Not to be Published

OPINION

COMBS, JUDGE.

Justin Hall appeals the order of the McCracken Circuit Court denying his motion filed pursuant to Kentucky Rule[s] of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 seeking to vacate his sentence. After reviewing the record and the law, we affirm.

On September 10, 2008, Hall pled guilty to charges flowing from two indictments and one information. The charges included in the plea were: three counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, second or subsequent offense; two counts of use/possession of drug paraphernalia, second or subsequent offense; one count of second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second or subsequent offense; and possession of an open alcoholic beverage container in a motor vehicle. As part of its plea offer, the Commonwealth dismissed a persistent felony offender (PFO) count and a count of bail jumping. His sentence totalled twenty-five years.

In 2010, Hall filed a motion to vacate his convictions and sentences for all three cases. The trial court denied all three motions in the same order. This appeal follows.

Hall argues that the trial court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing before denying his RCr 11.42 motion. We disagree. Our standard of review of an RCr 11.42 motion is governed by rules set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States. It has prescribed a two-pronged test describing the defendant's burden of proof in these cases:

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), adopted in Kentucky by Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Ky. 1985). Both criteria must be met in order for the test to be satisfied.

The Supreme Court refined the Strickland test in the context of guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), where it held that "in order to satisfy the `prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 59.

Upon appeal, we must review a trial court's denial of a motion for an evidentiary hearing by determining whether the allegations are refuted by the record and whether they would nullify the conviction if indeed they were true. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967). No evidentiary hearing is required if the record contradicts the allegations. Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. App. 1986).

Hall first contends that his trial counsel coerced him to enter a guilty plea by threatening him with the possibility of a federal prosecution that might potentially result in life imprisonment. However, the record includes a recording of the entry of Hall's guilty plea in court. During the Boykin colloquy, Hall told the court that no one had talked him into pleading guilty against his will and that he was entering his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant's statements in court in the course of entering a guilty plea are "a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629 (1977).

Furthermore, counsel's advice to a client to plead guilty does not, per se, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004); Beecham v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236-37 (Ky. 1983); Glass v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Ky. 1971). An examination of the pertinent federal statute reveals that if Hall had been federally prosecuted, he would have been in jeopardy of receiving a life sentence. 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). His sentence of twenty-five years is considerably more lenient. Therefore, even if Hall's counsel had advised him that he might receive a life sentence unless he pled guilty, Hall did not suffer prejudice as a result. The advice was accurate and was not, therefore, deficient. Its impact was in no way prejudicial; on the contrary, it was beneficial.

Hall also argues that his trial counsel did not provide him with discovery. As a result, Hall claims that he was not aware that a few seconds of surveillance video were missing. However, he does not indicate how the missing video would have affected his case. RCr 11.42(2) requires that grounds be stated with specificity and that they be supported factually. See also Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 444 (Ky. 2001) (overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009)).

Additionally, we must consider the totality of the circumstances. The evidence against Hall was strong, and he has not offered any proof of his innocence. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it denied Hall's motion.

Hall's final assertion is that he might have been subject to double jeopardy violations because he received two trafficking convictions as a result of one controlled buy. However, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that if a defendant pleads guilty to two offenses from two facially-distinct indictments, he is prohibited from subsequently making a double-jeopardy argument. U.S. v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 109 S.Ct. 757 (1989).

Hall pled guilty to one indictment and to one information. Both contain trafficking-in-cocaine charges related to events on or about May 14, 2008. However, the information charged Hall with the actual sale, transfer, or distribution of cocaine; the indictment charged him with possessing a large quantity of cocaine with the intent to sell. Thus, they are facially distinct, and Hall cannot demonstrate that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated.

Accordingly, we affirm the McCracken Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.