NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
PETTIGREW, J.
The defendant, Ralph E. Henley, was charged by grand jury indictment with one count of second degree murder, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:30.1. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. He filed motions for postverdict judgment of acquittal and new trial, both of which were denied. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. He filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the district court denied. The defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction and arguing that his sentence is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.
FACTS
In January 2011, a criminal investigator with the Pearl River County Sheriff's Department in Mississippi received a missing persons report filed by the victim's girlfriend, Crimson Pershing. Pershing and the victim, Brett Boudan, had been living together for six years. While still living with the victim, Pershing engaged in a romantic relationship with the defendant. Pershing testified that the relationship with the defendant ended two months prior to the victim's death.
The Pearl River County Sheriff's Department assisted the Pearl River Police Department in Pearl River, Louisiana, and their investigations led to the defendant. The defendant gave a taped statement wherein he claimed that he and the victim planned to meet in order for the victim to pay him money owed. He called the victim on Friday, January 14, 2011, to set up the meeting. The victim returned his call and told him to meet him at a boat landing. The defendant drove up beside the victim's vehicle at the landing, and the victim entered the defendant's vehicle. According to the defendant, the victim had a gun when he entered his vehicle and the two began wrestling for the weapon. The defendant claimed that he did not remember the gun going off and that he panicked after the victim was shot. He then began driving to the construction site, where he worked as a heavy equipment operator, and buried the victim. Because the newly dug hole caused speculation among the defendant's co-workers, the defendant went back to that location later that day, dug up the body, and moved it to a second location near a brick pile at the construction site. He then subsequently moved the body to a third location in an area where he used to go hunting in Mississippi. The defendant ultimately confessed to the killing to two of his co-workers and led authorities to the body. He claimed that he threw the gun into the river while driving down the interstate.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his first assignment of error, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction. The defendant does not contest killing the victim, but argues that he was acting in self-defense. He claims that there was only circumstantial evidence that he had the specific intent to kill.
The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, as enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821B. In conducting this review, we also must be expressly mindful of Louisiana's circumstantial evidence test, which states, in part, "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict," every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438. State v. Wright, 98-0601, p. 2 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 486, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157, 2000-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732.
The crime of second degree murder, in pertinent part, "is the killing of a human being: (1) [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]" La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific criminal intent is that "state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La. R.S. 14:10(1). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the fact finder. State v. Buchanon, 95-0625, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/96), 673 So.2d 663, 665 writ denied, 96-1411 (La. 12/6/96), 684 So.2d 923. It has long been recognized that specific intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant's act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. State v. Hoffman, 98-3118, p. 48 (La. 4/11/00), 768 So.2d 542, 585, opinion supplemented by 2000-1609 (La. 6/14/00), 768 So.2d 592 (per curiam), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 946, 121 S.Ct. 345, 148 L.Ed.2d 277 (2000).
When a defendant in a homicide prosecution claims self-defense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense. State v. Williams, 2001-0944, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So.2d 932, 939, writ denied, 2002-0399 (La. 2/14/03), 836 So.2d 135. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:20A(1) provides that a homicide is justifiable when committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger. For appellate purposes, the standard of review for a claim of self-defense is whether a rational trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense. Williams, 2001-0944 at 5-6, 804 So.2d at 939.
Doctor Michael DeFatta, a forensic pathologist and chief coroner for St. Tammany Parish, conducted an autopsy on the victim. He testified that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the victim's left temple. He noted that the victim had bruising on his neck, although not severe, which he stated could have been caused by a blow to the neck, someone holding the neck, or someone pushing the neck away.
The defendant did not testify. One of the defendant's friends testified that approximately three weeks prior to the murder, the defendant stated that he might kill someone. In his recorded statement, the defendant claimed that he and the victim struggled over the gun, and in the course of the struggle, the victim was shot. Two of the defendant's friends testified at trial that he told them that he killed the victim, but he did not "mean to kill him." However, testimony established that the defendant had no signs of physical injury nor did it appear that he had been involved in a fight. Testimony also established that although the defendant always carried a gun, the victim did not. After the victim's death, Pershing found a gun in their home under the victim's side of the mattress. Pershing testified that the victim was aware of the affair since it began and never reacted violently toward her because of it. The defendant also stated that the victim was aware of the affair.
The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given is not subject to appellate review. Thus, an appellate court will not reweigh the evidence or overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. Williams, 2001-0944 at 6, 804 So.2d at 939.
The guilty verdict in this case indicates that the jury rejected the defendant's claim that he shot the victim in self-defense and had no specific intent to kill the victim. Moreover, the defendant's actions in failing to report the shooting, fleeing from the scene, burying the body, and discarding the weapon are not consistent with a theory of self-defense. See State v. Emanuel-Dunn, 2003-0550 p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/03), 868 So.2d 75, 80, writ denied, 2004-0339 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 829; State v. Wallace, 612 So.2d 183, 191 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So.2d 1253 (La. 1993). Flight following an offense reasonably raises the inference of a "guilty mind." State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 n.4 (La. 1984).
A rational juror could have found that the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. Thus, we find no error in the jury's rejection of the defendant's claim of self-defense. Accordingly, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207, pp. 14-15 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the trier of fact. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306, pp. 1-2 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). We are convinced that any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis, all of the elements of second degree murder. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE
In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by not considering the seriousness of the crime, his criminal history, his personal history, and his potential for rehabilitation. He further claims that the district court has the authority to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence if the sentence would be constitutionally excessive.
Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm caused to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. State v. Reed, 409 So.2d 266, 267 (La. 1982).
Under Section 14:30.1B, a person convicted of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Courts are charged with applying statutorily mandated punishment unless it is unconstitutional. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1278 (La. 1993). Indeed, it is incumbent on the defendant to rebut the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional by "clearly and convincingly" showing that "[he] is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case." State v. Johnson, 97-1906, p. 8 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676; State v. Henderson, 99-1945, p. 19 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/23/00), 762 So.2d 747, 760, writ denied, 2000-2223 (La. 6/15/01), 793 So.2d 1235.
The defendant does not attempt to rebut the presumption that the mandatory sentence for a second degree murder conviction is constitutional. The defendant fails to give a single reason why the sentence is excessive to him in particular. He simply complains that the district court sentenced him without considering the seriousness of the offense, his criminal and personal history, and the potential for rehabilitation. During sentencing, the district court stated that the jury rendered their verdict and the defendant was guilty of second degree murder. It stated that the mandatory sentence under that statute was life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth items that must be considered by the district court before imposing sentence. Generally, the district court need not recite the entire checklist of factors, but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the guidelines. The factors guiding the decision of the district court are necessary for an appellate court to adequately review a sentence for excessiveness and, therefore, should be in the record. Otherwise, a sentence may appear to be arbitrary or excessive and not individualized to the particular defendant.
The failure to articulate reasons for the sentence as set forth in Article 894.1 when imposing a mandatory life sentence is not an error; however, articulating reasons or factors would be an exercise in futility since the court has no discretion. State v. Felder, 2000-2887, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 360, 371, writ denied, 2001-3027 (La. 10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1173. Moreover, the defendant has failed to give any reasons why the circumstances of his case are so exceptional that the statutory mandatory sentence was not meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. See Henderson, 99-1945 at 20, 762 So.2d at 761. Accordingly, this assignment of error has no merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
