PAINTER, Judge.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in Cross Claim, Excell Crane & Hydraulics, Inc. (Excell), recognizing that Defendant in Cross Claim, Hercules Offshore, Inc. (Hercules), was required to defend and indemnify Excell with respect to a lawsuit filed by one of Hercules' employees and ordered Hercules to pay $126,024.51 plus legal interest from the date of judicial demand to Ex cell. We affirm.
Kevin C. Currey (Currey) allegedly suffered serious personal injuries in the course and scope of his employment with Hercules on an oil drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico when an elevator in which he was a passenger fell. He alleged that Excell negligently inspected, maintained, repaired, and certified that the elevator in question was safe for operation. Hercules ultimately reached a settlement agreement with Currey. Prior to the settlement, Excell filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a ruling that Hercules was required to defend and indemnify Excell under the Master Service Agreement (MSA) relating to the elevator in question and entered into by Excell and Hercules on March 25, 2002. Hercules filed a cross motion for summary judgment seeking a ruling that the indemnity obligation was not triggered because the amount of insurance coverage Excell was required to obtain had not been exhausted. The trial court agreed with Excell, and Hercules filed a writ application with this court. The writ application was denied in an unpublished opinion rendered November 4, 2011, finding that an ordinal), appeal after complete and final aciudication would afford Hercules adequate relief. Currey v. Ewell Crane & Hydraulics, Inc., 11-905 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/11). Hercules paid the settlement, and a judgment of dismissal of all of Currey's claims, but reserving the rights of Hercules and Excell against each other, was entered. Excell then filed a motion for summary judgment concerning its claim for reimbursement of defense costs. This motion was granted by the trial court, and Hercules was ordered to pay $126,024.51 plus legal interest from the date of judicial. demand. However, insofar as the motion sought reimbursement for defense costs incurred in pursuing the indemnity claim, it was denied. Hercules appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's rulings.
"The interpretation of a contract's provisions is typically a matter of law that properly may be decided on motion for summary judgment." Iteld v. Four Corners Coml., L.P., 12-1504, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/5/13), ___ So.3d ___, ___ (citing Hall v. Malone, 12-264 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/7/12), 104 So.3d 593). With respect to the standard of review, "[w]hen addressing legal issues, a reviewing court gives no special weight to the findings of the trial court. It conducts a de novo review of questions of law and renders a judgment on the record" Huston v. City of New Orleans, 12-1171 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/27/13), ___ So.3d ___, ___ writ denied, 13-695 (La. 5/17/13), 118 So.3d 381, quoting Campbell v. Markel Amer. Ins. Co., 00-1448, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/21/01), 822 So.2d 617, 620, writ denied, 01-2813 (La. 1/4/02), 805 So.2d 204 (citing Gaylord Container Corp. v. CNA Ins. Companies, 99-1795 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/03/01), 807 Sold 864, writ denied, 01-2368 (La. 12/7/01) 803 So.2d 31).
Hercules asserts one assignment of error:
Hercules asserts that the MSA provides that it shall be governed by the general maritime law of the United States. Hercules points to the following relevant contract provisions.
Hercules contends that Exhibit "A" to the MSA provides that Hercules must be named as an additional assured under any insurance policy and that such policies shall be primary as to additional assureds. Hercules contends that "[t]he separate and independent insurance and indemnity provisions thus exhibit that the MSA has reciprocal indemnity obligations, but a one-sided insurance requirement in Hercules' favor." Hercules further contends that "[i]f the parties had intended the mutual, reciprocal indemnity obligations to come first, they would have had any insurance requirement be limited by the indemnity obligation or required the insurance requirements to also be reciprocal." Hercules asserts that Ogea v. Loffland Bros. Co., 622 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1980) and its progeny lead to the conclusion that "[e]ither Hercules is covered as an additional insured for Currey's claims, which coverage primes Hercules' indemnity obligation[;) or Excell breached the MSA, is liable to Hercules for damages caused by its failure to satisfy its contractual obligations[,) and Hercules is relieved on any obligation to indemnity Excel"
Excell frames the issue simply as: "whether the indemnity provision in favor of Excell is negated by an unrelated additional insured provision." Excell asserts that this court has explicitly rejected the argument advanced by Hercules in Spell v. X.L. Indus., Inc., 618 So.2d 17 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 624 So.2d 1224 (La.1993). We wee.
In Spell, the contract at issue provided for reciprocal indemnity. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that "the contractual provisions regarding indemnity and insurance are independent and the indemnification provision remains effective regardless of whether Two "R" complied with the insurance provision in question." Id. at 19. This court further noted that "[T]he trial judge found nothing in the contract requiting compliance with the insurance provision for the indemnification provision to remain effective." Id. We note the finding that:
Id. at 19-20.
Such is the case here. Moreover, "[t]he rules of contractual interpretation simply do not authorize . . . the exercise of inventive powers to create an ambiguity where none exists or the making of a new contract when the terms express with sufficient clarity the parties' intent." Iteld at p. 7. Accordingly, we find that the trial judge was legally correct in finding that Hercules owed contractual defense and indemnity to Excell.
We affirm the trial court's ruling that Excell was entitled to defense and indemnity from Hercules under the MSA. We also affirm the trial court judgment ordering Hercules to pay the costs of defense in the amount of $126,024.51 plus legal interest from the date of judicial demand. Further, we affirm the trial court's denial of reimbursement of Excell's defense costs related to the pursuit of the indemnity claim. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Hercules.