TANYA WALTON PRATT, District Judge.
Plaintiff Joanne S. Palmore ("Palmore") requests judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner"), denying her application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). For the following reasons, the Court
On September 13, 2013, Palmore filed an application for DIB, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2009
Palmore alleges the following impairments: obesity, asthma, degenerative disc disease of the lumbosacral spine, high blood pressure, anemia, and acid reflux. (
Palmore was born in 1963 and at the time of her amended alleged disability onset date in 2009, she was 49 years old. (
On May 16, 2012, Palmore presented to Mushkbar Khan, M.D. ("Dr. Khan") for a physical disability evaluation. (
On May 23, 2013, a lumbosacral x-ray was unremarkable. Id. On April 14, 2013, Dr. Khan noted that a thoracic x-ray showed minimal multilevel degenerative disc disease and minimal anterior spurring at the T6-T10 levels. (
Palmore attended a consultative examination with Wallace J. Gasiewicz, M.D. ("Dr. Gasiewicz") on October 11, 2013. (
Two state agency medical consultants, Dr. David Everetts, M.D. ("Dr. Everetts") and Dr. J.V. Corcoran, M.D. ("Dr. Corcoran"), reviewed Palmore's medical records and specifically considered her degenerative disc disease, but both opined that it was not a severe impairment sufficient to support a decision on her claim. (
Under the Act, a claimant may be entitled to DIB only after he establishes that he is disabled. Disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In order to be found disabled, a claimant must demonstrate that his physical or mental limitations prevent him from doing not only his previous work but any other kind of gainful employment which exists in the national economy, considering his age, education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled. At step one, if the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled despite his medical condition and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, if the claimant does not have a "severe" impairment that meets the durational requirement, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment is one that "significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals any impairment that appears in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, and whether the impairment meets the twelve month duration requirement; if so, the claimant is deemed disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If the claimant's impairments do not meet or medically equal one of the impairments on the Listing of Impairments, then his residual functional capacity will be assessed and used for the fourth and fifth steps. Residual functional capacity ("RFC") is the "maximum that a claimant can still do despite his mental and physical limitations." Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); SSR 96-8p). At step four, if the claimant is able to perform his past relevant work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At the fifth and final step, it must be determined whether the claimant can perform any other work in the relevant economy, given his RFC and considering his age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). The claimant is not disabled if he can perform any other work in the relevant economy.
The combined effect of all the impairments of the claimant shall be considered throughout the disability determination process. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B). The burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps; it then shifts to the Commissioner for the fifth step. Young v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992).
Section 405(g) of the Act gives the court "power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing the ALJ's decision, this Court must uphold the ALJ's findings of fact if the findings are supported by substantial evidence and no error of law occurred. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). "Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. Further, this Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2008). While the Court reviews the ALJ's decision deferentially, the Court cannot uphold an ALJ's decision if the decision "fails to mention highly pertinent evidence, . . . or that because of contradictions or missing premises fails to build a logical bridge between the facts of the case and the outcome." Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
The ALJ "need not evaluate in writing every piece of testimony and evidence submitted." Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1993). However, the "ALJ's decision must be based upon consideration of all the relevant evidence." Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). The ALJ is required to articulate only a minimal, but legitimate, justification for her acceptance or rejection of specific evidence of disability. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2004).
The ALJ made the following findings as part of her decision. The ALJ first determined that Palmore met the insured status requirement of the Act for DIB through December 31, 2013. (
The ALJ then determined that Palmore had a RFC to perform light work with the following additional limitations:
(
In her request for judicial review, Palmore argues that remand is appropriate because the ALJ's determination that Palmore does not medically equal Listing 1.04 Disorders of the Spine ("Listing 1.04") at step three constituted reversible error because it was not supported by substantial evidence. Palmore focuses her argument on the standard established in Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2004). (
In response, the Commissioner explains that the ALJ referenced two expert medical opinions that supported her determination at step three that Palmore's back disorder did not meet or equal Listing 1.04. The Commissioner also notes that Palmore failed to meet her burden of proof at step three in rebutting the two state agency physicians' opinions. The Commissioner states that, "The state-agency reviewing physicians, David Everetts, M.D. and J.V. Corcoran, M.D., specifically considered Palmore's degenerative disc disease, but opined that it was not a severe impairment, let alone an impairment of listing-level severity." (
The Commissioner relies on the standard established in Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990). (
Under Listing 1.04, Palmore had the burden to show that she had a disorder of the spine, such as a herniated nucleus pulposus, spinal arachnoiditis, spinal stenosis, osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease, facet arthritis, or vertebral fracture. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.04. This showing is evidenced by a disorder of the spine resulting in compromise of a nerve root or the spinal cord of twelve months duration and satisfying Paragraph A, B, or C criteria as follows:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a). An ALJ's decision will stand so long as she minimally articulates her reasons for consideration of medical evidence. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Upon review of the ALJ's decision and the record, the Court determines that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ minimally articulated the reasons for her determination that Palmore did not have a severe impairment that meets or medically equals the requirements of one of the listed impairments, and those reasons were supported by substantial evidence. Palmore did not meet her burden of proof at step three. The ALJ noted that Palmore did not allege that she has a condition of listing level severity, but the ALJ still evaluated all impairments using the appropriate section of the Listing of Impairments. The Court focuses specifically on Palmore's degenerative disc disorder because that is the impairment which she argues the ALJ materially erred. (
The ALJ consulted various medical opinions in concluding that Palmore's back impairment did not meet or equal Listing 1.04. The ALJ noted that Palmore lacked the significant and persistent neurological abnormalities that Listing 1.04 requires. The ALJ gave medium weight to the opinions of Dr. Everetts, and Dr. Corcoran. Dr. Everetts determined at the initial level on October 17, 2013, that Palmore had a non-severe impairment that did not result in work-related functional limitations. (
The ALJ specifically noted the opinion of Dr. Gasiewicz regarding his consultative examination. (
Dr. Everetts considered Dr. Gasiewicz's opinion that Palmore is able to perform normal movements like walking, sitting, squatting, bending, hand movements, manipulative movements with hands and feet, able to grasp objects, and able to get on and off the table without assistance. Dr. Everetts found Dr. Gasiewicz's opinion to be consistent with the evidence in the record, including a May 2013 x-ray of the lumbar spine that showed no abnormalities. (
Palmore's treating physician, Dr. Khan, noted that Palmore complained of back pain, but x-rays showed only mild degenerative disc disease. (
Palmore's degenerative disc disease does not meet or medically equal the requirements of Listing 1.04. After a review of the ALJ's decision and the evidence, the Court determines the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, her reasoning is sufficiently explained, and her conclusions logically follow the evidence and her rationale. The ALJ properly considered the medical evidence before her, including the medical opinion of Palmore's treating physician. Thus, Palmore's argument for remand on this basis is unavailing.
For the reasons set forth above, the final decision of the Commissioner is
