NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

VANMETER, Judge.

George Lewis appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the Christian Circuit Court adjudging him guilty on two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree and sentencing him to fourteen years' imprisonment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Lewis was arrested on October 29, 2009 and charged with two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree. At his trial, the Commonwealth presented a videotape of a controlled buy in a motel room between Stephanie Howell, a confidential informant, and a man Howell identified at trial as Lewis. Howell testified that she gave Lewis $330 when he entered the motel room, then Lewis asked her to step outside, and once outside Lewis dropped a small bag of heroine on the ground and walked away. The videotape shows Howell meeting with a man in the motel room, the two walking outside, and Howell returning to the room, but no audio recording of the transaction was made.

Officers from the Special Investigations Unit ("SIU") of the Hopkinsville Police Department monitored video surveillance of the controlled buy from another motel room of the same complex. Over Lewis's objection, Officer Kyle Spurlin, a member of the SIU, was permitted to testify that from the motel room where the SIU was stationed he heard Lewis tell Howell to "step outside." Sergeant Clayton Sumner testified that he saw Lewis at the motel on the same day of the controlled buy. A jury convicted Lewis of two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree and recommended a sentenced of fourteen years' imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. This appeal followed.

Lewis argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce Officer Spurlin's testimony that he heard Lewis tell Howell to "step outside" because it was an incriminating statement which the Commonwealth did not disclose to the defense prior to trial. As a result of the alleged discovery violation, Lewis argues his conviction should be vacated and he be granted a new trial. We disagree.

We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Ky. 2004) (citation omitted). The trial court has abused its discretion if its decision was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principals." Id. (citations omitted). We will set aside a conviction for a discovery violation only if there exists a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed the outcome of the trial would have been different. Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Ky. 1997) (citations omitted).

RCr1 7.24 governs the discovery of incriminating statements made by defendants, and provides, in pertinent part:

An incriminating statement includes "anything that the defendant has said to a witness which in any way incriminates himself or herself[.]" Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288, 296 (Ky. 2008) (citation omitted).

In this case, even if we assume Lewis's statement "step outside" was incriminating, the videotape depicts Howell and the man identified as Lewis "step outside" the motel room. Further, Howell testified that Lewis insisted they step outside after she gave him the $330 and that Lewis sold her drugs on two separate occasions. Additionally, Sergeant Sumner testified he saw Lewis at the motel on the same day of the controlled buy. Other than Officer Spurlin's testimony, a significant weight of evidence still placed Lewis in the motel room of the controlled buy and telling Howell to step outside. Thus, even if the Commonwealth disclosed the statement prior to trial, a reasonable probability does not exist that the outcome of this case would have been different. Accordingly, we find no reason to set aside Lewis's conviction.

The judgment of the Christian Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.