Filed: Aug. 11, 1997
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: make out a prima facie case of age discrimination.argument and thus treat this as a nonreduction of force case.of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.3 (1st Cir.demonstrate pretext on Overseas' part.of this evidence was untimely presented to the district court.Hidalgo's Normal Retirement Date.
For the First Circuit
No. 96-2000
MANUEL T. HIDALGO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
OVERSEAS CONDADO INSURANCE AGENCIES, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Andres
Guillemard-Noble with whom Joan
S.
Peters and Nachman,
Santiago & Guillemard were on brief for appellant.
Jorge
E. Perez
Diaz with whom Pietrantoni
Mendez
& Alvarez was on
brief for appellee.
August 11, 1997
STAHL,
Circuit Judge
. Plaintiff-appellant Manuel T.
Hidalgo appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of defendant-appellee Overseas Condado Insurance
Agencies, Inc. on Hidalgo's claim for damages and equitable
relief pursuant to the Age Discrimination and Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. SS 621-634. Finding that plaintiff-appellant failed
to present evidence sufficient to meet his burden of persuasion
concerning unlawful age animus, we affirm.
Background
On January 15, 1963, Hidalgo and two partners formed
the Condado Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Condado"). Hidalgo
subsequently became the sole shareholder. In September 1982,
Hidalgo sold Condado to Royal Insurance Ltd. ("Royal"). After
the sale, Royal retained Hidalgo as president of Condado. Some
time later, Royal acquired Overseas Insurance Agencies, Inc.,
and, in 1988, merged this agency with Condado to form the
Overseas Condado Insurance Agencies, Inc. ("Overseas"). In the
process of the merger, Royal created the Condado Division of
Overseas and named Hidalgo president of the Division. The
Condado Division consisted of Hidalgo, Sagrario Maiz del Toro
(Hidalgo's secretary) and Doris Rodriguez (Hidalgo's
assistant). Dating from the sale of Condado to Royal,
Hidalgo's functions included promoting and servicing all of
Condado's existing accounts and acquiring new accounts.
On September 1, 1993, Hidalgo's sixty-fifth birthday,
Hidalgo was to become eligible to retire and receive normal
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benefits under Overseas' retirement plan. Approximately five
months before this date, on March 29, 1993, Victor Rios,
President of Royal and Chairman of Overseas, sent Hidalgo a
letter informing him that Overseas recognized that he would
become eligible for normal retirement benefits on September 1,
1993, and that Overseas expected him to retire on that date
"[i]n accordance with the company's established guidelines."
After receiving this letter, Hidalgo informed Rios
that he did not intend to retire on September 1. On July 2,
1993, Rios sent Hidalgo another communication informing him
that the Condado Division would cease to exist on September 1
because Overseas planned to integrate it into its "regular
operation." In this same communication, Rios instructed
Hidalgo that Overseas would wait until September 1 to allow him
to "fully qualify for . . . [his] pension plan," but that it
did not intend to extend his employment contract after that
date. On August 18, Hidalgo again informed Rios of his desire
to remain as president of the Condado Division. Rios replied
by offering Hidalgo an arrangement whereby he could function as
an "independent producer" with his compensation based on
commissions and bonuses. Hidalgo refused this offer.
Subsequently, Hidalgo filed complaints with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Department
of Labor and Human Resources of Puerto Rico. On December 30,
1993, the Department of Labor issued Hidalgo a Notice of Right
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to Sue. On March 10, 1994, Hidalgo filed in federal district
court the complaint which underlies this appeal. He alleged
that Overseas dismissed him from his job because of his age and
requested damages and equitable relief pursuant to the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 621-
634. Hidalgo also invoked the district court's supplemental
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367 for his state law
claims seeking compensation for age-based discrimination, 29
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, S 146 (1985).
On June 24, 1994, Overseas filed a Motion to Dismiss
or for Summary Judgment. On June 20, 1996, the district court
(Casellas, J.), treating the motion as a motion for summary
judgment, determined that Hidalgo failed to establish one of
the elements necessary to state a prima facie case of
employment discrimination under the ADEA. Notwithstanding this
determination, the court further ruled that Hidalgo failed
either to prove that Overseas' articulated legitimate reasons
for his dismissal were a "mere pretext" or to provide evidence
of discriminatory animus on Overseas' behalf. The court also
refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Hidalgo's state
law claims. Consequently, the court disposed of Hidalgo's
complaint in its entirety. This appeal ensued.
Standard of Review
1. We note that Hidalgo did not appeal the dismissal of the
state law claims he stated in his complaint.
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"[O]ur review of a grant of summary judgment is de
novo, [and] we, like the district court, are obliged to review
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
and to draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's
favor." LeBlanc v. Great
Am.
Ins.
Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st
Cir. 1993). "'An inference is reasonable only if it can be
drawn from the evidence without resort to speculation.'"
Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte,
Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 672 (1st Cir.
1996) (quoting Frieze v. Boatmen's
Bank
of
Boston, 950 F.2d
538, 541 (8th Cir. 1991)). The district court's award of
summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). "[T]o defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must establish a trial-worthy
issue by presenting 'enough competent evidence to enable a
finding favorable to the nonmoving party.'"
LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at
842 (quoting Goldman v. First
Nat'l
Bank
of
Boston, 985 F.2d
1113, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993)). "An appellate panel is not
restricted to the district court's reasoning but can affirm a
summary judgment on any independently sufficient ground."
Mesnick v. General
Elec.
Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.
1991).
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Discussion
Hidalgo makes two primary arguments. He first
argues that the district court erred in determining that he
failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
under the ADEA. He then contends that the district court
improperly concluded that he did not prove that Overseas'
reasons for dismissing him were pretextual and that Overseas'
actions derived from discriminatory animus. We address these
contentions in turn.
In an ADEA discrimination action, the plaintiff bears
the ultimate "'burden of proving that his years were the
determinative factor in his discharge, that is, that he would
not have been fired but for his age.'" Mesnick v. General
Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Freeman
v. Package
Mach.
Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335 (1st Cir. 1988)).
"[W]hen there is little overt evidence of age discrimination,
the case usually follows the ritualized burden-shifting
paradigm" set forth in McDonnell
Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842. Pursuant to
McDonnell
Douglas, a plaintiff must present a prima facie
2. Interspersed with these two arguments, in addition to being
designated in a separate section of his brief, is Hidalgo's
argument that the district court committed reversible error
because it viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, namely Overseas. Instead of analyzing this
assertion independently, we address it in the context of our
analysis of Hidalgo's two primary contentions concerning the
district court's disposition of his ADEA claim.
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"showing of certain standardized elements suggestive of
possible discrimination." Id.
In this circuit, McDonnell Douglas' burden shifting
paradigm assumes a slightly different form in age
discrimination cases depending on whether or not the dismissal
represented part of a reduction in force. If the plaintiff was
not dismissed as part of a reduction in force, the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating the following:
"(1) [he] was at least forty years of age, (2) [he] met the
employer's legitimate job performance expectations, (3) [he]
experienced adverse employment action, and (4) [he] was
replaced by a person with roughly equivalent job
qualifications."
Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117. With respect to
the fourth element necessary to establish a prima facie case in
a nonreduction in force scenario, "[i]t is enough for [the]
plaintiff to show that the employer sought some form of
replacement performance, which would demonstrate its 'continued
need for the same services and skills.'"
Kale v.
Combined Ins.
Co. of Am.
, 861 F.2d 746, 760 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting
Loeb v.
Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979)); see
Keisling v.
SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc.
, 19 F.3d 755, 760 (1st
Cir. 1994);
Vega v.
Kodak Caribbean, Ltd.
, 3 F.3d 476, 479 (1st
Cir. 1993). "A replacement need not be sought from outside the
company, of course, nor need he be designated formally as
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8
such." Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1013 n.11; see
Keisling, 19 F.3d at
760.
If the employer dismissed the plaintiff as part of a
reduction in force, the plaintiff "need not show replacement by
someone with equivalent job qualifications. Instead, to
satisfy element (4), the plaintiff may demonstrate either that
'the employer did not treat age neutrally or that younger
persons were retained in the same position.'" LeBlanc, 6 F.3d
at 842 (quoting Hebert v. Mohawk
Rubber
Co., 872 F.2d 1104,
1111 (1st Cir. 1989)).
The district court granted summary judgment in
Overseas' favor because it found that Hidalgo had failed to
make out a prima facie case of age discrimination. Although
3. In his opposition to Overseas' summary judgment motion and
his surreply to Overseas' response to his opposition, Hidalgo
argued that his termination was not part of a reduction in
force; he failed even to articulate an argument addressing the
potentiality that his dismissal was part of a reduction in
force. In his appellate brief, Hidalgo, for the first time,
insists that even if his dismissal occurred as part of a
reduction in force scenario, Overseas did not treat age
neutrally. "It is well established that this court will not
consider an argument presented for the first time on appeal."
Villafane-Neriz v.
F.D.I.C., 75 F.3d 727, 734 (1st Cir. 1996);
see Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc.,
989 F.2d 527, 531 (1st Cir.
1993); Clauson v. Smith,
823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir. 1987).
Because Hidalgo did not address the argument that his
termination constituted a reduction in force before the
district court, we will not consider his reduction of force
arguments on appeal. See Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
595
F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1979) (indicating that exceptions to
the general rule proscribing the assertion of arguments for the
first time on appeal exist only "'in horrendous cases where a
gross miscarriage of justice would occur'") (quoting Newark
Morning Ledger Co.
v.
United States
, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir.
1976)).
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9
the court regarded this case as presenting a reduction in force
scenario, it considered whether Hidalgo's claim had merit under
the law governing a non-reduction in force scenario as well.
The district court concluded specifically that Overseas did not
have a continuing need for someone of Hidalgo's skills, that
Hidalgo failed to establish that Overseas did not treat age
neutrally, and that Overseas did not retain younger persons in
the same position. The court further ruled that Hidalgo failed
to "properly show he was 'replaced by a person with roughly
equivalent job qualifications.'"
"While it is not clear to us that the court erred in
this regard, we prefer--because the question is so close--to
assume for present purposes that . . . [Hidalgo] did establish
a prima facie case within the McDonnell Douglas formulation."
LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 844;
see
Pages-Cahue v.
Iberia Lineas Aereas
de Espana
, 82 F.3d 533, 537 (1st Cir. 1996) (assuming, without
concluding, that plaintiff established a prima facie case
because doing so did not alter the ultimate outcome); Udo v.
Tomes,
54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1995) (same);
Mesnick, 950 F.2d
at 825 n.7 (same). Hidalgo lacks direct evidence that Overseas
terminated him because of his age, and the parties do not
dispute that he satisfied the first three of the four elements
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10
necessary to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas.
With respect to the fourth element at issue in this
case, Hidalgo presented, and the district court accepted,
evidence that subsequent to his dismissal, Overseas assigned
certain accounts for which Hidalgo had been responsible to
other Overseas employees who handled them in addition to the
work they performed prior to his dismissal. Hidalgo also
submitted evidence that subsequent to his termination Overseas
informed certain of his former accounts of its desire to
"continue servicing" them "as heretofore." It seems plausible,
viewing Hidalgo's evidence concerning the servicing of his
accounts by other Overseas employees after September 1, 1993
and Overseas' communications to at least one of his former
accounts in the light most favorable to him, see LeBlanc, 6
F.3d at 841, that Overseas had a "'continued need for the same
services and skills'" that Hidalgo offered before his
termination,
Kale, 861 F.2d at 760 (quoting
Loeb, 600 F.2d at
1013); see also
Keisling, 19 F.3d at 760 (quoting
Loeb, 600
F.2d at 1013). Specifically, like the plaintiffs in Loeb,
4. The parties do not dispute that Hidalgo was at least forty
years of age, that he met Overseas' legitimate job performance
expectations, and that he experienced adverse employment
action.
5. We find
Loeb,
Kale, and
Keisling particularly persuasive in
this context because they constituted nonreduction of force
cases. Despite Overseas' contention and the district court's
ruling that this case actually entailed a reduction of force,
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11
Kale, and Keisling, Hidalgo may well have met his burden
concerning the fourth element necessary to establish a prima
facie case under McDonnell
Douglas through evidence that
Hidalgo's "'job functions were absorbed by several different
employees of defendant.'" Kale, 861 F.2d at 760 (quoting
Loeb,
600 F.2d at 1013);
see
Keisling, 19 F.3d at 760. We recognize
we afford Hidalgo the benefit of the doubt for purposes of
argument and thus treat this as a nonreduction of force case.
6. In his Unsworn Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury, Rios
stated that "[n]obody performs the services that [Hidalgo] . .
. was performing or assumed his job responsibilities, as there
is no continued need for an individual of Mr. Hidalgo's skills
or who could provide the services he provided." This assertion
does not jibe with Rios' subsequent admission that certain
accounts for which Hidalgo had responsibility prior to his
termination "were assigned to other Overseas[] employees who
handle[d] them in addition to the work they performed before
the Condado [D]ivision was eliminated." Moreover, Hidalgo
presented testimony from employees of his former accounts
indicating that subsequent to his termination, Overseas
employees contacted them concerning these accounts. The fact
that certain of Hidalgo's former accounts were "handled" by
several other Overseas employees subsequent to his termination
would seem to satisfy the
McDonnell Douglas
' fourth requirement
for establishing a prima facie ADEA claim, at least as
interpreted in Loeb, Kale, and Keisling. We recognize that
LeBlanc stated specifically that "[a] discharged employee 'is
not replaced when another employee is assigned to perform the
plaintiff's duties in addition to other duties, or when the
work is redistributed among other existing employees already
performing related work.' Rather, '[a] person is replaced only
when another employee is hired or reassigned to perform
plaintiff's duties.'" LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 846 (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Barnes v. Gencorp
Inc., 896 F.2d
1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990)); see Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas
Aereas
de
Espana, 82 F.3d 533, 536 (1st Cir. 1996) (same).
LeBlanc,
Barnes and
Pages-Cahue, however, constituted reduction
of force cases, and, thus, the analytical construct they set
forth with respect to McDonnell
Douglas' fourth element does
not appear as persuasive as that of
Loeb,
Kale, and
Keisling in
a nonreduction of force scenario.
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12
that this evidence is not overwhelming; however, as in
LeBlanc,
see 6 F.3d at 844, we assume, without concluding, that Hidalgo
has satisfied
McDonnell Douglas
' fourth element, mindful of the
fact that "'the burden of making out a prima facie case is 'not
onerous.'" Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting
Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs
v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981)).
"Establishment of the prescribed prima facie case
creates a presumption that the employer engaged in
impermissible age discrimination." LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842.
Once a plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant "to rebut
the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that
the plaintiff was rejected . . . for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. "The
employer's burden at this stage is one of production; the
burden of persuasion remains plaintiff's at all times."
Lawrence v. Northrop
Corp., 980 F.2d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 1992).
The parties in this case do not dispute that Overseas met its
burden of production and offered non-discriminatory rationale
for its decision to terminate Hidalgo.
In rebutting Hidalgo's claim of age discrimination,
Overseas advanced two nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions. First, Overseas indicated that it decided to
eliminate the Condado Division, and thus terminate Hidalgo's
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13
position as president of the Division, because the Division had
become unprofitable since 1990. Second, according to Overseas,
"various insurance agents and brokers who placed policies with
Royal were complaining that the Condado Division, and
particularly Mr. Hidalgo, was interfering with some of its
[sic] clients. These actions affected Royal's business
relationship with these independent brokers and agents, some of
which were among the largest in Puerto Rico and responsible for
a substantial part of Royal's business."
"'If the defendant carries the burden of production,
the presumption raised by the prima facie cases is rebutted,'
and 'drops from the case.'" St.
Mary's
Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (internal citations omitted) (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 255 n.10). The plaintiff then
"retains the burden of persuasion."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
"In the context of a summary judgment proceeding, Hicks
requires that, once the employer has advanced a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory basis for its adverse employment decision,
the plaintiff, before becoming entitled to bring the case
before the trier of fact, must show evidence sufficient for the
factfinder reasonably to conclude that the employer's decision
to discharge him . . . was wrongfully based on age."
LeBlanc,
6 F.3d at 843; see
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 ("[A] reason cannot
7. The Hicks decision, unlike this decision, derived from an
appeal of a bench trial.
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14
be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination' unless it is
shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination
was the real reason."); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[W]hen, as here, the
employer has articulated a presumptively legitimate reason for
discharging an employee, the latter must elucidate specific
facts which would enable a jury to find that the reason given
was not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the
employer's real motive: age discrimination."); Mesnick, 950
F.2d at 825 ("[I]n a case where the first two steps of the
McDonnell
Douglas pavane have been satisfactorily
choreographed, a plaintiff must offer
some minimally sufficient
evidence, direct or indirect, both of pretext and of the
employer's discriminatory animus to prevail in the face of a
properly drawn Rule 56 motion.") (emphasis added); see also
Sanchez v. Puerto
Rico
Oil
Co., 37 F.3d 712, 720 (1st Cir.
1994);
Woods v.
Friction Materials, Inc.
, 30 F.3d 255, 260 (1st
Cir. 1994). Thus, Hidalgo "now must . . . demonstrate that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment
decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of
persuading the court that . . . [the plaintiff] has been the
victim of intentional discrimination."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at
256; see
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 515.
At this stage, "the
facts that comprised plaintiff's
prima facie case may be considered, but the inference of
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15
discrimination originally attributable to those facts no longer
pertains." Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 720. "Direct or indirect
evidence of discriminatory motive may do, but 'the evidence as
a whole . . . must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to
infer that the employer's decision was motivated by age
animus.'"
Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Connell v. Bank
of Boston
, 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.3 (1st Cir. 1991)),
quoted
in
LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 843. "Thus, the plaintiff cannot avert
summary judgment if the record is devoid of adequate direct or
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of
the employer."
LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 843.
Hidalgo offered circumstantial evidence to
demonstrate both that Overseas' stated reasons for his
termination was pretextual and that it was pretext for
discriminatory age animus. While we find that Hidalgo failed
to produce evidence sufficient to meet his ultimate burden of
persuasion,
see
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, we present Hidalgo's
evidence in detail in light of his contention that the district
court failed to consider this evidence in the light most
favorable to his claim. In his Unsworn Declaration Upon
Penalty of Perjury, Hidalgo indicated that between 1984 and
1986, the net underwriting profit for the Condado Division
climbed from $249,803.00 to $422,826.00. Hidalgo did not
present figures for the period after 1988, when the Overseas
and Condado operations merged, because, according to Hidalgo,
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16
Overseas failed to make these figures available upon his
request. Yet, he did state in his Unsworn Declaration that
Overseas underestimated the profitability of the Condado
Division since 1990. Hidalgo contends that Overseas' failure
to provide the figures concerning the profitability of the
Condado Division, combined with his testimony concerning
additional profits stemming from the Division, suffices to
demonstrate pretext on Overseas' part.
Hidalgo also submitted two communications from his
supervisor, Ramon Lozada, dated April 10, 1991 and January 16,
1993, as proof of Overseas' enthusiasm for Hidalgo's work as
president of the Condado Division and its belief that his
prospects with Overseas were excellent. In addition, Hidalgo
declared in his Unsworn Declaration that as a member of the
Overseas Board of Directors, he was present at a March 25, 1993
meeting during which the alleged unprofitability of the Condado
Division was never discussed. Hidalgo also stated in his
Unsworn Declaration that it was not until he informed Overseas
that he did not intend to retire on September 1 that Overseas
informed him that his termination constituted part of a plan to
eliminate the Condado Division effective September 1.
Hidalgo offered evidence that immediately after his
dismissal and the elimination of the Condado Division,
Rodriguez on several occasions performed some of the tasks that
she previously had performed as his assistant. According to
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17
Hidalgo, this activity, considered in conjunction with the fact
that certain accounts for which he previously was responsible
remained with Overseas and were attended to by other Overseas
employees after his dismissal, demonstrated that the Condado
Division "continued to function as before, albeit under a
different name." Hidalgo insists that this evidence
"combine[d] to prove that defendant's alleged reason, a
decision to close the Condado Division, was a sham, masking
defendant's illegal age discrimination."
Hidalgo finally maintains that Overseas never
informed him of the alleged complaints of brokers and agents
concerning his interference with their business. Instead,
Hidalgo offered an evaluation of his work that Lozada prepared
on January 16, 1993 (slightly more than two months before Rios
informed him that Overseas expected him to retire effective
September 1) in which he received the best possible ratings in
all categories, including the category labeled: "How
successful is he in getting along with people in his day-to-day
work relationships?" In fact, the evaluation indicated that he
"stands out as being among the best . . . known" and that he
"will qualify for advancement beyond the next higher job
classification or level of responsibility." Hidalgo insists
that this evidence "raises a genuine issue of fact as to
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whether age discrimination motivated the retirement or the
dismissal decision of defendant."
We doubt that the evidence that Hidalgo submitted,
taken in the light most favorable to his claim,
see
LeBlanc, 6
F.3d at 841, demonstrates that Overseas' asserted reasons for
dismissing him were pretextual, see Lehman v. Prudential Ins.
Co.
of
Am., 74 F.3d 323, 330 (1st Cir. 1996). We note,
however, that Hidalgo cites Mulero-Rodriguez to support his
pretext argument. In Mulero-Rodriguez, the plaintiff, a
director of the defendant corporation, stated in his deposition
testimony that the defendant never informed him of its
dissatisfaction with his ability to assure an inventory level
8. Overseas argues that much of the evidence Hidalgo submits
to demonstrate pretext and age-based animus fails to comply
with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) and thus should
not be considered on appeal. Overseas also contends that much
of this evidence was untimely presented to the district court.
Given the ultimate disposition of this appeal, we deem it
unnecessary to address these arguments. We assume for the sake
of argument, without concluding, that the evidence Hidalgo
submitted satisfies the minimum requirements of Rule 56(e).
9. In addition to Mulero-Rodriguez, Hidalgo cites Hebert and
Woodman v.
Haemonetics Corp.
, 51 F.3d 1087 (1st Cir. 1995), to
support his contention that the evidence he submitted sufficed
to demonstrate a material issue of fact concerning pretext. In
these cases, however, the evidence that the plaintiffs
submitted to demonstrate pretext was far more extensive and far
more persuasive than the evidence Hidalgo presents in this
instance. See
Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1093 (discussing not only
performance evaluations but also defendant's admission of
disfavoring older employers as creating a reasonable inference
of pretext for intentional age discrimination);
Hebert, 872
F.2d at 1115 (listing employer's failure to inform plaintiff of
adverse feedback on his work as only one of many pieces of
circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff submitted in
addition to statistical evidence).
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necessary for the smooth operation of the business. See 98
F.3d at 675. The plaintiff also indicated that the defendant
failed to produce "business records in any way reflecting a
shortage [of inventory] or lost sales or income based thereon."
Id. Considering only this evidence, the
Mulero-Rodriguez court
determined, "giving credence to [the plaintiff's] . . .
testimony," that the issue of pretext "should be left to the
factfinders." Id.
Much like the plaintiff in
Mulero-Rodriguez, Hidalgo
testified in his Unsworn Declaration both that Overseas never
informed him of the alleged complaints against him and that
Overseas failed to produce any business records supporting its
allegation of the Condado Division's unprofitability. While we
doubt that these similarities suffice to demonstrate pretext on
Overseas' part, we recognize that this is a close call and,
therefore, we assume, without deciding, that Hidalgo
established pretext. See
Udo, 54 F.3d at 13 (assuming
arguendo
that employer's action was pretextual). We thus "turn directly
to the question of whether [Hidalgo] . . . can show that the
real reason [for his dismissal] was age discrimination." Id.
at 676.
In this case, "even if [Hidalgo] . . . fashioned a
triable issue as to pretext, there was . . . no 'significantly
probative' evidence to show that the pretext masked age
discrimination." Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 9 (quoting
Anderson
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v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc.
, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). Hidalgo
offered no evidence that reasonably could be construed to
indicate that Overseas intended to discriminate against him
because of his age. None of Hidalgo's evidence concerning
either the profitability of the Condado Division or Overseas'
failure to inform him of the alleged complaints against him by
brokers and agents points to any age
related
animus on
Overseas' behalf. Similarly, the evidence concerning the
ongoing servicing of Hidalgo's former accounts by Overseas
employees, including Rodriguez's work on these accounts, and
Overseas' apparent satisfaction with his performance, though
perhaps indicative of pretext on Overseas' part, does not
evidence any
age-based discriminatory intent
. As we previously
have stated, "[t]he 'ADEA does not stop a company from
discharging an employee for any reason (fair or unfair) or for
no reason, so long as the decision to fire does not stem from
the person's age.' Courts may not sit as super personnel
departments, assessing the merits--or even the rationality--of
employers' nondiscriminatory business decisions."
Mesnick, 950
F.2d at 825 (internal citations omitted) (quoting
Freeman, 865
F.2d at 1341).
The only circumstantial evidence that Hidalgo sets
forth bearing upon Overseas' regard for his age comprises the
memorandum Rios sent to him on March 29, 1993 informing him
that Overseas, "[i]n accordance with the company's established
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21
guidelines . . . fully expect[ed]" him to retire when he became
eligible for normal retirement benefits on September 1, 1993.
Hidalgo makes much of this letter in light of the Royal
Retirement Plan's provision that despite the fact that Royal
employees' "Normal Retirement Date" was the first day of the
month after they turned sixty-five, if an employee "decide[d]
to continue working past [his] . . . Normal Retirement Date,
[he could] . . . do so."
This evidence does not "raise a genuine issue of fact
as to whether discrimination motivated the adverse employment
action." Olivera v. Nestle
P.R.,
Inc., 922 F.2d 43, 50 (1st
Cir. 1990). The reasonable inference,
see
Mulero-Rodriguez, 98
F.3d at 672, deriving from this evidence is that Overseas
expected its employees to retire when they became eligible for
normal retirement benefits at the age of sixty-five. The Royal
Retirement Plan indicates that the normal retirement date for
Overseas employees falls at or near their sixty-fifth birthday.
Overseas' March 29 letter to Hidalgo indicated its expectation
that Hidalgo would retire on or near his Normal Retirement
Date. We thus do not believe that the March 29 letter
constituted "'significantly probative,'"
Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d
at 9 (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50), "probative,"
Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 720, "adequate,"
Mulero-Rodriguez, 98 F.3d
at 673, "sufficient,"
LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 849, or even
"minimally sufficient,"
Vega, 3 F.3d at 479, circumstantial
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22
evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find discriminatory
animus on Overseas' part, see Lehman, 74 F.3d at 330
(concluding that the plaintiff's "evidence, taken at its best,
was insufficient to show that . . . [the defendant] was
motivated by age discrimination");
see
also
LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at
846-49;
Goldman, 985 F.2d at 119-21;
Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 826;
Menard v.
First Sec. Servs. Corp.
, 848 F.2d 281, 289 (1st Cir.
1988). In our view, the fact that Overseas expected Hidalgo to
retire when he became eligible for his normal retirement
benefits would not permit a jury determination that Overseas
was motivated by age animus when it decided to dismiss Hidalgo.
See
Udo, 54 F.3d at 14 (finding letter employer sent to
employee informing him that employer expected him to retire
when he turned sixty-five did not evidence age animus on
employer's behalf).
When considered in the context of the record evidence
as a whole, see Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 n.3; see also
Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1119 ("[T]he totality of the circumstances
must permit a reasonable inference that the employer's
justification for the challenged action was pretext for age
discrimination."), viewed in the light most favorable to
Hidalgo, see LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841, the March 29 letter and
the Royal Retirement Plan still would not suffice to allow a
jury reasonably to find that Overseas exhibited age-based
animus in this case. Overseas sent Hidalgo the letter
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concerning its expectation that he retire on his Normal
Retirement Date more than five months prior to his sixty-fifth
birthday and repeatedly declared its intention to take no
action that would interfere with his ability to qualify for
normal retirement benefits. On July 2, 1993, Overseas
explained to Hidalgo its independent business decision to
eliminate the Condado Division effective September 1, 1993,
which accommodated the full vesting of his pension plan.
Despite its decision to eliminate the Condado Division, on
August 19, 1993, Overseas offered to employ Hidalgo as an
independent producer, with compensation based on commission and
bonuses. Hidalgo rejected these offers, and, on September 1,
Overseas implemented the plan it had enunciated to Hidalgo on
July 2 to eliminate the Condado Division as a separate entity.
Contrary to Hidalgo's assertions, we believe the only
inference that the evidence in the record supports, without
improper speculation on our part, is that Overseas simply timed
its elimination of the Condado Division to dovetail with
Hidalgo's Normal Retirement Date. This would be entirely
appropriate. See Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1118 n.4 ("[A] 'mere
showing that the employer's articulated reason may shield
another (possibly nondiscriminatory) reason does not create a
dispute of material fact' sufficient to withstand summary
judgment.");
Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825;
see
also
Udo, 54 F.3d at
14 (finding letter expressing employer's expectation that
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employee would retire at age sixty-five insufficient evidence
of discriminatory age animus to withstand summary judgment
where employer subsequently articulated nondiscriminatory
rationale for dismissing employee).
As we previously have noted, "the material creating
the factual dispute must herald the existence of 'definite,
competent evidence' fortifying the plaintiff's version of the
truth. Optimistic conjecture . . . or hopeful surmise will not
suffice." Vega, 3 F.3d at 479 (internal citations omitted)
(quoting
Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822). In this case, Hidalgo's
arguments "are based largely upon . . . improbable inferences[]
and unsupported speculation,"
LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 849, and thus
fall short. In light of the evidence in the record, viewed in
the light most favorable to Hidalgo, we do not believe that a
trier of fact could conclude that Overseas unlawfully
discriminated against Hidalgo. We thus affirm the district
court's award of summary judgment in favor of Overseas.
Costs to Appellee.
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