HENRY R. WILHOIT, Jr., District Judge.
Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to challenge a final decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiff's application for supplemental security income benefits. The Court having reviewed the record in this case and the dispositive motions filed by the parties, and being otherwise sufficiently advised, for the reasons set forth herein, finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
Plaintiff filed her current application for supplemental security income benefits in 2012, alleging disability beginning in 1998, due to a gun shot wound in her left hand and mental problems (Tr. 186). This application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Thereafter, upon request by Plaintiff, an administrative hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge Bonnie Kittinger (hereinafter "ALJ"), wherein Plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, testified. At the hearing, Jackie Rogers, a vocational expert (hereinafter "VE"), also testified.
At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the following five-step sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Plaintiff was disabled:
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from left ring finger amputation, left hip problem and depression, which he found to be "severe" within the meaning of the Regulations (Tr. 11).
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal any of the listed impairments (Tr. 11). In doing so, the ALJ specifically considered Listings 1.02, 1.05, 12.04 and 12.06 (Tr. 11-12).
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a limited range of medium work, with certain restrictions as set forth in the hearing decision (Tr. 12).
The ALJ finally concluded that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national and regional economies, as identified by the VE (Tr. 14).
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not to be disabled at Step 5 of the sequential evaluation process.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil action seeking a reversal of the Commissioner's decision. Both parties have filed Motions for Summary Judgment [Docket Nos. 12 and 13] and this matter is ripe for decision.
The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6
On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's erred at Step 3 by failing to find that she meets the requirements of Listings 12.04 and 12.06.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Herr v. Commissioner of Social Security, 203 F.3d 388, 391 (6
"The listing of impairments `provides descriptions of disabling conditions and the elements necessary to meet the definition of disabled for each impairment." Arnold, at **2, quoting Maloney v. Commissioner, 211 F.3d 1269, 2000 WL 420700 (6
Listing 12.04 provides:
20 C.F.R. Ch. III, Pt. 404, Subpt. P. App. 1, 12.04.
Listing 12.06 provides:
20 C.F.R. Ch. III, Pt. 404, Subpt. P. App. 1, 12.06.
In support of her argument, Plaintiff relies upon the opinion of Michele Amburgey, M.A., a licensed clinical psychologist who saw Plaintiff on one occasion in April of 2013. Ms. Amburgey took a personal and family history, performed a mental status examination and a clinical interview. She diagnosed major depression, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), extremely low verbal comprehension and working memory, borderline perceptual reasoning and processing speed, and mild retardation. (Tr. pg. 322-324). She assessed a current GAF of 51, found psychological issues and social isolation. (Tr. pg. 324). She also determined that claimant would need assistance in managing finances. (Tr. pg. 324). She concluded claimant was hindered by her hand injury and hip problems. (Tr. pg. 324). She further found claimant's depression would interfere with her reliability as an employee and claimant would not be able to maintain a normal pace or adapt to changes in her routine. (Tr. pg. 324).
The ALJ gave this opinion little weight and specifically set forth her reasons for doing so, specifically that Ms. Amburgey saw Plaintiff once and, further, that her opinion was not supported by other evidence in the record. Having reviewed the record, the Court finds no error in this regard. First, as a one-time examiner, Ms. Amburgey's opinion is not entitled to special deference. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 (length and nature of treatment relationship and supportability are relevant factors when evaluating opinion evidence). In addition, as the ALJ noted, Ms. Amburgey's opinions are entirely at odds with evidence from Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist and therapists from Kentucky River Community Care, who noted that Plaintiff's mood and sleep improved with medication and Plaintiff's own reports in May, June, and September 2012 that she was doing well and "feeling happy" (Tr. 310-14). Furthermore, there is no medical support for Ms. Amburgey's diagnosis of anxiety with panic attacks, and that diagnosis appears to be based entirely on Plaintiff's subjective complaints. Her opinion is not a proper basis for a finding of presumptive disability at Step 3.
Moreover, Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a finding that she met the specific requirements of marked limitations in at least two domains of functioning. Plaintiff asserts in her brief that she had marked limitations in her ability to perform daily activities and marked deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace, but she provides no objective medical evidence to support her contentions. However, the evidence of record reveals that mental status examination findings were consistently normal (Tr. 225-65, 294-305, 310-14) and she reported improved mood and sleep when she was taking her medication (Tr. 310-14). Absent specific findings to support Plaintiff's claims that she has marked mental limitations, her argument has no merit. As such, Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden in proving that she met or equaled Listing 12.04 or 12.06.
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ "mechanically" applied the Medical-Vocational guidelines to find her disabled without considering her non-exertional impairments and "ignored" her mental impairments. This argument is not only confusing but contrary to the record. With regard to the guidelines, the ALJ did not "mechanically" apply them. Rather, she obtained evidence from the VE to assist her in determining the extent to which Plaintiff's combined impairments impacted her ability to perform basic work-related activities (Tr. 41-45). See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00.
As for Plaintiff's mental impairments, the ALJ did not "ignore" Plaintiff's mental impairments, but considered them in combination with her other impairments and found that she could follow only simple and some detailed (but not complex) instructions and maintain concentration and attention sufficient to perform only simple tasks (Tr. 12). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff should not interact with the public more than occasionally (Tr. 12). As he ALJ found Plaintiff had these and other non-exertional limitations, she properly received evidence from the VE, who identified more than 21,000 jobs in Kentucky that Plaintiff could perform considering her vocational profile and RFC (Tr. 43-44). It is unclear from Plaintiff's brief what additional limitations the record compelled the ALJ to include in her RFC finding.
The Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record. Accordingly, it is