BAILEY, Judge.
Santiago Valdez ("Valdez") was found mentally competent to stand trial on charges of Attempted Rape,
On April 7, 2012, Muncie police officers responded to a 9-1-1 call at a residence where they found a naked, screaming woman and Valdez standing behind her. The State brought criminal charges against Valdez and he was appointed a public defender. On July 13, 2012, counsel filed a "Suggestion of Insanity" and requested that Valdez be examined by Dr. Craig Buckles, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Frank Krause, a psychologist. (App. 85.) Counsel also advised the trial court that Valdez had previously been a professional boxer and had sustained blows to his head.
After interviewing Valdez, Drs. Buckles and Krause opined that Valdez was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Valdez was found competent to stand trial. On August 16, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on Valdez's request to proceed pro-se and initially granted the motion.
Over the next few months, Valdez filed numerous motions. Although some appeared to be appropriate motions, Valdez also claimed that he needed to be tested for mind-altering drugs and requested an investigation of the sheriff's department. On December 28, 2012, the trial court ordered an evaluation of Valdez's competency to stand trial.
Dr. Rebecca Mueller, a psychiatrist, was appointed to evaluate Valdez. After administration of a "cursory exam that was along the lines of a Folstein mini mental status," Tr. 57, Dr. Mueller did not perceive "glaring thought disorders." (Tr. 65.) Nor did she find evidence of "dementia pugilistica."
On February 4, 2013, Valdez was examined for seven hours by Dr. Javan Horwitz, a neuropsychologist. According to Dr. Horwitz, Valdez appeared rational for the first four or five hours. However, he subsequently talked incoherently and displayed psychotic symptoms. Valdez reported to Dr. Horwitz that he was suffering persecution and had been subjected to electronic monitoring in his jail cell and the court room. He also reported that he was forced to undergo electronic surgery; specifically, his throat and heart had been cut. He complained of being sprayed with sulfuric acid and "dummy dust." (Tr. 116.) Valdez offered to display burns on his body. To support his claim of torture, Valdez also proffered for testing a Ramen noodle bag containing fecal and saliva samples. Dr. Horwitz provided the trial court with a written report concluding that Valdez was not competent to stand trial or to represent himself. He diagnosed Valdez as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.
On March 7, 2013, the trial court conducted a competency hearing, at which Drs. Mueller, Horwitz, McDaniel, Buckles, and Krause testified and affirmed their written recommendations. The latter three acknowledged that Dr. Horwitz had performed the most extensive examination of Valdez to date. Dr. Horwitz testified that, although Valdez displayed moments of lucidity, he was not competent to stand trial due to "executive dysfunction and the significant thought disorder related to his schizophrenia." (Tr. 112.)
Valdez testified at the hearing, claiming that jail staff had tortured him and attempted to murder him. He stated that he had been given a "speed-type drug" causing a sixty-pound weight loss. (Tr. 136.) According to Valdez, food and water had been electronically removed from his stomach, chemicals had been emitted under his cell door, he had been cut up inside his body, he had been subjected to electronic implants, and he had been burned by lasers. He reported that jail employees and the Muncie Police Department were aiding the prosecution by monitoring him in the shower, cell, and courtroom. Valdez proffered a Cheetos bag of purported evidence and he asked that the trial court order his body examined for burns.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Valdez's request to proceed pro-se. The trial court concluded that "the Defendant here cannot communicate coherently with the Court" and provided specific examples:
(App. 508.) The State, defense counsel, and the trial court agreed that Valdez was not competent to stand trial and Valdez was committed to the Logansport State Hospital Division of Mental Health. On June 6, 2013, the Superintendent certified that Valdez "has attained the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his defense." (App. 516.)
Valdez, through counsel, filed a renewal of his motion to proceed pro-se. On May 29, 2014, a hearing was conducted at which Valdez testified. Valdez testified that "all through the night" prior to the hearing, he had been subjected to electronic cutting. (Tr. 186.) He claimed to have suffered cuts to his neck, throat, and chest area. He described the defense he wished to assert on his own behalf, that is, that the victim had perjured herself during her deposition. He anticipated arguing that the 9-1-1 tape was false and that evidence had been fabricated by the Muncie Police Department. He opined it would be necessary to discuss his subjection to surveillance and electronic surgeries because it formed part of the fabricated case against him. According to Valdez, he needed to depose police officers to garner evidence of the plot against him. Valdez's counsel suggested that an insanity defense might be appropriate, but Valdez insisted he had never been insane.
The trial court issued a second order with respect to Valdez's request to proceed pro-se, specifically incorporating the findings from the order of March 7, 2013. The order included additional findings, providing in pertinent part:
(App. 591.) Concluding that Valdez's "lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence and undercuts the most basic of the Constitution's criminal law objectives of providing a fair trial," the trial court denied Valdez's motion to proceed pro-se. This Court accepted jurisdiction of Valdez's interlocutory appeal.
A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is essential to the fairness of a criminal proceeding.
However, the right of self-representation is not absolute. "[A] trial court may deny a defendant's request to act pro se when the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial but suffers from severe mental illness to the point where he is not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself."
Mental competency is not a static condition; accordingly, it is to be determined at the time of trial.
The record reveals that Valdez suffers from a severe mental illness. Dr. Krause rendered to the trial court a report including a diagnosis that Valdez suffers from an antisocial personality disorder and schizotypal personality disorder. Dr. Buckles issued a report including his finding that Valdez displays symptoms suggestive of schizophrenia. Dr. Horwitz, who examined Valdez most thoroughly, diagnosed Valdez as a paranoid schizophrenic.
As to Valdez's competence to conduct trial proceedings himself, the trial court heard abundant testimony and was in a position to observe Valdez's demeanor and conduct at multiple hearings. Valdez consistently claimed that he had been framed for crimes he did not commit, he had been subjected to torture at the hands of law enforcement personnel, and an appropriate defense would include claims that all evidence against him, including the 9-1-1 call tape, had been fabricated. He had filed numerous motions — many of which were indecipherable — and he had requested a polygraph test to reveal the truth of his accusations of torture. Valdez had, on multiple occasions, proffered food bags containing his excrement, which he asserted would reveal evidence of his subjection to torture.
Valdez, by counsel, points to evidence that Valdez is intelligent and articulate, and asserts that the "trial court's criticisms were unfounded and exaggerated." (Appellant's Br. at 16.) According to Valdez, he displayed an appropriate understanding of the definition of hearsay and the process of voir dire. Valdez presents us with an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we decline.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Valdez suffers from severe mental illness such that he is not competent to represent himself at trial.
Affirmed.
ROBB, J., and BROWN, J., concur.