ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS Re: Dkt. No. 12

SUSAN ILLSTON, District Judge.

On November 16, 2018, the Court held a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the parties' exhibits and declarations, including street video surveillance footage,1 the police officers' "body cam" video footage, and the "C.A.D." police audio related to the incident.2 At approximately 12:50 p.m. on September 22, 2018, San Francisco Police Officers Paul Ruetti and Murray Daggs were driving in a marked patrol car through the intersection of Turk and Hyde Streets in San Francisco when a group of men flagged down the officers. Officer Ruetti's declaration describes the encounter as follows:

Ruetti Decl. ¶¶ 3-8 (Dkt. No. 16-1, Ex. 1).

According to the written C.A.D. report, prior to the officers' detention of defendant Nelson Castaneda, the officers stopped and frisked three other individuals, including the man in the white-shirt mentioned in Officer Ruetti's declaration. See Falk Decl., Ex. G (Dkt. No. 20-2) (written C.A.D. report at 12:52, "about to take him on"; referring to man in white t-shirt who walked east on Eddy Street toward Leavenworth Street); id. at 12:53-12:56 ("will check that out" and "no 221 for subj with the whi hat," referring to a man wearing a white baseball hat near Hyde and Ellis Streets); id. at 12:55 ("1 detd with red hat" around O'Farrell and Larkin Streets). As defendant notes, the video surveillance showing the "non-reporting" group of men walking north on Hyde Street does not show anyone wearing a red hat. See Narayan Decl., Ex. 4 (surveillance video at 7:35-8:09) (Dkt. No. 16-1).

Officer Ruetti's declaration continues,

Ruetti Decl. ¶ 8-9 (Dkt. No. 16-1, Ex. 1).

Defendant disputes Officer Ruetti's description of Castaneda's behavior. Castaneda states in his declaration,

Castaneda Decl. ¶¶ 2-7 (Dkt. No. 22).

Officers Ruetti and Vainshtok encountered Castaneda in the rear supply room of the restaurant where the bathroom was located, and another officer stood in the supply room and a fourth officer stood near the doorway between the supply room and the main room of the pizza shop. Falk Decl., Ex. E (Ruetti's body cam video at:00-:05) (Dkt. No. 20-1); see also Portman Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. H-M (Dkt. No. 21) (pictures of interior of Piccolo Italia Pizza showing, inter alia, the supply room with a door marked "restroom"). Officer Ruetti's body cam footage shows that Officer Ruetti turned Castaneda around and that Officer Vainshtok held Castaneda's wrists behind his back while Officer Ruetti proceeded to search Castaneda. Falk Decl., Ex. E (Ruetti's body cam video at:00-:05). Officer Ruetti states,

Ruetti Decl. ¶¶ 9-11. Officer Ruetti's body cam video shows that while Castaneda was being handcuffed, Ruetti asked him "Do you normally just run?", and that Castaneda denied running. Officer Ruetti then said, "Or, dip into pizza shops, or go wherever you feel like?" Castaneda responded that he was "just going to get some pizza" and again denied running. Falk Decl., Ex. E (Ruetti's body cam video at 1:12-1:25).

After Officer Ruetti arrested Castaneda, Ruetti gave Officers Vainshtok and Faulkner the Dodge car keys seized from Castaneda's pocket. Ruetti Decl. ¶ 11; Faulkner Decl. ¶ 4. Officer Faulkner states in his declaration:

Faulkner Decl. ¶¶ 4-5 (Dkt. No. 16-1, Ex. 2)

Later the same day, officers obtained a warrant to search Castaneda's residence at 3090 16th Street, Apt. 202 in San Francisco, as well as the Dodge Dart that Officers Faulkner and Vainshtok had searched without a warrant. Falk Decl., Ex. B (Search Warrant and Affidavit at NC-149-154) (Dkt. No. 8-2). San Francisco Police Officer Ronald Gilson prepared the search warrant application and Statement of Probable Cause. The Statement of Probable Cause stated, inter alia,

Id. at NC-000152. The evidence in support of the Statement of Probable Cause consisted of the drugs and weapons seized from Castaneda and the warrantless search of the Dodge Dart. Id. The Statement of Probable Cause also stated that Castaneda was a "documented Sureno gang member" and that Castaneda "is a multiple time convicted felon for narcotics and aggravated battery out of San Francisco (CRT#14007693, 03-14-2014), thereby making him a prohibited person from possessing firearms." Id. During the search of 3090 16th Street, Apt. 202, officers seized, inter alia, drug paraphernalia, currency, a Springfield .45 pistol with three magazines and unfired cartridges and bullets, an AR-18 rifle, and a high capacity magazine. Id. at NC-000151.

On October 9, 2018, Castaneda was indicted on two counts of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), felon in possession of a firearm. Count 1 of the indictment relates to the firearm recovered from the warrantless search of the Dodge Dart and Count 2 relates to the two firearms recovered from Castaneda's residence pursuant to the search warrant. Dkt. No. 1.

DISCUSSION

Defendant challenges the warrantless search and seizure of his person, the warrantless search of the Dodge Dart, and the subsequent search of his residence pursuant to a warrant that defendant contends was tainted by the previous searches. Defendant contends that he was unlawfully arrested prior to the search of his pockets because Officers Ruetti and Daggs held him at gunpoint in the back of the pizza shop while two other officers stood nearby, and a reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to leave. Defendant argues that even if the initial detention was a "Terry stop"9 rather than an arrest, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and frisk. Defendant also contends that even if the Terry stop was constitutional, the officers never developed probable cause on the scene to arrest Castaneda for possession of the knife in violation of San Francisco Municipal Code § 1291(b) because Castaneda was not loitering and the officers did not open the knife to measure its length.10 Defendant also argues that the drugs were unlawfully seized because Officer Ruetti's wiggling and manipulation of Castaneda's right pocket exceeded the scope of a Terry pat search. Finally, defendant argues that there was no probable cause for an automobile exception search where small personal use quantities of drugs are found on an individual and the automobile is located on a different alley around the corner from the arrest site.

The government defends the initial search and seizure of Castaneda as a permissible Terry stop and frisk because officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Castaneda was armed and dangerous. The government contends that once Officer Ruetti found the concealed knife on Castaneda, he had probable cause to arrest Castaneda for a violation of San Francisco Municipal Code § 1291(b). The government asserts that Officer Ruetti's seizure of the drugs from Castaneda's pockets was permissible as a search incident to arrest following the discovery of a concealed knife and under the plain feel doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). The government also argues that officers had probable cause to believe that the Dodge Dart would contain contraband, and thus that the search of the vehicle was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Finally, the government argues that because the officers properly seized drugs and weapons during the warrantless searches of Castaneda and the Dodge Dart, the subsequent search of Castaneda's residence pursuant to the search warrant was constitutional, or alternatively, the Court should apply the good faith exception under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

I. Reasonable suspicion

Although defendant's motion raises many issues, it is the Court's view that the threshold question of whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Castaneda is dispositive.11 "The government bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search or seizure falls within an exception to the warrant requirement." Job, 871 F.3d at 860. An investigatory stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment "if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity `may be afoot.'" Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). "Reasonable suspicion requires `specific, articulable facts' which, together with `objective and reasonable' inferences, form a basis for suspecting that a particular person is engaged in criminal conduct." United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989)). The reasonable suspicion analysis "must look at the `totality of the circumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer ha[d] a `particularized and objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal citation omitted). "Reasonable suspicion must be based on more than an officer's `inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). "Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the totality of the circumstances. . . ." Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (internal citation omitted).

Defendant contends that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion because the tip provided by the group of men was not particularized, was provided under suspicious circumstances by suspicious individuals, and did not report an emergency. Defendant argues that the tip did not come from a reliable source because the tipsters were known to Officer Ruetti "from prior police contacts" and at least one of them was a suspected drug dealer. See Ruetti Decl. ¶ 6. Defendant argues that the tip was not specific, and instead consisted of men repeating the word "gun" while saying something about a "white t-shirt" and "gangster" and pointing up the street at a group of men.12 Defendant notes that the men did not report their basis of knowledge for the tip, nor did they claim to have seen anyone with a gun (or brandishing a gun). Defendant also argues that even if anyone in the reporting group was frantic or agitated, that fact was significantly undercut by the tipster group's decision to directly and closely follow Officer Ruetti up Hyde Street towards the group accused of possessing a gun. Defendant further argues that to the extent there was any specificity about the tip — the reference to a "white t-shirt" — that should have directed the police away from Castaneda because he was wearing all black clothing. Defendant also argues that the officers' actions demonstrated "an utter disregard for the lack of particularity in the tip" because prior to detaining Castaneda, officers stopped and frisked three other individuals, including a man wearing a red hat even though no one in the group of men walking up Hyde Street was seen wearing a red hat.

The government contends that Officer Ruetti had reasonable suspicion to believe that Castaneda was armed and dangerous because the civilian tip provided by the group of men had substantial indicia of reliability. The government argues that Officer Ruetti reasonably relied on the information provided by the group of men because he recognized some of the witnesses and believed he could track them down later if needed. The government asserts that Officer Ruetti made an in-person assessment of the witnesses' demeanor and believed that they were genuinely frantic and fearful, and that "the tip was made nearly contemporaneously with the precipitating event, as the witnesses pointed to a group of men not even a block away." Gov't Opp'n at 7 (Dkt. No. 15). The government also argues that the "the occurrence of these events in a high-crime area" and "defendant's evasive behavior" also contributed to reasonable suspicion. Id. (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (holding the fact that defendant was holding an "opaque bag" in "an area of heavy narcotics trafficking," combined with the defendant's "unprovoked flight upon noticing the police," provided reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop).

When evaluating whether an informant's tip can provide a basis for reasonable suspicion, the Ninth Circuit has instructed:

United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). In addition, "when the tip is provided in a face-to-face encounter, even when the informant is unidentified," the tip is generally considered more reliable. See United States v. Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 2010).

In Rowland, the Ninth Circuit held that an informant's tip had several indicia of reliability where the informant "made himself known to the DEA agents, and the agents met with the informant personally," "the informant did not have any apparent motive to fabricate the tip, and could presumably have been held accountable if his information proved to be false," and "[t]he informant, although not of proven reliability, gave a general description of Rowland, predicted Rowland's future travel from Hawaii to Guam, and accurately stated that Rowland was on probation in Hawaii." Rowland, 464 F.3d at 908. In addition, "the DEA agents corroborated the informant's tip when they contacted the probation office in Hawaii and confirmed that Rowland lived in Hawaii and was on probation there. Rowland's criminal background, provided by the probation office, revealed past drug convictions." Id. In Palos-Marquez, the Ninth Circuit held that an in-person tip to a Border Patrol agent from an unidentified UPS driver was reliable because "the driver risked losing his anonymity by speaking face-to-face with Agent Simon, who was able to observe his appearance and affiliation with UPS, and who could have asked the driver for identification had it seemed necessary," "[the agent] could judge the UPS driver's demeanor and evaluate his credibility," and the agent "knew that the informant was a UPS driver who had worked a designated route at a certain time on the day of Palos-Marquez's stop . . . [and] the informant likely could be held accountable if the information proved to be false."13

After evaluating the totality of the circumstances and applying the legal framework set forth above, the Court concludes that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Castaneda. Although the government asserts that the high-crime location and Castaneda's "evasive" behavior supported reasonable suspicion, the majority of the government's argument hinges on the reliability of the tip. However, the tip provided by the group of men lacked the indicia of reliability necessary to support the Terry stop. Citing Palos-Marquez, the government emphasizes that the tip was provided in-person and that the tip was made "nearly contemporaneously" with the precipitating event. The in-person nature of the tip does, under Palos-Marquez, weigh somewhat in favor of its reliability. However, Officer Ruetti states in his declaration that he "recognize[d] some of the men in the reporting group from prior police contacts in the Tenderloin. In particular, I had previously suspected one of the reporting men of being involved in drug distribution in the Tenderloin." Ruetti Decl. ¶ 6. Thus, the reporting men consisted of (1) some men Officer Ruetti did not recognize; (2) some men Officer Ruetti recognized from "prior police contacts"; and (3) a suspected drug dealer. The reporting men had no track record of reliability, and to the contrary, a tip provided by a combination of unknown individuals and persons who were known to Officer Ruetti through prior "police contacts" should have been considered with some degree of skepticism. Unlike the tipsters in Rowland and Palos-Marquez who did not have an apparent motive to lie, the tipsters here — a group of men who included a suspected drug dealer and others known through "police contacts" — may very well have had a motive to lie about other individuals or a group of alleged "gangsters." Further, while the witnesses' "frantic" demeanor could be considered as bolstering the reliability of the tip, the fact that the entire tipster group of men immediately and closely followed Officer Ruetti up Hyde Street toward the first group of men further undercuts the reliability of the tip. Cf. Rowland, 464 F.3d at 908 ("The informant in this case provided sufficient detail to dispel concerns that the tip was a hoax."); see also White, 496 U.S. at 333 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that if a generalized tip is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion, "[a]nybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make her the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be able to formulate a tip about her").

In addition, the tip utterly lacked detail and did not contain any predictive information that could be verified by the police. Unlike the tips in Rowland or Palos-Marquez, which contained specific identifying information about a particular person or vehicle, here the tipsters did not provide a name or a specific description of any individual who allegedly had a gun, nor did the tipsters provide any other details regarding the event giving rise to the tip. Officer Ruetti's declaration states that the reporting men were "primarily Hispanic and speaking in broken English" and that neither he nor Officer Daggs spoke Spanish. Ruetti Decl. ¶ 6. Officer Ruetti states that "[t]he men were shouting about a gun and pointing Northward, up Hyde street, towards another group of men. I heard one of the men say the word `gangster,' and I recall one of the other men saying something about a white T-shirt." Id. Officer Ruetti "attempted to get additional details about what had happened, but due to the language barrier and the frantic demeanor of the men," he was "only able to comprehend that at least one of the men in the other group had a gun." Id. To the extent there was any specificity, one of the tipsters said "something" about a "white t-shirt." Id. It is undisputed that Castaneda was wearing all black clothing. Indeed, the record shows that based upon this generalized tip, police officers stopped and frisked at least four individuals: (1) a man wearing a white t-shirt; (2) a man wearing a white baseball hat; (3) a man wearing a red hat; and (4) defendant, who was wearing all black clothing. There is nothing in the information provided by the tipsters that would provide a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing" by Castaneda. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273; see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) ("An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity."); Thomas, 211 F.3d at 1189-90 (holding FBI tip to police officer that officer "might want to pay particular attention to a certain house" based on "a suspicion that there was a possibility that there might be some narcotics" there did not create reasonable suspicion because "[t]he FBI's information was devoid of specifics: no information about the occupants of the house, vehicles involved, any particular suspicious conduct, or the kind of narcotics at issue").

Officer Ruetti states that based upon the tip, he "assessed the situation to be an emergency." Id. Significantly, however, the tipsters did not say that they saw anyone with a gun or that someone brandished a gun or threatened someone with a gun, nor did they explain "their basis of knowledge for the tip — how [they] came to know the information." Palos-Marquez, 591 F.3d at 1277. In Palos-Marquez, the UPS driver "relayed his tip near to where he had observed the events, and agents stopped a pickup fitting the driver's description within minutes of his statement" and the driver "had first-hand knowledge of the crime when he reported that he had seen the pickup load up with several suspected illegal aliens." Id.

Here, the tipster group simply reported that someone in a group walking down the street may have had a gun; there was no specific contemporaneous event — such as the brandishing of a gun — that was reported. Instead, the tipsters were "shouting about a gun and pointing Northward, up Hyde Street, towards another group of men." Ruetti Decl. ¶ 6. In Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), the Supreme Court held that there is no "firearm exception" to the reasonable suspicion requirement for a Terry stop. In J.L., "an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun." Id. at 268. Nothing was known about the informant. Id. Police officers were dispatched to the bus stop and saw three black males "just hanging out" and one of the males was wearing a plaid shirt. Id. "Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm, and J.L. made no threatening or otherwise unusual movements." Id. The officers frisked the three individuals and found a gun in J.L's pocket. Id.

The Supreme Court held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk J.L. The Court held that the anonymous tip "provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." Id. at 271. "All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L." Id. The Court rejected the argument that the tip was reliable because its description of the suspect's visible attributes proved accurate, stating "[t]he reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." Id. at 272. The Court also rejected the assertion "that the standard Terry analysis should be modified to license a `firearm exception.' Under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. We decline to adopt this position." Id. The Court explained,

Id. at 272-73 (internal citation omitted).

Here, although the tip was not anonymous like the tip in J.L., in many respects it is similar and arguably even less reliable. The tipsters in this case "provided no predictive information" and "neither explained how [they] knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing [they] had inside information." Id. at 272. In J.L. the tip provided a physical description of J.L., which the Court found insufficient; here, there was no description other than "white t-shirt" and "gangster" while the tipsters pointed to a group of men walking up the street. Cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1980) ("[A] person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person."); see also Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) ("That one member of a group may have committed a crime doesn't establish probable cause to arrest everyone in that group.") Finally, even though the tip here was in-person, it was given primarily in a language not spoken by either officer and the tipsters were of questionable credibility given that they were known to Officer Ruetti through "police contacts" and included a suspected drug dealer.

The government also argues that Officer Ruetti had reasonable suspicion to support the Terry stop because the Tenderloin is a high-crime area and because Castaneda engaged in evasive behavior when he saw the police. However, "[a]n individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. In the absence of a reliable tip indicating that Castaneda was (or was about to be) engaged in criminal behavior, his presence in the high-crime Tenderloin neighborhood is not, on its own, sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.

With regard to Castaneda's alleged "evasive" behavior, Officer Ruetti states that as he got out of his patrol vehicle on O'Farrell Street to make contact with Castaneda and two other men, "Castaneda turned and looked back at me. He had a startled expression on his face that I would describe as a `deer in the headlights' look. He immediately separated himself from the other two men and quickly entered" the pizza shop. Ruetti Decl. ¶ 8. Officer Ruetti also states that he believed Castaneda was attempting to evade him because Castaneda went directly to the back supply room rather than attempting to order food. Id. The Court notes that Castaneda disputes Officer Ruetti's description of his behavior. See Castaneda Decl. ¶¶ 4-6. However, even assuming Officer Ruetti's description is correct, the Court finds that Castaneda's behavior, in the totality of the circumstances, did not provide a basis for the Terry stop. It is undisputed that Officer Ruetti's patrol car drove the wrong way down O'Farrell Street against traffic, with the siren and lights on. The business surveillance footage from O'Farrell Street submitted by the government shows several people turning around and/or stopping to look at the patrol car. That Castaneda would have a startled expression on his face under those circumstances is not particularly surprising. "Quickly entering" a pizza shop is not the same as "headlong flight," Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Castaneda walked to the rear of the shop where the bathroom was located. Officer Ruetti does not state that Castaneda was hiding or crouched in the back room. The alleged evasive behavior here is, in the Court's view, minimal. If the tip possessed greater indicia of reliability and contained specific information about Castaneda, the Court would afford Castaneda's alleged evasive behavior greater weight. However, because the Court finds that the tip provided no basis to suspect that Castaneda was engaged in criminal activity, the Court gives little consideration to Castaneda's alleged evasiveness. Cf. United States v. I.E.V., 705 F.3d 430, 438 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that "mere nervous or fidgety conduct and touching of clothing" is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion).

II. Exclusionary rule

Because the Court concludes that there was no reasonable suspicion to support the initial Terry stop and frisk of defendant, the search of Castaneda's person was unlawful, and the evidence discovered during the search, including the drugs and the key fob, must be suppressed. See Job, 871 F.3d at 862. The warrantless search of the Dodge Dart directly flowed from this initial unlawful search, as officers only searched the Dodge Dart by seizing the key fob from Castaneda and walking through the neighborhood until they found a car that responded to the key. "[T]he exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or `fruit of the poisonous tree.'" Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (citations omitted). "It `extends as well to the indirect as the direct products' of unconstitutional conduct." Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)). Thus, the evidence seized during the warrantless search of the vehicle shall be suppressed.

"All evidence [the officers] seized during the illegal warrantless search[es] was tainted and should not have been included in the affidavit for a search warrant." United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 788 (9th Cir. 1987). "The mere inclusion of tainted evidence in an affidavit does not, by itself, taint the warrant or the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant." Id. "A reviewing court should excise the tainted evidence and determine whether the remaining, untainted evidence would provide a neutral magistrate with probable cause to issue a warrant." Id. Here, once all reference to the drugs and firearm discovered in the warrantless searches is excised from the search warrant affidavit, the remaining statements of fact in the affidavit would not support probable cause to issue the warrant.

The government argues that the Court should apply the good faith exception under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), to the search warrant affidavit. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Leon good faith exception does not apply in circumstances where an officer conducts a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Vasey, the Ninth Circuit explained,

Id. at 789. The Vasey court further held that "the magistrate's consideration of the evidence does not sanitize the taint of the illegal warrantless search." Id. Accordingly, the good faith exception under Leon is not applicable in this case, and the evidence seized from Castaneda's residence pursuant to the search warrant is also suppressed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, the Court SUPPRESSES the evidence seized from the warrantless searches of Castaneda's person and the Dodge Dart, and the evidence seized from Castaneda's residence pursuant to the search warrant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.