COMBS, JUDGE.
A.D.H., the biological mother of C.A.H. and S.R.H. (the children), appeals from orders of the Grant Family Court entered on August 1, 2012, that terminated her parental rights to her children.
The parties agree on the following facts. Near midnight on February 2, 2011, Deputy Kevin Burke of the Grant County Sheriff's Department responded to the mother's home in response to a call for assistance. He found the mother lying face up and unconscious on the bathroom floor. Her skin was mottled purple, and zshe appeared to be deceased. The children (approximately 18 months of age and 30 months of age at that time) were observed running around the house naked.
After recovering from the heroin overdose that had severely impaired her on that night, the mother later admitted to Katherine Burke, a Cabinet social worker, that she had been attempting to bathe the children at 1:00 a.m. while under the influence. Alternatively, she said that she was trying to diaper one of the children when she succumbed to the effects of the overdose. Deputy Burke indicated that there had been an unidentified adult male in the house when he arrived.
On February 4, 2011, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed dependency, neglect, and abuse petitions in Grant Family Court. The Cabinet alleged that the mother's habitual use of heroin prevented her from providing necessary care for the children. Following the temporary removal hearing conducted a few days later, the children were placed in the temporary custody of the Cabinet. Because the children's natural father was incarcerated on a drug-related conviction, the children were placed in foster care on February 8, 2011. The mother was ordered to avoid contact with the children and to submit to random drug screenings. Because she did not show up for an initial substance abuse assessment, she could not enter a drug treatment program. Eventually, she was permitted to have supervised visits with the children.
An adjudication hearing was conducted by the family court on March 22, 2011. After considering the evidence presented, the court concluded that the allegations in the petition had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
On April 20, 2011, the family court conducted a disposition hearing. After considering the Cabinet's report and recommendations, the court concluded that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the removal of the children from the mother's home. The court also determined that a return to the mother's care and control was contrary to the children's welfare. The Cabinet's recommendations were adopted by the court, and the children remained committed to the Cabinet.
Despite the Cabinet's assistance, the mother could not meet drug treatment goals, nor could she comply with a case plan designed to reunite the family. On September 14, 2011, the Cabinet filed petitions for the involuntary termination of her parental rights.
On June 8, 2012, the family court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Cabinet's motion to terminate parental rights. The court heard testimony from Deputy Burke, two Cabinet social workers, the children's maternal grandfather, the children's uncle, the mother's neighbor, the children's foster father, and the mother. Following the hearing, the family court issued findings of fact and an order terminating mother's parental rights to the children. Among the family court's findings of facts were the following items:
Based upon these findings of fact, the family court concluded: that the mother had neglected the children; that despite the Cabinet's attempts to render all reasonable services to her, the mother had failed to provide essential parental care for the children for a period of longer than six months; that there is no reasonable expectation of improvement in her ability to provide parental care and protection, considering the ages of the children; and that it was in the children's best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights.
On appeal, the mother presents several evidentiary issues for our review. First, she contends that the family court erred by permitting Katherine Burke (as noted earlier, the Cabinet social worker who undertook the investigation following her overdose) to testify concerning the mother's drug screen test results and by permitting records of those results to be admitted into evidence. Second, the mother argues that the court erred by permitting into evidence correspondence from Transitions/WRAP house to Lacie Marcum, the Cabinet social worker who took over the case after Burke had concluded her initial investigation into the matter. Next, she contends that the family court erred by considering evidence indicating that the children's prospective adoptive parents were properly equipped to meet their needs. Finally, the mother claims that the family court erred by failing to find that the children would not likely be abused or neglected in the future. We address each of these issues.
We first address the contention that the family court erred by permitting Katherine Burke to testify concerning the mother's initial drug screen test results and by permitting records of those results to be admitted into evidence. She argues that the testimony and records constitute hearsay under the circumstances. We find no reversible error.
In G.E.Y. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 701 S.W.2d 713 (Ky.App.1985), we reaffirmed the important and long-accepted principle that a judge acting as a fact-finder is presumed to have disregarded hearsay evidence in reaching his conclusions of law. Because he is trained in the law, a judge is capable of discerning "the grain from the chaff, and to decide the case alone upon the law. . .." Id. at 715 (quoting Andrews v. Hayden's Adm'rs., 88 Ky. 455, 11 S.W. 428 (Ky. App. 1889)). The admission of unreliable evidence is considered prejudicial (and potentially reversible) only where it is apparent that the trial court erroneously relied upon it to reach its decision.
From the family court's findings in this case, it is clear that it did not rely upon the challenged evidence. There is no indication whatsoever that Burke's testimony or the challenged drugs screen records were a factor in the family court's ultimate conclusion in this matter. Indeed, there is absolutely nothing in the record to support the assertion that the family court considered it. Consequently, we conclude that any error with respect to the admission of the challenged evidence was harmless since it resulted in no prejudice.
Next, the mother contends that the family court erred by permitting the admission of correspondence from Transitions/WRAP house to Lacie Marcum.
Having examined the record, we also reject this claim of error. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the challenged evidence affected the family court's ultimate conclusion. There is nothing in the record to support her claim that the family court even considered it. Again, we must conclude that any error with respect to the admission of the challenged evidence was harmless since it resulted in no prejudice.
Next, the mother contends that the family court erred by allowing proof indicating that the children's needs would be met in the future by means of adoption. We disagree with this argument.
The provisions of Kentucky Revised Statute[s] 625.090(1)(b) require the family court to consider the interests of the children and to be persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights would be in the their best interests before ordering a termination of rights. The court properly considered the evidence that was offered to show that the children were "blossoming in foster care" and that they could be expected to continue to grow and develop properly if they were eventually adopted by the foster parents. The court did not err in reviewing this evidence since it directly pertained to the best interests of the children.
Finally, the mother contends that the family court erred by failing to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the children would not likely be abused or neglected by her if they returned to her care. We disagree.
When reviewing a family court's determination of the best interests of a child, we must decide whether the court abused its discretion. D.J.D. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 350 S.W.3d 833 (Ky. App. 2011). Absent a showing that a decision to terminate parental rights was arbitrary or unsupported by sound legal principles, a family court's determination on the issue will not be considered an abuse of discretion.
In this case, the family court was persuaded — under the standard of clear and convincing evidence — that the mother had neglected the children; that she had failed to provide essential parental care for them for a period of longer than six months; that there was no reasonable expectation of improvement in her ability to provide the necessary parental care; and that it was in the children's best interests that parental rights be terminated.
Each of the family court's determinations was supported by substantial evidence. There was substantial and probative evidence of the mother's continuing addiction and complete inability to provide a safe, healthy, loving environment where the children could be expected to grow and develop properly. Similarly, there was substantial evidence indicating that there was little reason to hope for improvement in her ability to parent the children. Evaluated as a whole, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the court's determination that it was in the children's best interests to terminate the mother's parental rights. The family court did not abuse its discretion.
Therefore, we affirm the orders of the Grant Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
