KAREN WELLS ROBY, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is a
This action was filed in the District Court on July 21, 2016 by Plaintiff Thomas D'aquin ("Plaintiff") asserting claims which appear to arise out of a contract dispute with the Defendants. R. Doc. 1. The Plaintiffs allegations are difficult to decipher. On one hand, the Plaintiff appears to allege that because of a contract with the Defendants his non-profit ACES attempted to relocate. R. Doc. 1, p. 1-2. After relocation, the Plaintiff further seems to allege that the Defendant wrongfully breached that the contract. Id. at p. 2. On the other, the Plaintiff appears to be making a claim that as an employee he was wrongfully terminated. He also appears to assert some claims connected to discrimination because the contract was terminated after "Plaintiff informed Defendant that wife was having immigration problems and was black." Id. For this, the Plaintiff seeks damages related to the relocation of his non-profit, loss of revenue and expenses as well as $2,000,000 in damages from each of the Defendants. Id.
After receiving an extension of time to answer (R. Doc. 8), the Defendants filed the instant motion for a more definite statement on November 10, 2016. R. Doc. 9. The Defendants argue that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, and incoherent. R. Doc. 9-1, p. 2. In particular, the Defendants seek clarification as to:
Id. at p. 6-7.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) allows a party to move for "a more definite statement of a pleading . . . which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Additionally, the motion must be made prior to filing a responsive pleading and "point out the defects complained of and the details desired." Id. However, 12(e) motions are generally disfavored given the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8. David v. C & G Boats, Inc., No. 15-1655, 2015 WL 5553668, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 18, 2015) (Vance, J.) (citing Mitchell v. E-Z Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959)). As such, "[t]he standard for evaluating a 12(e) motion is whether the complaint is `so excessively vague and ambiguous as to be unintelligible and as to prejudice the defendant seriously in attempting to answer it.'" Phillips v. ABB Combustion Eng'g, Inc., No. 13-594, 2013 WL 3155224, at *2 (E.D. La. June 19, 2013) (quoting Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. McGriff, Seibels & Williams, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 632, 633 (E.D.La.2006)). To do this, the Court determines whether the complaint would withstand a motion to dismiss based on the appropriate pleading standard. Id. See also, Koerner v. Vigilant Ins. Co., No. 16-13319, 2016 WL 4728902, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 12, 2016).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) states that a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "It is well-established, of course, that the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis necessarily incorporates the federal pleading standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: `To pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6), [a] complaint must have contained `enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Int'l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., 818 F.3d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 2016). "`The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'" Koerner, 2016 WL 4728902, at *1 (quoting Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2015)). However, mere conclusory or formulistic recitation of the elements required to plead to a claim are insufficient. See Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 555 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
The Defendant has filed a motion for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(e). R. Doc. 9. The Defendant challenges that the Plaintiff's complaint is impermissibly vague, ambiguous, and incoherent, and the Defendants seek clarification for seven particular areas. R. Doc. 9-1, p. 6.
"A pleading which violates Rule 8 may be dismissed when it is `so verbose, confused and redundant that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'" Young v. Marriot Corp., No. 92-3318, 1992 WL 329531, at *1 (E.D. La. 1992) (quoting Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir.)). Upon reviewing the Plaintiff's complaint, the Court agrees with the Defendant that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, and nigh incoherent to the point that "its true substance . . . is well disguised" even under the liberal standard used to evaluate pro se pleadings. Id.
Accordingly,