NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

VANMETER, JUDGE.

Geraldine Sullivan appeals from the Anderson Family Court order which dissolved her marriage to Anthony Sullivan and incorporated by reference the parties' settlement agreement. For the following reasons, we affirm.

In March 2012, Geraldine and Anthony executed a settlement agreement which addressed all issues related to the dissolution of the parties' marriage, including custody, timesharing, and child support of the parties' two minor children. The agreement provided for Anthony to have sole custody of both children, with the parties to enjoy relatively equal timesharing. Pursuant to the agreement, the parties would not pay child support and would equally divide costs incurred for the children for daycare expenses, extracurricular activities, and summer programs. Geraldine would continue to provide health insurance for the children through her employer and the parties would equally divide costs of extraordinary medical expenses for the children. The agreement mandated that it be incorporated into the decree of dissolution and that the parties comply with its terms. While Geraldine was unrepresented at the time the parties executed the agreement, she signed an affidavit acknowledging her right to employ counsel prior to executing the agreement.

A month after the parties executed the agreement, Geraldine filed a motion to set aside the portions of the agreement relating to custody, timesharing, and child support. In her motion, she stated that she had full opportunity to review the agreement before she signed it and that she signed it in large part because she "just wanted to get it over with." She further stated that since execution of the agreement, the parties had not adhered to their equal timesharing schedule and that she has had more time with the children. She requested the family court to resolve the issues of custody, timesharing, and child support in light of the "best interests of the child" standard set forth in KRS1 403.270.

In response, Anthony pointed out that any discrepancy in the timesharing was temporary and attributable to the fact that he was currently attending the Lexington Police Academy, from which he was scheduled to graduate in early August 2012. He stated that after graduating, he had every intention of resuming the equal timesharing schedule set forth in the settlement agreement. Anthony emphasized that while Geraldine had reconsidered her position, the agreement was the result of careful consideration and negotiation between the parties rather than a "rash decision" as Geraldine now contends. He maintained that Geraldine had not presented any basis on which the court should set aside the parties' agreement.

At a hearing on May 15, 2012, both parties informed the family court that their circumstances had not changed since execution of the agreement. Thereafter, the court denied Geraldine's motion and declined to modify the agreement. The court elected to adopt the agreement in full, rather than conduct a separate evidentiary hearing on the issues of custody, timesharing, and child support, and entered a decree of dissolution incorporating by reference the terms of the agreement. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Geraldine argues that the family court abused its discretion by failing to make independent findings of fact concerning custody, timesharing, and child support following her repudiation of the agreement and before entry of the decree of dissolution. We disagree.

The intent of Kentucky's divorce laws is to promote the amicable settlement of disputes between parties attendant to their separation or dissolution of their marriage. 5 Ky. Prac. Methods of Prac. § 48:13 (4th ed. 2012). In accordance with that intention, KRS 403.180(1) authorizes parties to enter into a written settlement or separation agreement containing provisions concerning maintenance, division of property, and the custody, support, and visitation of minor children. The terms of a settlement agreement are binding on the court, with the exception of terms providing for custody, support, and visitation, unless the court finds that the parties' agreement is unconscionable, based on its review of the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant factors. KRS 403.180(2). If the court finds the agreement is unconscionable, it is not required to adopt the settlement agreement and may direct the parties to submit a revised agreement or may make such orders for disposition of property, support, and maintenance under the relevant and appropriate statutes. KRS 403.180(3).

Absent evidence of fraud, undue influence, or overreaching, the party seeking to set aside a separation agreement "must prove that the agreement is so one-sided as to be not just a bad bargain, but so clearly detrimental to the movant's interest as to create a prima facie case, i.e., a rebuttable presumption, that the agreement is manifestly unfair or inequitable." Shraberg v. Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d 330, 335 (Ky. 1997) (J. Cooper, concurring). "If the movant's evidence is insufficient to satisfy this burden, the motion to set aside the agreement must be denied." Id. Further, "the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a particular settlement agreement is manifestly unfair or inequitable." Id.

In the case at bar, Geraldine did not allege that the terms of the settlement agreement were unconscionable, i.e., that she was unaware of the content of the agreement or that its terms were in some way misrepresented to her. Instead, she stated that she simply changed her mind. Under these circumstances, the family court was in the best position to assess the fairness of the agreement and was not required to make independent findings of fact concerning the portions of the agreement which Geraldine challenged (regarding custody, timesharing and child support), absent proof the agreement was unconscionable. Since the family court had discretion to adopt the custody, timesharing and child support provisions, and Geraldine does not allege any other abuses of that discretion, the order stands.

The order of the Anderson Family Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.