JOHN PRESTON BAILEY, District Judge.
On this day, the above styled matter came before this Court for consideration of the
Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge John S. Kaull [Doc. 18]. Pursuant to this Court's Local Rules, this action was referred to Magistrate Judge Kaull for submission of a proposed report and a recommendation ("R & R"). Magistrate Judge Kaull filed his R&R on February 6, 2015, wherein he recommends that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied. On February 19, 2015, the plaintiff timely filed Objections to the R & R. [Doc. 19]. For the reasons set forth below, this Court adopts Magistrate Judge Kaull's R&R.
On August 28, 2009, Jeffrey A. Phillips filed an application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") alleging disability since June 11, 2009. [Doc. 18 at 1]. On June 13, 2011, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Mark Swayze entered a decision finding Mr. Phillips was not disabled. [Doc. 8-3 at record pg. 110-12]. Thereafter, on July 6, 2011, plaintiff filed another application for DIB alleging disability since June 11, 2009 due to rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, and depression. [Doc. 8-5 at 168-69, 199]. Mr. Phillips' applications were denied at the initial and reconsideration levels [Doc. 8-4 at 116-20, 126-28]. On April 2, 2013, Mr. Phillips had a hearing in front of ALJ Regina Carpenter. [Doc. 8-2 at 35-37]. At the hearing, Mr. Phillips, represented by counsel, Brian Bailey, testified as well as Vocational Expert ("VE") Larry Bell. [Doc. 8-2 at 35]. On April 15, 2013, the ALJ entered a decision finding Mr. Phillips not disabled. Id. at 14-29. In accordance with the five-step evaluation process described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, the ALJ made the following findings:
[Doc. 8-2 at 16-29].
On July 7, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Mr. Phillips' request for review, which made the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 15. On August 25, 2014, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration for denying plaintiff's claim for DIB under Title II of the Social Security Act. The R&R provides a detailed discussion of the plaintiff's medical history, which this Court will not rehash, and adopts the facts as stated therein. [Doc. 18].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court must conduct a de novo review of any portion of the magistrate judge's recommendation to which objection is timely made. As to those portions of a recommendation to which no objection is made, a magistrate judge's findings and recommendation will be upheld unless they are "clearly erroneous." See
An ALJ's findings will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. See
In response to the magistrate judge's R&R, the plaintiff asserts four objections to the magistrate judge's report. First, the plaintiff claims that Dr. Salman's opinion was consistent with his treatment notes, specifically concerning Mr. Phillips' limitation of missing four or more days of work per month. Second, the plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's credibility analysis is still unclear based on the ALJ crediting Mr. Phillips' statements relative to treatment notes and then discrediting statements at the hearing. Third, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not indicate how Mr. Phillips' activities of daily living equated to the ability to sustain substantial gainful activities for eight hours per day, fives days per week. Last, the plaintiff asserts that the ALJ based her medical analysis to "define the terms `stabilization' and `improvement' to mean that Mr. Phillips was capable of sustaining substantial gainful activity." [Doc. 19 at 1]. This Court will address the objections in the order that they were raised.
The plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to address why Dr. Salman's treatment notes were inconsistent with Dr. Salman's opinion that Mr. Phillips would miss more than four days of work per month. [Doc. 19 at 1]. The plaintiff also claims that the ALJ ignored 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. This Court disagrees. The plaintiff dismisses the examples the magistrate judge cites in the R&R [Doc. 18 at 36], and chose to focus on one note in a medical record. Regardless of that fact, the ALJ and the magistrate judge address the plaintiff's concern regarding Dr. Salman's inconsistences in his treatment notes. As the ALJ notes, on December 13, 2011, Dr. Salman opined that the plaintiff was unable to work gainful employment due to his disability. See [Doc. 8-9 at pg. 518 (Ex. B16F at pg. 2)]. On March 15, 2013, Dr. Salman opined that the plaintiff would likely be absent from work more than four times a month. See [Doc. 8-11 at pg. 604]. The ALJ concludes that Dr. Salman's opinion is inconsistent with the longitudinal view of the record.
Next, the plaintiff asserts that the ALJ "seems to be selectively attributing credit to only the portions of Mr. Phillips' statements . . . that show that Mr. Phillips is not disabled." [Doc. 19 at 3].
As set forth by the Magistrate Judge, an ALJ's evaluation of a claimant's credibility must be given great deference. Specifically, it has been held that an ALJ's credibility determination should only be reversed "if the claimant can show it was `patently wrong.'"
Here, the plaintiff's conclusory statement that the ALJ improperly assessed the plaintiff's credibility is unpersuasive. The plaintiff has failed to point to anywhere in the record where the ALJ summarily dismissed the plaintiff's claims at the hearing. After a careful review of the record the ALJ did not improperly weigh Mr. Phillips' credibility. This Court agrees with the magistrate judge that the ALJ properly followed the credibility assessment as outlined in
[Doc. 8-2 at pg. 19-20].
The ALJ gave several more reasons why the plaintiff was not credible, which the magistrate judge thoroughly addressed. See [Doc. 18 at 25]. The plaintiff's proof by assertion argument is crippled by not asserting any evidentiary basis for the objection and by not addressing any specific conclusions the magistrate judge raised. Accordingly, the plaintiff's objection is
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ "did not explain how the ability to attend church service relates to Mr. Phillips' limitations in daily activities; and the ALJ did not explain how Mr. Phillips' ability to attend a weekly church service was indicative of the ability to sustain work for 8 hours a day for 5 days a week." [Doc. 19 at 5].
The ALJ makes the conclusion that the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). [Doc. 8-2 at 18]. The ALJ makes a detailed finding based on the medical records and in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 96 4P. See [Doc. 8-2 at 19]. After the ALJ provided seven pages to support his opinion, the ALJ opines the following:
[Doc. 8-2 at 27].
The plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to explain how the ability to attend church service relates to Mr. Phillips' limitations in daily activities. The plaintiff supports his argument by citing to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572, which provides the definition of substantial gainful activity. [Doc. 19 at 4]. The definition states that "[g]enerally, we do not consider activities like taking care of yourself, household tasks, hobbies, therapy, school attendance, club activities, or social programs to be substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572.
The plaintiff conflates the requirement that the plaintiff show an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity with the ALJ's opinion that the record provides evidence that the plaintiff is not totally disabled. Whether the plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity is evaluated at step one of the Social Security Administration's five-step evaluation process. The ALJ determined that the plaintiff was not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 14, 2011. [Doc. 8-2 at 16]. In determining whether the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, the ALJ made the determination that the plaintiff is not totally disabled, in part, based on the plaintiff's Adult Functional Reports. [Doc. 8-6 at 206]. The ALJ found, in light of the Adult Functional Reports
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ "used her own medical analysis to define the terms `stabilization' and `improvement' to mean that Mr. Phillips was capable of sustaining substantial gainful activity." [Doc. 19 at pg. 6]. In essence, the plaintiff rehashes his argument that the ALJ dismissed Dr. Salman's opinion that—despite the record showing that Mr. Phillips had periods of improvement and stabilization— Mr. Phillips would still miss more than four days of work per month. [Doc. 19 at 6].
This Court finds no merit to the plaintiff's objection. As stated above, the ALJ properly gave Dr. Salman's opinion limited weight in reference to the March 15, 2013, Medical Source Statement that the plaintiff would miss more than four days from work a month. [Doc. 8-11 at 604]. The ALJ states that:
[Doc. 8-2 at 26].
For this reason and the reasons stated in the R&R, this Court finds that the ALJ considered the substantial evidence in the record by befittingly denoting the terms "stabilization" and "improvement."
Upon careful review of the above, it is the opinion of this Court that the
Accordingly, this Court hereby
It is so
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Order to all counsel of record herein.
