JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff Shroyer Bros., Inc. ("Shroyer") is a corporation engaged in the demolition contracting business in Delaware County, Indiana. Defendants Craig Nichols, Terry Whitt Bailey, James Lee, Doug Marshall, Aaron Wood, Brad King, and Debra Malitz all hold various positions with the City of Muncie, Indiana. This action stems from two separate incidents: (1) Shroyer performed demolition on a Budget Inn, discovered a concrete slab, and Defendants allegedly refused to perform a final inspection on the property and retained a portion of the owner's bond that Shroyer alleges it is entitled to; and (2) Shroyer contracted with the City of Muncie to perform demolition on a residential structure, had to stop mid-demolition due to a court order, was told after the order was lifted to resume demolition, but by then was working on another project and could not resume demolition that day so Defendants allegedly hired another entity to complete the project.
Shroyer asserts claims against Defendants for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conversion, and business defamation. Presently pending before the Court are several motions, including: (1) Shroyer's Application for Judgment by Default, [
Shroyer filed its initial Complaint in this matter on April 1, 2016, [
In its Motion for Default Judgment, Shroyer argues that Defendants were required to respond to the Amended Complaint within fourteen days of service or the balance of their original 60 days to respond to the initial Complaint, whichever was longer. [
Defendants respond that September 19, 2016 (the day they filed the Motion to Dismiss) was actually the deadline for filing their responsive pleading to the Amended Complaint because they were afforded three additional days since they were "responding to a pleading via the Court's CM/ECF system." [
Shroyer did not file a reply.
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth a two-step process for a party seeking default judgment. McCarthy v. Fuller, 2009 WL 3617740, at *1 (S.D. Ind. 2009); see also Lowe v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 361 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make a clear distinction between the entry of default and the entry of a default judgment."). First, the plaintiff must obtain an entry of default from the Clerk. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(a). Second, after obtaining that entry, the plaintiff may seek an entry of default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(b). The plaintiff "is not permitted to bypass the necessary step of obtaining an entry of default" before seeking an entry of default judgment. Proassurance Indemnity Company, Inc. v. Wagoner, 2016 WL 231315, *1 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (citation and quotation omitted).
Shroyer has not moved for a Clerk's entry of default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), and its Motion for Default Judgment can be denied on that basis alone. But the motion also fails substantively. The parties appear to agree that Defendants' responsive pleading was originally due September 16, 2016 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3) ("Unless the court orders otherwise, any required response to an amended pleading must be made within the time remaining to respond to the original pleading or within 14 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever is later"). [See
Defendants are correct, however, that they were entitled to an additional three days to file their responsive pleading because the Amended Complaint was served electronically. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E) (allowing service by "sending it by electronic means if the person consented in writing — in which event service is complete upon transmission, but is not effective if the serving party learns that it did not reach the person to be served"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) (version of the rule in effect before December 1, 2016 providing that "[w]hen a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F), 3 days are added after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a)").
Before considering the substantive arguments Defendants raise in their Motion to Dismiss, the Court will consider three other motions — Shroyer's Motion to Strike Immaterial and Surplus Matter from Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, [
Shroyer moves to strike portions of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, raising several arguments. First, Shroyer argues that Defendants discuss allegations they made in a state court proceeding, and then contradict themselves through arguments made in this case. [
In response, Defendants argue that material can only be stricken from a pleading, not a brief, as Shroyer requests here. [
Local Rule 56-1(i) states that "[t]he court disfavors collateral motions — such as motions to strike — in the summary judgment process. Any dispute over the admissibility or effect of evidence must be raised through an objection within a party's brief." While this rule applies in the summary judgment context, the Court finds it appropriate in the motion to dismiss context as well. The arguments that Shroyer has raised in its Motion to Strike are all arguments it could have — and in some cases, did — raise in response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Shroyer is not entitled to another brief in which to raise arguments against dismissal. Additionally, Shroyer's arguments relate to the facts the Court should consider in deciding the Motion to Dismiss, and in most cases relate to Defendants not following the correct standard. The Court is capable of applying the correct standard to the facts discussed by the parties, and deciding which of those facts are properly considered based on the motion to dismiss standard. It will not nit-pick the way that Defendants have characterized facts through a Motion to Strike, but rather will only consider the well-pled facts in the Amended Complaint when considering the Motion to Dismiss. Shroyer's Motion to Strike Immaterial and Surplus Matter from Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, [
Shroyer also moves to file a surreply to Defendants' reply brief in support of their Motion to Dismiss. [
Defendants respond that the Local Rules do not provide for a surreply on a motion to dismiss, and that leave to file a surreply should only be given when new matters are argued in a reply brief. [
Defendants are correct that the Local Rules do not give the non-movant an opportunity to file a surreply in opposition to a motion to dismiss. And while the Local Rules do provide for a surreply in connection with a motion for summary judgment, one can only be filed "if the movant cites new evidence in the reply or objects to the admissibility of the evidence cited in the response," and "must be limited to the new evidence and objections." L.R. 56-1(d). Here, even if a surreply were permitted in the motion to dismiss context under the same circumstances as it is in the summary judgment context, Shroyer's proposed surreply would still be inappropriate. In the proposed surreply, Shroyer does not address any new matters raised by Defendants in their reply brief — indeed, it makes no attempt to argue that Defendants raised new matters. [
Shroyer's Request for Oral Argument states that "a hearing is the most time-efficient means of resolving disputes on the issues" raised in the Motion to Dismiss. [
The parties' briefs have afforded the Court an adequate basis on which to rule on the pending Motion to Dismiss without the assistance of oral argument. The Court, therefore,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) "requires only `a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "Specific facts are not necessary, the statement need only `give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
A 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court will not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations as sufficient to state a claim for relief. See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). Factual allegations must plausibly state an entitlement to relief "to a degree that rises above the speculative level." Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). This plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
The factual allegations in Shroyer's Amended Complaint, which the Court must accept as true in connection with the Motion to Dismiss, are as follows:
Defendant Craig Nichols is the Building Commissioner for the City of Muncie, where he has "the sole discretion to decide whether a given structure in the City of Muncie is unsafe and must be demolished." [
Defendant Terry Whitt Bailey is the Director of the City of Muncie's Community Development Department, and "has authority to commit certain City funds toward the demolition of unsafe buildings." [
Defendants James Lee, Doug Marshall, Aaron Wood, Brad King, and Debra Malitz each hold a seat on the City of Muncie's Unsafe Building Hearing Authority ("
On March 12, 2015, Shroyer contracted with Popatlal Patel to demolish the former Budget Inn located at 2000 North Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. in Muncie (the "
Shroyer demolished the Budget Inn structure completely, and removed the concrete foundation and the asphalt which covered the parking lot that served the hotel. [
UBHA members have retained the balance of Mr. Patel's bond, until Shroyer removes the concrete pad and fuel tanks. [
On December 2, 2015, Shroyer entered into a contract with the City of Muncie to demolish a structure at 812 West 11th Street in Muncie (the "
On December 15, 2015, after Shroyer had started demolition, the Delaware Circuit Court issued an Order prohibiting the City of Muncie from demolishing the structure at 812 West 11th Street. [
On January 5, 2016, the Delaware Circuit Court issued an Order allowing demolition to resume. [
Because Shroyer could not perform the demolition on January 14, and claiming that a public emergency existed, Ms. Bailey asked the Muncie Board of Public Works to hire another company to finish removing and filling the basement at 812 West 11th Street. [
Shroyer initiated this litigation on April 1, 2016, [
Defendants argue that Shroyer fails to allege an actionable claim under § 1983, or for conversion or business defamation. [
In connection with its § 1983 claim, Shroyer states that it filed the lawsuit "to vindicate and exert the rights of the Plaintiff to equal protection under the law, including the right[:] a) to perform and be compensated for private contracts without interference by Government officials; b) to hold choses in action and a valid expectation of payment for services rendered without let, hindrance or encumbrance from the State or its political subdivisions; c) to hold property of all sorts free of Government interference, unless due process results in a legitimate taking and adequate compensation, all as assured by the 13th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. . . ." [
Defendants argue that Shroyer fails to allege a claim under § 1983 because even assuming Defendants' actions were taken under color of state law, Shroyer "received $5,000.00 more than it stood entitled to receive under the 2000 Contract," and that any injury Shroyer sustained related to the 812 Contract was "because of its own action/inaction, not because of any actions by [Defendants]." [
Shroyer argues that it has stated a claim under § 1983 because it alleges that Defendants are persons, that they acted under color of state law, that they "subjected [Shroyer], or caused [Shroyer] to be subjected, to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States," and that Shroyer was injured by Defendants' actions. [
On reply,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any . . . State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. . . ." To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that it was:
(1) deprived of a federal right, privilege, or immunity; (2) by any person acting under color of state law. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2005). "It is well-established that a plaintiff only may bring a § 1983 claim against those individuals personally responsible for the constitutional deprivation." Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2002).
"[T]he first step in [analyzing] any [1983] claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Here, Shroyer refers in passing to rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to "perform and be compensated for private contracts without interference by Government officials," "hold choses in action and a valid expectation of payment for services rendered without let, hindrance or encumbrance from the state or its political subdivisions," and "hold property of all sorts free of Government interference, unless due process results in a legitimate taking and adequate compensation. . . ." [
The Court notes at the outset that Defendants appear to agree, or at least assume for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, that they acted under color of state law. [See
As to Shroyer's substantive allegations, while the Amended Complaint is not a picture of clarity, the Court discerns the following allegations in connection with Shroyer's § 1983 claims:
The Court will consider whether Shroyer's allegations are sufficient to state claims for violation of the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, or conspiracy to violate those amendments.
The Thirteenth Amendment provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. The Thirteenth Amendment was "intended `to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery.'" Chapman v. Yellow CAB Cooperative, 2016 WL 6956624, *7 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988)).
Shroyer appears to allege that Defendants have violated his Thirteenth Amendment rights by refusing to release the bond related to the 2000 Contract until it performs additional work not covered by the contract. This allegation simply does not rise to the level of involuntary servitude contemplated by the Thirteenth Amendment. Indeed, in response to the Motion to Dismiss, Shroyer does not even mention the Thirteenth Amendment, nor cite to any authority to indicate that its allegations related to the 2000 Contract could support a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Shroyer's vague allegation that withholding the bond would cause it to have to work without compensation cannot support a claim that the Thirteenth Amendment has been violated. See United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2006) (Thirteenth Amendment claim failed where plaintiff "fail[ed] to provide any citation or basis for his assertion" that the circumstances constituted "enslavement"); United States v. Lanzotti, 205 F.3d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 2000) ("We repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived (even where those arguments raise constitutional issues)").
To the extent Shroyer alleges that Defendants' actions in connection with the 812 Contract violated the Thirteenth Amendment, those allegations also do not support such a claim. Shroyer's own allegations indicate that Shroyer ultimately did not perform the complete demolition under the 812 Contract — in fact, Shroyer alleges that Defendant's actions, and the state court order, prevented it from doing so. These allegations do not support a claim that Shroyer was forced into involuntary servitude, in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Shroyer does not set forth allegations that state a claim for violation of the Thirteenth Amendment "that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation and quotation omitted).
In the Amended Complaint, Shroyer appears to refer, in passing, to both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. [See
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. A procedural due process claim — which is what Shroyer appears to allege here — requires Shroyer to allege "(1) a cognizable property interest; (2) a deprivation of that property interest; and (3) a denial of due process." Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2007) ("In order to maintain successfully a procedural due process claim, the plaintiff[] must show that [it was] deprived of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or property. If the plaintiff[] can establish such a loss, we then must determine what process was due regarding that loss") (citing Porter v. DiBlasio, 93 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Here, Shroyer alleges that it filed the lawsuit to vindicate its rights to "hold property of all sorts free of Government interference, unless due process results in a legitimate taking and adequate compensation." [
Additionally, Shroyer's own allegations indicate that it did not perform the 812 Contract because it had committed to work on another job on January 14 2015 the day that the City wanted Shroyer to resume demolition. [
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause commands that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which essentially is a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). "All equal protection claims, regardless of the size of the disadvantaged class, are based on the principle that, under like circumstances and conditions, people must be treated alike, unless there is a rational reason for treating them differently." LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation omitted).
Again, Shroyer does not clearly allege an Equal Protection claim — it does not allege that it was treated differently than other, similarly situated, companies. To the extent that it bases its Equal Protection claim on its allegation that Mr. Nichols and Ms. Bailey removed, or may have removed, Shroyer from the list of responsive bidders for City demolition projects, such an allegation falls far short of supporting that type of claim.
Specifically, Shroyer alleges that "[Shroyer's] failure to complete [the 812 Contract] per Defendant Bailey's demand has ostensibly contributed, or will ostensibly contribute, to Defendant Nichols and Defendant Bailey removing [Shroyer] from the list of responsive bidders for City demolition projects." [
As noted above, Shroyer alleges that Defendants "committed, consented to, conspired to commit, or authorized actions," but does not refer specifically to constitutional violations. [
"To establish Section 1983 liability through a conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a state official and private individual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (2) those individual(s) were willful participants in joint activity with the State or its agents." Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). "Vague and conclusory allegations of the existence of a conspiracy are not enough to sustain a plaintiff's burden; a complaint must contain factual allegations suggesting that the defendants reached a meeting of the minds" to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. Evers v. Reak, 21 Fed. Appx. 447, 450 (7th Cir. 2001).
Here, Shroyer's conspiracy allegations could not be much vaguer. The Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations that Defendants reached an understanding with each other to deprive Shroyer of its constitutional rights, nor that they were willful participants in a conspiracy. To the extent Shroyer asserts a § 1983 conspiracy claim, it is not adequately pled and is dismissed.
Because the Court has found that Shroyer has not adequately alleged a claim under § 1983, it need not consider Defendants' qualified immunity argument. In the interest of thoroughness, however, the Court will briefly consider Defendants' argument. Defendants argue that Mr. Lee, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Wood, Mr. King, and Ms. Malitz — all UBHA members — are entitled to qualified immunity because Shroyer does not allege that those individuals "had any final decision-making authority in their official capacities with regards to any contracts with the Plaintiff." [
Shroyer responds that UBHA members would only be entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that Shroyer seeks injunctive relief. [
On reply, Defendants contend that UBHA members are entitled to qualified immunity from claims seeking monetary relief, not just injunctive relief, when they are sued in their personal capacities. [
"Government officials performing discretionary functions enjoy a qualified immunity. . . ." Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1079 (7th Cir. 2005). It is "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984, 988 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "Qualified immunity gives government officials `the benefit of legal doubts.'" Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also Findley v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Qualified immunity protects public servants from liability for reasonable mistakes made while performing their public duties"). Its purpose is "to provide reasonable notice to government officials that certain conduct violates constitutional rights before a plaintiff can subject them to liability." Narducci v. Moore, 572 F.3d 313, 318 (7th Cir. 2009). "Qualified immunity balances two important interests — the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). "Once the defense of qualified immunity is raised, `it becomes the plaintiff's burden to defeat it.'" Estate of Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388, 404 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008)).
"To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts must address two issues: (1) whether the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the violation." Rooni, 742 F.3d at 742 (citation omitted). The Court may decide these factors in either order. Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 2012). If the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the Court may exercise its discretion not to determine whether the defendant violated that plaintiff's constitutional right. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 ("[T]he judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand").
The Court notes that Shroyer does not directly address Defendants' qualified immunity argument, instead only stating that UBHA members may be entitled to qualified immunity from claims seeking injunctive relief. [
Further, and in any event, the Court has already found that Shroyer has not adequately alleged the violation of a constitutional right. Accordingly, Shroyer fails the first part of the twopart test for determining whether qualified immunity applies. See Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1995) ("When a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, this court engages in a two-part, objective inquiry: the court must determine (1) whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a federal constitutional right, and (2) whether the constitutional standards implicated were clearly established at the time in question. . . . The first part of this two-part test is a threshold issue that can defeat entirely a claim of qualified immunity. If a plaintiff's allegations, even when accepted as true, do not state a cognizable violation of constitutional rights, then the plaintiff's claim fails") (citations and quotations omitted).
In sum, Shroyer's allegations regarding any constitutional violations are vague and conclusory, and are insufficient to adequately allege a § 1983 claim. The Court notes that Shroyer's remedies in connection with the 2000 Contract and the 812 Contract may be more properly sought through breach of contract claims against the parties Shroyer contracted with. In terms of the 2000 Contract, Shroyer alleges that it contracted with Mr. Patel, so Mr. Patel is the party that owes him money for work performed under the contract. As for the 812 Contract — entered into with the City of Muncie — the involvement of City officials or employees does not automatically constitutionalize Shroyer's claims. See Horwitz-Matthews, Inc., 78 F.3d at 1250 ("when a state repudiates a contract to which it is a party it is doing nothing different from what a private party does when the party repudiates a contract; it is committing a breach of contract. It would be absurd to turn every breach of contract by a state or municipality into a violation of the federal Constitution"); Taake v. County of Monroe, 530 F.3d 538, 541-42 (7th Cir. 2008) ("we have refuted the notion that [constitutional violations are] at issue simply because a state actor allegedly broke a contract with a citizen"). The City's refusal to pay Shroyer in connection with the 812 Contract, and any issues related to Shroyer's non-performance of the 812 Contract, are more properly viewed through the lens of a breach of contract claim. Shroyer simply has not alleged that Defendants' actions in connection with the 2000 Contract or the 812 Contract (including possibly removing it from the City's list of responsive bidders for demolition projects) rise to the level of constitutional violations. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
Because the Court is dismissing Shroyer's § 1983 claim, Shroyer's only remaining claims are those brought under Indiana state law. Accordingly, the Court must determine whether to exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
The district court ultimately has discretion whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claims. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) ("The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. . . .") (citation and quotation omitted). When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, "`a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.'" City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). "In the usual case in which all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of these factors will point to declining to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining pendent statelaw claims rather than resolving them on the merits." Wright v. Associated Ins. Companies Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994).
This litigation is in the early stages. Defendants have not yet even answered the allegations of Shroyer's Amended Complaint, and no discovery has taken place. Accordingly, the Court concludes that all four factors — economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — strongly weigh in favor of it relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over Shroyer's state law claims and dismissing those claims without prejudice. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Shroyer's conversion and defamation claims is
