THOMAS M. ROSE, District Judge.
The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman (doc. 13), to whom this case was referred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and noting that no objections have been filed thereto and that the time for filing such objections under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) has expired, hereby
Accordingly, it is hereby
MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding Plaintiff not "disabled" and therefore unentitled to Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and/or Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). This case is before the Court upon Plaintiffs Statement of Specific Errors (doc. 9), the Commissioner's Memorandum in Opposition (doc. 11), Plaintiffs Reply (doc. 12), the administrative record
This case involves Plaintiff's second application for disability benefits. Plaintiff initially filed for DIB and SSI in November 2003, alleging a disability onset date of February 1, 2003. PageID 103. After initial denials of his application, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ Daniel Shell. Id. In a written decision issued on February 22, 2007, ALJ Shell found Plaintiff not "disabled," see PageID 103-12, on the basis that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work
Thereafter, on February 20, 2008, Plaintiff filed a new application for DIB and SSI, claiming disability due to a pinched sciatic nerve and chronic back and leg pain. PageID 172-82, 199. It is this application which is the subject of the instant case.
After initial denials, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ James Knapp. Id. In a written decision issued on July 15, 2010, ALJ Knapp found Plaintiff not "disabled." See PageID 50-60. Specifically, ALJ Knapp's "Findings," which represent the rationale of his decision, were as follows:
PageID 53-60.
Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review, making ALJ Knapp's non-disability finding the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. PageID 43-45. See Casey v. Sec'y of H.H.S., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir.1993). Plaintiff then filed this timely appeal on May 22, 2012. Doc. 2.
At the June 2010 administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified before ALJ Knapp that he is 5'3" tall and weighs 150 pounds. PageID 69. He lives alone in an apartment. PageID 70. Plaintiff stated that he stopped driving in 2000 due to his license being revoked because of repeated DUIs. Id.
Plaintiff testified that he originally stopped working due to a pinched nerve in his back, which caused hip and leg pain. PageID 73. Plaintiff also testified that he had back surgery in July 2004, which resulted in back pain due to scar tissue. PageID 74. Plaintiff additionally testified to suffering from sciatica, resulting in hip pain which runs down his right leg to his ankle. PageID 75. Plaintiff stated that he is on pain medication, which helps to reduce his back and hip pain by approximately 30 percent. PageID 75.
Regarding his daily activities, Plaintiff testified that he performs household chores such as cooking, cleaning, dishwashing, sweeping, mopping, and laundry. PageID 78. On a typical day, besides doing chores, he takes naps and watches television. PageID 78-80. Plaintiff stated that he walks to the grocery store once or twice per week, and visits his children and aunt twice per week. PageID 79-80. Plaintiff testified that he smokes one pack of cigarettes daily, and drinks beer several times per week. PageID 77, 80.
Plaintiff testified that he is able to lift up to 35 pounds occasionally and 15 pounds frequently. PageID 79, 81. Plaintiff estimated that he could walk one block at a time without stopping. PageID 81. He also estimated that he could stand 15 minutes at a time, and sit 15-20 minutes at a time. Id.
Vocational Expert ("VE") Brian Womer also testified at the administrative hearing. PageID 87-90. The VE classified Plaintiffs past work as a parts clerk at the heavy, semi-skilled level; his work as a building maintenance repairer at the medium, skilled level; and his work as a dishwasher at the medium, unskilled level. PageID 91.
ALJ Knapp proposed a series of hypotheticals regarding Plaintiffs RFC to the VE. PageID 91-93. Based on Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and RFC, the VE responded that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work, but could nevertheless perform, in the regional economy, 3,000 jobs at the light exertional level and 1,500 jobs at the sedentary exertional level. Id.
The Court's inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). When substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found Plaintiff disabled. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir.2001). Thus, the ALJ has a "`zone of choice' within which he can act without the fear of court interference." Id. at 773.
The second judicial inquiry — reviewing the correctness of the ALJ's legal analysis — may result in reversal even if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir.2009). "[A] decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
To be eligible for DIB and/or SSI benefits, a claimant must be under a "disability" as defined by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a "disability" includes physical and/or mental impairments that are both "medically determinable" and severe enough to prevent a claimant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in "substantial gainful activity" that is available in the regional or national economies. Id.
Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the ALJ's review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir.2007), the complete sequential review poses five questions:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D.Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he or
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that ALJ Knapp erred by "finding that [his] back impairment had not worsened since the previous [ALJ]'s decision." Doc. 9 at PageID 782-85. Plaintiff claims that under Drummond v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir.1997), it was reversible error for ALJ Knapp to "essentially adopt[] the RFC of the previous ALJ's decision" with regard to Plaintiff's back impairment because "there was such a significant change, a worsening, in Plaintiff's back condition" since the prior administrative decision was issued in 2007. Id. at PageID 782-83. In that regard, Plaintiff also challenges ALJ Knapp's review of medical records by Plaintiffs treating primary care physician, Susan Franer, M.D. Id. at PageID 783-84.
Prior final decisions of the Commissioner which were not appealed are binding. Casey, 987 F.2d at 1232. As such, "Social Security claimants are bound by the principles of res judicata" Drummond, 126 F.3d at 841. In Drummond, the Sixth Circuit held that the Commissioner is bound by prior ALJ findings with regard to a claimant's disability application unless new evidence or changed circumstances require a different finding. Id. at 842; AR 98-4(6), 1998 SSR LEXIS 5, at *9, 1998 WL 283902, at *2-3. Accordingly, Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 98-4(6), issued by the Commissioner following the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Drummond, mandates that:
AR 98-4(6), 1998 SSR LEXIS 5, at *9, 1998 WL 283902, at *3.
It is the claimant's burden to present evidence showing that his or her symptoms have changed since the time of the ALJ's prior determination. See Casey, 987 F.2d at 1232-33. The Sixth Circuit has held that "when a plaintiff previously has been adjudicated not disabled, [he or] she must show that [his or] her condition so worsened in comparison to [his or] her earlier condition that [he or] she was unable to perform substantial gainful activity." Id. at 1232. See also McCracken v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:08-CV-327, 2009 WL 2983049, at *10 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 14, 2009) ("new and material evidence must document a significant change in the claimant's condition") (emphasis in original).
For instance, in September 2009, Plaintiff reported his pain as being 3 out of 10 (on a scale of 10), and Dr. Ahmed noted, "[Plaintiff] informed me that his injections have helped him and his last injection which was done in July is still giving him enough pain relief. He is taking his medication on a regular basis and that seemed to help him as well. He denies any new symptoms of numbness, weakness, and tingling." PageID 732.
Similarly, in November 2009, Plaintiff reported his pain as being "0-3" out of 10. PageID 726. At that time, Dr. Ahmed noted, "[Plaintiff] informs me that with the help of injection, he has found significant improvement of his pain. His back pain is pretty much resolved but he still has some right-sided hip pain. He is taking his medication as prescribed, and they seem to be controlling his pain very well." Id.
In February 2010, Plaintiff again rated his pain as being 3 out of 10, and Dr. Ahmed noted that "[Plaintiff's] pain symptoms are now under good control. He denies any new symptoms of numbness, weakness, and tingling.... Generally speaking, at this time, he seems to be doing reasonably well." PageID 721. Likewise, in April 2010 — in the most recent treatment note of record — Plaintiff again reported his pain as being 3 out of 10, and Dr. Ahmed noted, "[Plaintiff] informed me that he is managing his pain very well. His injection which was done in the month of January is still helping. He denies any new symptoms of pain, numbness, weakness, or tingling." PageID 762.
In light of the foregoing, and pursuant to Drummond, the Court finds ALJ Knapp's RFC determination supported by substantial evidence. ALJ Knapp properly considered the evidence of record, and made no error in adopting essentially the same RFC from the previous administrative decision with regard to Plaintiff's back impairment. Plaintiff has not met his burden under Drummond to show a significant worsening of his condition which would justify a new RFC. See Casey, 987 F.2d at 1232-33.
To the extent Plaintiff argues that ALJ Knapp improperly weighed the opinion of Dr. Franer, such an argument is without merit. Dr. Franer's October 2009 opinion — that Plaintiff's back problems are "deteriorating"; that Plaintiff can only work 7 hours in a workday; and that Plaintiff is "unemployable," see PageID 710-11 — is unsupported by the record, and is refuted by the notes of fellow treating physician Dr. Ahmed, which were recorded in the months immediately before and after the issuance of Dr. Franer's opinion. See, e.g., PageID 726-27, 732-33, 762-63.
While the medical opinions of treating physicians are generally entitled to greater weight than those of consulting physicians, a treating physician's conclusory statement — that the claimant is disabled
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiffs arguments unmeritorious, and the ALJ's non-disability analysis supported by substantial evidence.