NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

MAZE, Judge.

William R. Whitehouse appeals from an order of the Oldham Circuit Court which denied his motion for relief from a judgment of conviction pursuant to CR1 60.02. He argues that his guilty plea should be set aside because it was not the product of a knowing and intelligent choice. However, we agree with the trial court that Whitehouse was not entitled to assert this ground under CR 60.02. Furthermore, the record conclusively refutes Whitehouse's assertions regarding his guilty plea. Hence, we affirm.

On May 25, 2006, an Oldham County grand jury returned an indictment charging Whitehouse with Murder for wantonly causing the death of his four-month old daughter. Thereafter, on August 24, 2007, he entered a plea of guilty to an amended charge of first-degree Manslaughter. He also entered an Alford2 plea to an additional charge of first-degree Wanton Endangerment. In exchange for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth recommended a total sentence of 25 years' imprisonment, which the trial court imposed.

In 2010, Whitehouse filed a notice of intent to file an RCr3 11.42 motion, and a request for an extension beyond the three-year time limitation to file the motion. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court separately denied his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Whitehouse then appealed both rulings. This Court affirmed the trial court's latter holding, and thereafter Whitehouse failed to pay the filing fee. Consequently, his appeal was dismissed.

On September 13, 2012, Whitehouse filed his current motion for relief from his conviction pursuant to CR 60.02(e) & (f). The trial court denied the motion without appointing counsel and without a hearing. The court concluded that the motion was not brought within a reasonable time. The trial court also rejected Whitehouse's substantive arguments challenging the validity of the indictment and the validity of his guilty plea. This appeal followed.

CR 60.02 is an extraordinary remedy that is "available only when a substantial miscarriage of justice will result from the effect of the final judgment[.]" Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1966). In pertinent part, the rule authorizes a trial court to grant relief from a final judgment if, "the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application . . ." or for "any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief." CR 60.02 (e) & (f). A movant must demonstrate that "he is entitled to this special, extraordinary relief." Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion. White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000).

On appeal, Whitehouse argues that neither his trial counsel nor the trial court adequately explained the necessary elements of proof for the offenses of first-degree manslaughter prior to the entry of his guilty plea. He further asserts that the evidence would not have supported a conviction on this charge. Consequently, Whitehouse maintains that the guilty plea must be set aside because it did not represent "a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. App. 1986).

But as an initial matter, CR 60.02 may be used only in extraordinary circumstances not otherwise subject to relief by direct appeal or by way of RCr 11.42. Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856. In the present case, Whitehouse could have brought his claims regarding the validity of his guilty plea and challenging his trial counsel's advise to accept the guilty plea by way of an RCr 11.42 motion. Because Whitehouse failed to pursue those claims in that manner, he is precluded from raising the issues by way of CR 60.02.

Moreover, as the trial court pointed out, Whitehouse failed to substantiate his challenge to the validity of his guilty plea. During his plea colloquy, Whitehouse told the court that his trial counsel had explained to him the charges of first-degree manslaughter and first-degree wanton endangerment. Whitehouse also admitted to the court that, while he did not intend the death of the child, he did intentionally inflict the injuries that resulted in the child's death. Although the evidence may have supported a charge of second-degree manslaughter, as was the case in Barnhill v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-SC-000184-MR, 2012 WL 601224 (Ky. 2012), Whitehouse's plea colloquy contains sufficient facts to support the elements of the offense of first-degree manslaughter as set out in KRS4 503.030. Consequently, we find that his guilty plea was clearly the result of a knowing and voluntary choice.

Accordingly, the order of the Oldham Circuit Court denying Whitehouse's CR 60.02 motion is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.