF No. 49 at 1. They argue that removal was proper under the complete preemption doctrine because the Plaintiffs' claims are "subsumed by" ERISA § 502(a) and cannot be resolved without reviewing ERISA plan documents. Id. at 3.
A party may remove to federal court "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The removing party bears the burden of showing that the district court has jurisdiction, see Strawn v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir.2008), and the Court "must strictly construe removal jurisdiction" because it "raises significant federalism concerns." Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148,151 (4th Cir.1994).
The district courts have federal question jurisdiction "of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Generally, removal on the basis of federal question jurisdiction is appropriate only if the plaintiffs "well-pleaded complaint" raises issues of federal law. Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir.2005). Thus, "state law complaints usually must stay in state court when they assert what appear to be state law claims." Id. at 441.
The complete preemption doctrine is a "narrow exception" to this rule. See Lontz, 413 F.3d at 439-40. Under this doctrine, "if the subject matter of a putative state law claim has been totally subsumed by federal law ... then removal is appropriate."
"ERISA's civil enforcement provision, § 502(a), completely preempts state law claims that come within its scope and converts these state claims into federal claims under § 502."
Under § 502, "[a] civil action may be brought ... by a participant
Healthcare provider claims are "usually not subject to complete preemption" because healthcare providers "generally are not considered `beneficiaries' or 'participants' under ERISA."
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have ERISA standing for the same reasons that Feldman's had standing in the Maryland Action:
ECF No. 49 at 5 (internal footnote omitted). The Defendants argue that the Maryland and Pennsylvania Actions challenged the Defendants' "processing of ERISA benefit claims under [the] purported assignments," and "[t]he only distinction in this case is that [the][P]laintiffs now seek the consequential damages Feldman's allegedly suffered as a result of how those same benefit claims were processed." Id.
Although they concede that Feldman's obtained assignments,
An assignee "stands in the shoes of [its] assignor," and only "has standing to assert whatever rights the assignor possessed."
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs allege "two primary categories of wrongdoing" that fall within the scope of § 502(a): the Defendants' (1) "untimely processing and reimbursement of Feldman's factor-related ERISA benefit claims," and (2) "alleged breach of fiduciary duty, by failing to administer ERISA plans solely in the interests of their participants." ECF No. 49 at 11. The Defendants contend that Feldman's "allegedly suffered harm in its status as an assignee" because of how the Defendants "processed the assigned ERISA benefit claims [that] Feldman's submitted for reimbursement." Id. at 12 n. 7.
The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants "gross[ly] misread[]" the amended complaint, which has "nothing to do with an ERISA plan, a particular claim, or a particular patient." ECF No. 44-1 at 20-21, 5. They contend that all their claims "relate to the interference by [the] Defendants in [their] business relationships[,] leading to the ultimate destruction of those business relationships and [the] Plaintiffs' business." Id. at 25.
"[H]ow a plaintiff denominates [its] claim does not determine whether [the
The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants destroyed the Plaintiffs' business by withholding payments on reimbursement claims, instigating frivolous investigations, spreading false rumors, and encouraging the Plaintiffs' customers to fill their prescriptions elsewhere. This differs from "[t]he core allegation underlying a § 502(a) claim" — that "a plan participant or beneficiary was denied a benefit ... or that the manner of administering the benefits caused the participants or beneficiaries some injury."
Although several claims refer to the Defendants' handling of reimbursement claims,
Because the Plaintiffs are not suing as the assignees of beneficiaries or participants, nor seeking to enforce a remedy under § 502, complete preemption does not apply.
For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs' motion to remand will be granted and the action, and all other pending motions, will be remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
The Court rejects the Defendants' apparent contention that, because Feldman's had assignee standing in the Maryland Action, the Plaintiffs necessarily have such standing in this lawsuit. See ECF No. 49 at 6 ("the 'question is whether the Appellants, at any time, asserted claims on behalf of ERISA beneficiaries'") (quoting Borrero v. United Healthcare of NY., Inc., 610 F.3d 1296, 1303 (11th Cir.2010) (emphasis added)). The Borrero passage cited by the Defendants merely paraphrases the Supreme Court's statement that standing depends on whether "an individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim" — i.e., the claim in the pending lawsuit — "under ERISA." See Borrero, 610 F.3d at 1301 (quoting Davila, 542 U.S. at 210, 124 S.Ct. 2488). The Borrero Court did not consider whether the claims asserted in separate litigation would have been within the scope of ERISA. Indeed, the Borrero Court made clear that standing was a casespecific inquiry, because "plaintiffs may choose to exclusively pursue their state law claims in state court, even against the backdrop of another set of potentially preempted claims." Id. at 1303; see also Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Inc. v. Cent. States Joint Bd. Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 538 F.3d 594, 598 (7th Cir.2008) ("Simply because at one point in time [the plaintiff] acknowledged an assignment from [a participant] does not mean that it simultaneously and implicitly gave up any claim(s) it had against [the defendant] apart from that assignment.").