MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................865
II. ANALYSIS ..........................................................866
III. CONCLUSION ........................................................874
This case presents an issue of first impression, the resolution of which will determine whether Defendant Richard Shaffer (Shaffer) spends the rest of his life in a federal prison. Shaffer recently pleaded guilty to bank robbery, a serious violent felony under federal law. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) — the federal three strikes law — a defendant convicted of a serious violent felony receives a mandatory life sentence if he "has been convicted (and those convictions have become final) on separate prior occasions in a court of the United States or of a State of ... 2 or more serious violent felonies...." 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). Shaffer has two prior serious-violent-felony convictions: one from a federal district court and another from an Army general court-martial. The question is: Is a court-martial "a court of the United States" under § 3559(c)? If it is, Shaffer gets a mandatory life sentence. If it is not, Shaffer's sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines is 46 to 57 months, and his statutory maximum sentence is 20 years.
Shaffer is before me for final sentencing today. Shaffer has filed a sentencing memorandum in which he argues that § 3559(c) does not apply because Shaffer's court-martial is not a conviction in "a court of the United States." The Government argues it is. After Shaffer's initial, but uncompleted, sentencing hearing, I provided the parties with a tentative opinion in which I tentatively concluded that a court-martial is "a court of the United States" under § 3559(c). The parties were then given the opportunity to file objections to the tentative opinion before I imposed a sentence. Shaffer filed objections, which expound upon his original argument that a
On February 10, 2014, Shaffer pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The robbery occurred on October 12, 2012. Shaffer walked into a bank in Sioux City, Iowa, approached a teller, and handed her a note demanding money. The note read: "Be Quiet (GUN) Gimmie the money in the drawer and the replenishment drawer 100, 50, 20, 10, 5, Now Be Quiet!" The teller gave Shaffer $3,710 and Shaffer fled with the money. Police arrested Shaffer the next day on an outstanding warrant. Police then searched Shaffer's girlfriend's home, with her consent, where they found the clothes Shaffer had worn during the robbery and the note he handed to the teller.
Ordinarily, Shaffer's bank robbery would carry a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). But here, the Government seeks an enhanced sentence of life in prison under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), which provides:
18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1). Shaffer's most recent bank robbery conviction qualifies as a "serious violent felony." 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). In addition to his most recent offense, Shaffer has two prior felony convictions that the Government relies on in seeking a life sentence. Shaffer has a 1979 conviction in a United States Army General court-martial for unpremeditated murder, for which he was sentenced to 25 years confinement at hard labor and served 18 years. Shaffer also has a 2004 conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska for six consolidated bank robberies.
Shaffer does not dispute any of this. Rather, he argues that his court-martial conviction was not a conviction "in a court of the United States or of a State" and, therefore, it cannot serve as a predicate offense under § 3559(c). The Government argues that a court-marital is "a court of the United States." If it is, § 3559(c) applies and Shaffer gets a life sentence. If it
Section 3559 does not define "a court of the United States." Thus, I look to familiar rules of statutory interpretation to determine whether the phrase includes courts-martial. In interpreting § 3559(c), I give the statute's "words their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning...." Hennepin Cnty. v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n, 742 F.3d 818, 821 (8th Cir.2014) (quoting United States v. Friedrich, 402 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir.2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). I must "interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context, structure, history, and purpose." Abramski v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 2267, 189 L.Ed.2d 262 (2014) (quoting Maracich v. Spears, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 2209, 186 L.Ed.2d 275 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A [phrase] in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities." Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006). Determining a phrase's limits "depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis." Id. A statute's text itself may be evidence of the statute's purpose. See, e.g., AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1748, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011) (noting that the Federal Arbitration Act's purpose "is readily apparent from [its] text"). If, after reading a statute in its proper context, that statute is unambiguous, then the "judicial inquiry is complete." United States v. Smith, 756 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
Based on these standards, I conclude that the phrase "a court of the United States," as used in § 3559(c), includes United States military courts-martial. A court-martial is certainly a "court." See Anderson v. Crawford, 265 F. 504, 506 (8th Cir.1920) ("A court-martial is a court of limited jurisdiction." (quoting Deming v. McClaughry, 113 F. 639, 650 (8th Cir. 1902))). Courts-martial are also naturally courts "of the United States" given their role in our federal constitutional and statutory scheme. Courts-martial are courts created by Congress and authorized by Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261-62, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 107 S.Ct. 2924, 97 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); see also U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14, 76 S.Ct. 1, 100 L.Ed. 8 (1955) ("Article I ... authorizes Congress to subject persons actually in the armed service to trial by court-martial for military and naval offenses." (footnote omitted)). Courts-martial are largely governed by federal statute: the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946. The UCMJ classifies courts-martial, regulates their composition, and defines their jurisdiction. Id. §§ 816-829. Specifically, "general courts-martial have jurisdiction to try persons subject to [the UCMJ] for any offense made punishable by [the UCMJ] and may, under such limitations as the President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden by [the UCMJ]...." Id. § 818(a). Decisions by courts-martial can be appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, id. § 866, and later to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) (formerly the
Given that courts-martial are creatures of federal constitutional and statutory law, and that their cases can ultimately be reviewed by the Supreme Court, Shaffer's claim that a court-martial is not "a court of the United States" raises the question: If a court-martial is not "a court of the United States," then what is it a court of? Shaffer offers no answer. A court-martial is certainly not a court of a State or municipality. Nor is it a court of a foreign country or international body. It seems that a United States military court-martial could only be "a court of the United States." Cf. Gagnon v. United States, 42 C.M.R. 1035, 1041-42 (C.M.A.1970) (Gray, S.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("That a general court-martial, at least while in session, is a court of the United States is hardly open to question."), on reh'g, 43 C.M.R. 933 (A.F.C.M.R.1971), rev'd, 44 C.M.R. 212 (C.M.A.1972).
Moreover, treating a court-martial as "a court of the United States" is consistent with § 3559(c)'s purpose. That purpose — evident in § 3559(c)'s text — is to enhance the sentences of defendants who have committed three "serious violent felonies." The statute broadly defines "serious violent felonies" to include:
18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F) (emphasis added). The definition's expansive language, emphasized above, allows a wide range of crimes to qualify as "serious violent felonies." See United States v. Wicks, 132 F.3d 383, 387 (7th Cir.1997) ("Both the language of [§ 3559] and its legislative history support the proposition that it reaches a broad range of both state and federal crimes.").
Specifically, § 3559(c)'s definition of "serious violent felony" covers Shaffer's court-marital conviction for murder. First, Shaffer's court-martial conviction was for "a Federal or State offense, by whatever designation and wherever committed, consisting of murder (as described in section 1111)...." 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). Shaffer's crime — unpremeditated murder — is a federal offense under Article 118 of the UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. § 918. It also comports with 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a)'s definition of murder: "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought." See also United States v. Pearson, 159 F.3d 480, 486 (10th Cir.1998) (noting that, under § 1111, "murder's malice aforethought element [can be] satisfied by ... intent-to-kill without the added ingredients
To support his claim that a court-martial is not "a court of the United States," Shaffer relies heavily on the differences between military and civilian courts. Shaffer cites Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974), in which the United States Supreme Court noted that, "[j]ust as military society has been a society apart from civilian society, so `(m)ilitary law ... is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.'" (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953)). The Court in Parker also recognized that "[t]he differences ... between the military community and the civilian community, and ... between military law and civilian law, continue in the present day under the [UCMJ]" and that the UCMJ "cannot be equated to a civilian criminal code." Id. at 749, 94 S.Ct. 2547. In addition to Parker, Shaffer points out that courts-martial are not Article III courts.
But these differences, while true, do not resolve the question here. Shaffer's argument
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an argument similar to Shaffer's in United States v. Lee, 428 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.1970). The defendant in Lee was convicted under a federal statute that provided:
Id. at 919-20. The defendant's conviction rested, in part, on his prior conviction in an Air Force court-martial for rape. Id. at 918. Like Shaffer, the defendant in Lee argued that the federal statute did not apply to him because "a court martial is not a part of the judicial branch of the Federal Government and, therefore, judgments rendered by military tribunals are not within the contemplation of the statute." Id. at 920. The court rejected the defendant's argument, reasoning as follows:
Id. Like the statute at issue in Lee, § 3559(c)'s language does not limit its applicability to Article III or civilian courts. Thus, because court-martial convictions are no less conclusive than those in Article III courts, the differences between the two court types alone cannot prevent Shaffer's court-martial conviction from qualifying as a predicate felony under § 3559(c).
More recent cases interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) are also instructive here. The ACCA provides enhanced penalties for defendants who are convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and who have "three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another...." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (emphasis added). Section 922(g)(1) provides:
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). Three federal appeals courts have addressed the question: Does the term "any court" in §§ 924 and 922 include a court-martial? All three have concluded, "yes." United States v. Grant, 753 F.3d 480, 485 (4th Cir.2014); United States v. Martinez, 122 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir.1997); United
In United States v. Grant, 753 F.3d 480, 482 (4th Cir.2014), a defendant argued that "his court-martial convictions [did] not constitute predicate convictions for enhancements under the ACCA because a general court-martial [did] not constitute `any court.'" The defendant in Grant relied on Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 394, 125 S.Ct. 1752, 161 L.Ed.2d 651 (2005), in which the United States Supreme Court held that § 922(g)'s term "any court" presumptively referred only to domestic courts (as opposed to foreign courts). In holding that "any court" meant any domestic court, the Supreme Court relied, in part, on the differences between foreign and domestic convictions. See id. at 389, 125 S.Ct. 1752 (noting that "foreign convictions differ from domestic convictions in important ways" and that "[p]ast foreign convictions ... may include a conviction for conduct that domestic laws would permit"). The defendant in Grant tried to apply the same reasoning to his predicate court-martial conviction, arguing that "just as there are differences between foreign and domestic courts ... there are also differences between general courts-martial and civilian courts that warrant not classifying individuals as armed career criminals due to their military convictions." Grant, 753 F.3d at 483. But the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that a court-martial was not "any court." Id. at 485. The court noted that, although the defendant "correctly identifies several dissimilarities between courts-martial and civilian courts, these differences do not rise to the level of the contrasts between domestic and foreign courts that Small highlighted." Id. The court also found that "[i]ncluding court-martial convictions for violent felonies in the armed career criminal tabulation furthers Congress's objective of identifying and deterring career offenders." Id. As I discussed above, the same is true here.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a similar argument in United States v. Martinez, 122 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 1997). The defendant in Martinez argued "that a military court is not a `court' within the meaning of the [ACCA]...." Id. at 424. The court in Martinez disagreed:
Id. The court also relied on Lee's reasoning that "[t]he language of [§ 922(g)] is not limited to judgments rendered by Article III courts." Id. (quoting Lee, 428 F.2d at 920). The court thus held that the defendant's conviction by a general court-martial, under the UCMJ, was a conviction by "any court." Id.
Finally, in United States v. MacDonald, 992 F.2d 967, 969 (9th Cir.1993), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the very argument Shaffer makes here — that a court-martial is too different from a civilian court to be covered by the term "any court":
Like the court in Martinez, the court in MacDonald also found that treating court-martial convictions as convictions in "any court" under § 922(g) was "consistent with the statutory purpose, `to keep guns out of the hands of presumptively risky people.'" Id. at 970 (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983)). Thus, the court in MacDonald held "that a general court-martial is a `court' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)...." Id.
Like the courts in Grant, Martinez, and MacDonald,
Shaffer suggests that these ACCA cases are inapplicable here because the ACCA uses the term "any court," which is broader than the term "a court of the United States" under § 3559. While the terms
Shaffer also cites United States v. Stuckey, 220 F.3d 976 (8th Cir.2000) in response to the ACCA cases. In Stuckey, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant's prior court-martial drug convictions were not "serious drug offenses" under the ACCA. Id. at 984. But the court in Stuckey did not hold, or even suggest, that a court-martial is not "any court" under the ACCA. To the contrary, the court implicitly recognized what Grant, Martinez, and MacDonald expressly held — that a military court-martial conviction is a conviction in "any court":
Id. Shaffer's reliance on Stuckey is, therefore, misplaced.
In addition to noting the differences between military and civilian courts, Shaffer makes a few arguments based on the language in various statutes. For instance, Shaffer argues that "18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) could have referred specifically to prior convictions in military courts as well as convictions in state court, but Congress did not choose to include convictions in military courts" (docket no. 47, at 6-7). This argument fails for the same reason discussed earlier; it begs the question by presuming that the phrase "a court of the United States" does not include military courts. One could just as easily argue that Congress did not refer specifically to military courts in § 3559(c) because it considered military courts to be "court[s] of the United States," thus making a separate reference to military courts unnecessary.
Shaffer also argues that other federal statutes treat courts-martial and "court[s] of the United States" as separate entities. But none of the statutes Shaffer cites bears on what "a court of the United States" means under § 3559(c). A court-martial and a "court of the United States" may be distinguishable for the purposes of certain statutes, but not for the purposes of others. That determination has to be made based on the language and context of each particular statute. For all the reasons discussed above, specific to § 3559(c), I conclude that a court-martial conviction is a conviction in "a court of the United States" under § 3559(c).
Finally, I note that the rule of lenity does not apply here. "[T]he rule of lenity applies only if, after using the usual tools of statutory construction, we are left with a `grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.'" Robers v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1854, 1859, 188 L.Ed.2d 885 (2014) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). After applying "the usual tools of statutory construction" above, I find no ambiguity or uncertainty in the scope of § 3559(c), let alone a "grievous" ambiguity or uncertainty. "Although
For the reasons discussed above, Shaffer's conviction in an Army court-martial is a conviction in "a court of the United States." Thus, Shaffer receives a mandatory life sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c).
Id. at 507. The court in Mills, however, did not cite any authority for its assumption that "only the courts of general jurisdiction" are included in statutory references to "the courts of the United States." In fact, the Mills court simply asserted that "it requires no elaboration of argument or citation of authorities to show that when there is mention, either in the Constitution or in the statute law, of the courts of the United States, the courts thereby meant are those of general jurisdiction...." Id. at 506-07. (Mills also incorrectly describes certain federal courts as "courts of general jurisdiction." All federal courts are, in fact, courts of limited jurisdiction. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978) ("It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.")). In light of the more modern rules of statutory interpretation and case law cited in this opinion, I decline to apply Mills's rationale here.
The second case is United States v. Long, 6 C.M.R. 60 (C.M.A.1952). One of the issues in Long was whether a summary court-martial was "any court of the United States" for the purposes of a statute that provided:
Id. at 64 (emphasis added). The majority opinion did not attempt to resolve the issue. But a concurring opinion reasoned that a summary court-martial was not "any court of the United States," applying logic similar to Shaffer's:
Id. at 72 (Brosman, J., concurring). For the reasons stated later in this opinion, I do not find the Long concurrence's logic to be persuasive, at least as applied to § 3559(c).
I disagree with the Grant court's opinion that Small "diminished" the reliability of Martinez and MacDonald. First, Small did not "foreclose" Martinez's reasoning that the word "any" expands the word "court" to include courts-martial. Contrary to the Grant court's assertion, Small did not hold that the term "any court" is ambiguous as between all possible interpretations of that term. Small only held that the word "any" did not itself resolve whether the term "any court" referred to domestic and foreign courts, or only to domestic courts. Small, 544 U.S. at 388, 125 S.Ct. 1752. Small did not hold that the term "any court" was ambiguous as to whether it included different types of domestic courts, like courts-martial. Second, to the extent that MacDonald relied, in part, on cases that Small overruled, I do not rely on those cases or those portions of MacDonald here.
