Filed: Aug. 05, 1997
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: F. Michael Keefe, and , Jennifer R. Jones, on brief for appellant.initial motion.specific instances in which Congress has granted jurisdiction.United , States v. Blackwell, 81 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir.courts have no equity jurisdiction in criminal cases.the first time on appeal), cert.
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
No. 97-1240
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW ZSOFKA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges,
and Pollak*, Senior District Judge.
F. Michael Keefe
and
Jennifer R. Jones
on brief for appellant.
Paul
M.
Gagnon, United States Attorney, Mark
D.
Seltzer,
Director, New England Bank Fraud Task Force, and Paul J. Andrews,
Trial Attorney, New England Bank Fraud Task Force, on brief for the
United States.
Joan
McPhee, Heidi
Goldstein
Shepherd, and Ropes
&
Gray on
brief for Dime Savings Bank.
August 5, 1997
*Of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam
. Having carefully reviewed the record in this
matter, we are fully persuaded that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by the appellant in his
initial motion. Consequently, this appeal must be dismissed. We
explain briefly.
In general, federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction. In particular, a district court's authority to
revise a criminal defendant's sentence is restricted to those
specific instances in which Congress has granted jurisdiction.
See
United
States v. Blackwell, 81 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Angiulo,
57 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 1995).
In this instance, the appellant has not identified any
statute or rule conferring jurisdiction upon the district court to
hear and determine his motion to amend sentence (which was filed
more than three years after the imposition of sentence). Nor has
he identified any other plausible basis on which such jurisdiction
might be predicated. Instead, he tries to premise jurisdiction
over his motion on "the ongoing equity jurisdiction of [the
district] court." See Appellant's Reply Brief at 6. This effort
is unavailing; the appellant cites no pertinent authority in
support of the proposition and, as a general principle, federal
We emphasize that the appellant has resolutely refused to
characterize the motion in question which he terms a motion to
amend sentence as a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. S 2255
(1994). In point of fact, the appellant did bring a separate
section 2255 petition advancing substantially the same argument.
The district court denied the petition on October 21, 1996, and an
appeal of that ruling is presently pending in this court (No. 96-
2365). We take no view of that appeal in this proceeding.
2
courts have no "equity jurisdiction" in criminal cases.
That ends the matter. Because the district court lacked
jurisdiction to hear and determine the motion to amend sentence,
the court's order in respect thereto was a nullity, as were the
court's ensuing orders in regard to the various motions for
reconsideration and intervention.
We need go no further. The defendant's appeal is
summarily dismissed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.
Appeal dismissed
. All parties will bear their own costs
.
The fact that the district court purported to act is of no
moment. A jurisdictional defect of this kind may be noticed at any
time. See Fed R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2); see also United
States v.
DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1244 (1st Cir. 1996) (reaffirming that the
district court's supposed lack of jurisdiction may be raised for
the first time on appeal), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1109 (1997).
3
