MARC T. TREADWELL, District Judge.
Defendant Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General of the U.S. Postal Service, has moved for summary judgment. Doc. 17. The motion is
On December 27, 2016, Plaintiff Shekita T. Maxwell, proceeding pro se, filed this complaint against Defendant Megan J. Brennan, in her capacity as Postmaster General of the U.S. Postal Service, alleging Maxwell suffered discrimination, disparate treatment, and a hostile work environment based on both her race and gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
A court shall grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citation omitted). A material fact is any fact relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. And a factual dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non[-]moving party." Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party." Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation and punctuation marks omitted).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden to show that there is no issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may make this showing by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," or by showing that the non-movant cannot produce admissible evidence to support the issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). If the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party must produce evidence showing that an issue of material fact does exist. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. To do so, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and identify "specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)-(3). However, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citation omitted).
Drawing all inferences in favor of Maxwell where possible, the facts of this case are as follows. On April 4, 2015, Maxwell, an African-American female, began working with the United States Postal Service as a postal support employee (PSE) sales, services, and distribution associate. Doc. 9 at 51, 355. Maxwell's employment was only temporary with her appointment scheduled to end on March 28, 2016. Id. Moreover, her employment included a three-month probationary period, which, for Maxwell, would have ended on July 3, 2016. Id. However, her temporary employment proved to be much shorter, and more tumultuous, than expected, lasting only until May 7, 2015. Id. at 348.
Maxwell first worked at her assigned worksite location, the Zebulon Road Post Office in Macon, Georgia, on April 8, 2015 after completing orientation. Docs. 9 at 364; 19 at 15:3-16. Soon after this, Maxwell started having issues with two of her coworkers, Bonnie Hester and Jacqueline Epps, both of whom were white. Docs. 9 at 227-231; 19 at 32:6-14. Epps and Hester, who, according to Maxwell, had a history of treating other African-American employees poorly, allegedly harassed Maxwell by "fussing" at her, "arguing" with her, "jumping in [her] face," and saying discriminatory comments, including Hester telling Maxwell she did not like "her kind," meaning African-Americans, and Epps telling Maxwell that "White people run this!" Docs. 1 at 11; 19 at 32:9-11, 34:21-35:2, 51:24-53:5. The relationship between Maxwell and her coworkers continued to sour, and Maxwell complained about the harassment to her supervisor, Marcus Daniels. Docs. 1 at 4; 19 at 95:10-16. Maxwell claims that Daniels, who is also African American, told her he "did not like black females" and that he would not side with her against Hester because people would think he favored African-American employees. Docs. 1 at 4; 9 at 38; 19 at 95:4-7, 95:10-16. In addition to her issues with coworkers, two weeks into her nearly one-month employment with the Postal Service, Maxwell learned she was pregnant. Docs. 9 at 100; 19 at 88:15-18. And, after notifying the Postal Service of this, she was placed on work restrictions, although Maxwell claims those restrictions were not sufficient. Doc. 19 at 89:8-25.
On April 23, 2015, 15 days after Maxwell began working at the Zebulon Road facility, Maxwell and Hester had a disagreement related to mail sorting activities, and, in response, management met with the two, along with a union representative, to resolve the dispute in accordance with the Postal Service's standard operating procedures. Doc. 17-2 ¶¶ 9-10. The issue was resolved, but then, on April 25, Maxwell and Epps engaged in a heated altercation because Maxwell was upset that Hester moved a work-related item in Maxwell's workspace; co-workers had to physically separate Maxwell and Epps as a result. Docs. 9 at 227-231, 347; 17-2 ¶¶ 3, 12, 14. Once separated, Maxwell, Hester, and Epps were brought into a conference room to discuss the incident with two supervisors and a union representative. Doc. 17-2 ¶¶ 15-16. After Epps entered the room, she made a "gesture" toward Maxwell who then "assumed a `defensive yet aggressive posture.'" Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Doc. 9 at 227-231). Daniels then sent all three women home for the day. Docs. 9 at 245; 17-2 ¶ 17. After this altercation, Maxwell was placed on emergency leave. Doc. 9 at 227-231, 347. Management then requested that the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the Employee Assistance Program send a Threat Assessment Team to investigate the situation. Doc. 17-2 ¶ 18.
After an investigation and review of the facts, Hester was given a warning letter, and Epps was suspended for 14 days. Docs. 9 at 245; 17-2 ¶ 19. But Daniels determined that, because Maxwell had been "extremely aggressive" towards Daniels and others, it was appropriate to terminate Maxwell's probationary employment; thus, Maxwell was fired for failing to "maintain harmonious working relationships" and for "contribut[ing] to an unpleasant working environment." Doc. 9 at 347-48. She received a Notice of Termination During Probation on May 7, 2015. Docs. 9 at 348; 17-2 ¶ 21. After her termination, Maxwell unsuccessfully pursued several administrative remedies against her former employer. See Docs. 1 at 10; 17-2 ¶ 5; see generally Doc. 9. Maxwell then filed this action, stating claims under Title VII, specifically that she suffered discrimination, disparate treatment, and a hostile work environment.
Maxwell alleges that she suffered discrimination and disparate treatment based on both her gender and her race in violation of Title VII. To survive summary judgment on either claim, she may rely on "direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or [ ] statistical proof." Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008). When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the court determines the sufficiency of her claim through the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Accordingly, the Court must first determine whether Maxwell presents direct evidence of race or gender-based discrimination.
Direct Evidence is that which, "if believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact in issue without interference or presumption." Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). Direct evidence of employment discrimination shows, without inference, that a decision-maker was motivated by illegal reasons, like racial animus, in doling out an adverse employment decision. Quigg v. Thomas County School Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1236 n.5 (11th Cir. 2016); Williamson v. Adventist Health Sys/Sunbelt, Inc., 372 F. App'x 936, 940 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004). Remarks that are isolated and "unrelated to the challenged employment decision" do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 2002). And "[i]f an alleged statement at best merely suggests a discriminatory motive, then it is by definition only circumstantial evidence." Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, direct evidence is limited to "[o]nly the most blatant remarks" that can only be interpreted to show the decision-maker was motivated to "discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor." See Quigg, 814 F.3d 1227, 1242 n.11 (alterations in original) (quoting Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1086) (explaining that a school board member's statement that "it is time we put a man in there" was not direct evidence that a female superintendent was fired for illegal reasons because the statement could be interpreted not to refer to that employment decision and, even so, an inference was still required to reach that conclusion); see also Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 (11th Cir. 1998) ("We have held that statements that are open to more than one interpretation do not constitute direct evidence of racial discrimination.").
There is no direct evidence that Maxwell was discriminated against because of her gender and pregnancy. Doc. 19 at 31:19-23. But, construing her allegations liberally, Maxwell alleges that two statements by her former supervisor, Marcus Daniels, are direct evidence that her employment was terminated for discriminatory reasons.
The need for inference to link Daniels's comment to Maxwell's termination is even greater given the two events that transpired the last three days Maxwell worked. The April 23 and 25 incidents, which nearly came to physical violence, led to the involvement of other management personnel, union officials, and a Threat Assessment Team from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service that investigated those incidents. Doc. 17-2 at ¶¶ 9-10, 12, 14-16, 18. Thus, these intervening events and involvement of other Postal Service officials further show Daniels's statement to be isolated and unrelated to Maxwell's termination. See Rojas, 285 F.3d at 1342-43.
Additionally, Maxwell alleges that Daniels told her: "I do not like Black Women that is why I married a Mexican. She knows when to be quiet." Doc. 1 at 4; see also Doc. 19 at 95:4-7. This statement suggests—or even establishes—a bias on Daniels's part, but an inferential step is still required to move from that bias to the conclusion that any adverse employment action was carried out as a result. Like Daniels's other statement, there is no evidence that this statement was made in connection with Maxwell's termination or the termination process. See Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 19 at 95:4-7. Thus, a jury would have to infer from this statement that Maxwell's termination was a result of Daniels's bias towards black women, and, accordingly, the Court finds Maxwell has presented no direct evidence of discrimination.
The dearth of direct evidence is not fatal, to Maxwell's case, however, because she also attempts to present circumstantial evidence of discrimination and disparate treatment. Specifically, she alleges that her white coworkers were not disciplined in the same manner that she was for similar conduct. Thus, her claim must be evaluated under the McDonnel Douglas framework.
Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the test for which differs slightly depending on the nature of the claim. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production, but not the burden of persuasion, shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). A plaintiff then has the opportunity to show that the employer's stated reason is in fact pretext for discrimination. Id.
Maxwell has not met her initial burden to establish a prima facie case for either race discrimination or disparate treatment. To recover under either theory, Maxwell must establish that she was treated differently than similarly situated individuals outside of her protected class.
When she was fired, Maxwell's employment was less than a month into a temporary employment, scheduled to end on March 28, 2016, while both Hester and Epps were permanent employees. Docs. 9 at 51, 227-31, 355, 383; 19 at 47:2-25. Moreover, Maxwell was still in the probationary period of her employment at the time of the incidents precipitating her termination. Id. at 355. On the other hand, Hester was a PSE clerk with "six or seven years" experience whose job duties included training other PSE's; indeed, she trained Maxwell. Doc. 19 at 47:2-25. And Epps had a wholly different job than Maxwell—she was a mail carrier with 27 years of experience who was close to retirement. Id. at 48:16-49:3 (Maxwell: "[T]he mail carriers, they - you know, their job's different from ours."); Doc. 9 at 227-31, 383. Thus, Maxwell was not similarly situated with Hester or Epps because they had "different experiences, credentials, job duties, and qualifications."
Therefore, because Maxwell is not similarly situated with her proffered comparators, there is no material issue as to whether she suffered illegal discrimination, and the Postal Service has established it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Lathem v. Dep't of Children & Youth Servs., 172 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir. 1999) ("If two employees are not `similarly situated,' the different application of workplace rules does not constitute illegal discrimination."); see also Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562 (stating that summary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to establish a similarly situated employee, and there is no other evidence of discrimination).
Further, the Postal Service has proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for Maxwell's termination, reasons which Maxwell has not disputed as pretext for discrimination.
To satisfy its burden of production, in response to a plaintiff's prima facie case, an employer "need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons" but must produce evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. Kragor v. Takeda Pharm. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The proffered reason must be one that "might motivate a reasonable employer." Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000). Because "this burden involves no credibility determination, it has been characterized as `exceedingly light.'" Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 769-70 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
A plaintiff may dispute a defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons as pretext "by showing that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination . . . either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). Put another way, "[a] plaintiff may . . . survive summary judgment by `presenting evidence sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the truth or falsity of the employer's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.'" Freeman v. Perdue Farms Inc., 496 F. App'x. 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 965 (11th Cir. 1997)). If a proffered reason is one that would motivate a reasonable employer, to prove it unworthy of credence, "an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason." Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Thus, the Court must determine "whether the plaintiff has demonstrated such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence." Jackson v. State of Ala. State Tenure Comm'n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
As stated, Maxwell was a probationary, temporary employee whose position was dependent on satisfactory performance. Doc. 9 at 355. When she was hired, Maxwell acknowledged her probationary status and that satisfactory performance included "maintaining positive working relationships with others; working harmoniously with others in getting the work done; cooperating well with co-workers, supervisors, and others with whom she comes into contact; conducting herself in a manner appropriate to the work setting; and demonstrating a positive approach toward work, co-workers, and supervisors." Id. The Postal Service asserts that the April 25 incident, which included an altercation between Maxwell and Epps that required them to be "physically separated," alone constituted a failure to meet the conditions of Maxwell's probationary employment and was cited as such when Maxwell was fired. Doc. 9 at 348. Moreover, the May 6, 2015 request for termination stated that Maxwell's "behavior during mediation was unprofessional and unacceptable" and that she was "unable to control her emotions and also pose[d] a threat to authority." Doc. 9 at 347. These are reasons that would motivate a reasonable employer and, thus, Maxwell must rebut them head on. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030.
In her response, Maxwell summarily states that "[t]he Defendant's actions were not based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons" but "were a pretext for unlawful discrimination." Doc. 22 at 11. Yet, in her deposition, Maxwell admitted that "getting along with others [was a] part of [her] job." Doc. 19 at 79:19-22. Maxwell does not dispute her confrontations with co-coworkers, but she questions why she was the only person fired from the incident if in fact getting along with co-workers is an important part of job. Id. at 91:5-25. However, as stated, those other employees, who were disciplined, were not at all similarly situated, and this response does not meet the Postal Service's asserted reason head on and rebut it. Nor has Maxwell shown that her employer was more likely motivated by a discriminatory reason. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1052. And the record does not show "weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions" in the Postal Service's rationale for terminating Maxwell's employment. See Jackson, 405 F.3d at 1289. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute that Maxwell has not proven the Postal Service's legitimate non-discriminatory reason to be pretext for discrimination, and, thus, the Postal Service is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Rather than argue Maxwell's gender-based claims fail within the confines of McDonnell Douglas, the Postal Service merely argues that Maxwell's claim was "not fairly presented" for review by this Court. Doc. 17-1 7 n.1 (citing Smith v. Sec., Dept. of Corrections, 572 F.3d 1327, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that an issue may be not fairly presented if raised in a way that the district court could not understand it)). The Postal Service correctly states that Maxwell's complaint presents no argument as to how she was discriminated against because of her gender. Id. (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 598-99 (11th Cir. 1995) ("the onus is one the parties to formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned").
However, in her deposition testimony, Maxwell clarifies that her claim hinges on her assertion that she was not given sufficient work restrictions for her pregnancy.
Presumably, Maxwell attempts to state that the adverse employment action she suffered due to her gender and pregnancy was that she was not given sufficient restrictions. But her basis for this assertion is unclear. She testified that her doctor told her she could not lift up to 15 pounds. Doc. 19 at 89:12-13.
Moreover, she cannot point to a similarly situated individual who was treated more favorably. She does not point to another individual who was given accommodations beyond that recommended by a doctor. She complains that other people had "more restrictions than [her], and [she] was pregnant." Doc. 19 at 90:2-3. Specifically, she complained that one individual was not required to walk "but so far"; however, she admitted that she did not know what accommodations were required under that individual's doctor's restrictions. Doc. 19 at 90:22-91:4. Accordingly, from the undisputed evidence before the Court, Maxwell cannot establish a valid comparator for her gender-discrimination claims.
Maxwell alleges that she suffered a hostile working environment because of racial harassment at the hand of other employees, including Hester, Epps, and her supervisor, Marcus Daniels.
To prove harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment, an employee must prove that she "subjectively perceive[d] the harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive" and that "this subjective perception [was] objectively reasonable." Guthrie v. Waffle House, Inc., 460 F. App'x. 803, 806 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999)). Certainly, Maxwell subjectively considered the harassment she suffered to be severe and pervasive. But to determine objective severity, courts look at the totality of the circumstances, including: "`(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's job performance.'" Alhallaq v. Radha Soami Trading, LLC, 484 F. App'x. 293, 295 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Miller v Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002)); see also Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246. "Title VII is not a `general civility code,' and `simple teasing . . . offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)' do not constitute a hostile work environment." Guthrie, 460 F. App'x. at 806 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998)); see also Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001). Moreover, "[w]orkplace conduct is viewed cumulatively and in its social context." Guthrie, 460 F. App'x. at 806 (citing Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Here, the harassment lasted a little less than a month, because Maxwell was fired after only a short time on the job, but Maxwell claims that she suffered harassment every day for three weeks after her first day. Doc. 19 at 58:21-25. First, Maxwell testified that, on her second day of employment, Hester told her that she did not "like [her] kind," meaning African-Americans, and stated that "you black people . . . don't want to do your job." Id. at 32:9-11, 34:21-35:2. And Maxwell also stated in her complaint that Hester told her, "I am working on how I treat Yall-African Americans [sic]." Doc. 1 at 10. Similarly, Maxwell alleged in her complaint that Epps threatened that she would "get [Maxwell]" and told Maxwell that "We (White People) run this!" Id. at 11. And she testified that Daniels, who is also African-American, told her that he did not like "black females, that's why [he doesn't] deal with [them], that's why [he's] got a Mexican wife"—a comment that Maxwell characterized as a "racial slur" in her complaint. Id. at 4; Doc. 19 at 95:4-7. However, other than this characterization, Maxwell does not allege that anyone used racial epithets or vulgar language towards her. Cf. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (the defendant called the plaintiff "boy"); Miller, 277 F.3d at 1273-74 (the defendant called the plaintiff ethnic slurs including "Wetback," "Spic," and "Mexican Mother F_____"); McCann, 526 F.3d at 1378-79 (the defendant referred to a former African-American employee as a "n___er bitch"). The rest of Maxwell's allegations relate to incidents involving Hester and Epps, in which they "fuss[ed]" and "argued" with her, "exchang[ed] words" with her, or "jump[ed] in [her] face." See, e.g., Doc. 19 at 51:24-53:5. Maxwell did state, in the Postal Service's EEO investigation, that she "was in constant fear for the life of my child and myself" because of Hester and Epps's harassment. Doc. 9 at 123. And Maxwell describes one incident in which Hester "slammed every locker door behind [her]" in an "aggressive, physical" manner, though Maxwell does not allege Hester actually touched her during that incident. Doc. 19 at 45:4-15. But besides this incident and the altercation on April 25, the harassment does not appear to have been physically threatening.
And from the record, the totality of the circumstances does not show a "workplace [that was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." See Miller, 277 F.2d at 1275-76 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (stating a jury could find plaintiff established hostile work environment claim where his supervisor "hurled" ethnic slurs at him "three to four times a day"); see also Alhallaq, 484 F. App'x at 296 (stating that "offensive conduct," even if "rude and insensitive, is not actionable under Title VII," which does not regulate "offensive utterances and general vulgarity"). And thus, the harassment Maxwell suffered was, objectively, not sufficiently severe and pervasive.
Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute that Maxwell has failed to state a prima facie claim for hostile work environment. Thus, the Postal Service is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Postal Service's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) is
