SARAH S. VANCE, District Judge.
John D. Floyd was convicted of second degree murder in Louisiana state court in January, 1982 and sentenced to life in prison. He now petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Magistrate Judge Knowles issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that Floyd's petition be granted on grounds that the State withheld material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that the Louisiana courts' contrary decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Having reviewed the parties' briefing, the Magistrate Judge's Report, and the parties' objections to the Report and related responses, the Court approves the Report and adopts it as its opinion with the following additional discussion.
The Court has already given a full procedural and factual background of this case.
On January 19, 1981, petitioner John D. Floyd confessed to murdering both Hines and Robinson.
Bar owner Steven Edwards testified that around the time of Hines' murder, Edwards spotted Floyd trying to enter Edwards's bar.
As to Robinson, Floyd's acquaintance and former sexual partner Byron Gene Reed, testified that Floyd once threatened to "take care of [Reed] like he did the one at the Fairmont."
At the conclusion of his joint bench trial, Floyd was convicted of second-degree murder of William Hines, but acquitted of second-degree murder of Rodney Robinson. State v. Floyd, 435 So.2d 992, 992 (La. 1983). Despite Floyd's confession and other statements, he was acquitted of the Robinson murder based on evidence suggesting that Robinson was killed by an African-American man with Type A blood. Id. at 994. Floyd is white and has Type B blood. Id. Floyd's conviction became final when the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court on June 27, 1983. Id. at 992.
Floyd first filed an application for habeas corpus relief in state court on March 2, 2006, twenty-three years after the Louisiana Supreme Court finalized his conviction.
Court finds that the Defendant in this matter, Mr. John Floyd, has failed to meet his burden of proof required in his Post-Conviction Application. Accordingly, sir, at this time, your application is denied. We'll note the Defense's objections, and let the Appellate process begin. Good luck.
Without assigning additional reasons, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Floyd's writ application by 4-3 vote. Floyd v. Cain, 62 So.3d 57 (La. 2011).
At the conclusion of his post-conviction proceedings in state court, Floyd promptly petitioned this Court for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
On September 14, 2016, this Court—considering both old and new evidence
Floyd v. Cain, No. 11-2819, 2016 WL 4799093, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 2016) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court found that Floyd had satisfied the standard necessary to overcome the untimeliness of his habeas petition and remanded Floyd's petition to the Magistrate Judge for an evaluation on the merits. Id.
Floyd's original habeas petition asserted three bases for relief: the State suppressed material, favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); the State destroyed evidence in violation of Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); and Floyd is entitled to habeas relief because he is actually innocent.
In his Second Supplemental Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Knowles recommended that Floyd's Youngblood and actual innocence claims be denied, but that his Brady claim be granted.
Both Floyd and the State objected to the Report and Recommendation. Floyd's objection advances two arguments: (1) the Court need not defer to the state court's habeas ruling because the state court failed to consider important evidence; and (2) the Court could find that Floyd prevailed on his Brady claim based on the other evidence not considered by Magistrate Judge Knowles.
The Court applies de novo review to the parties' objections to the Report and Recommendation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3). The Court is, however, limited to plain error review of any part of the report not subject to a proper objection. Starns v. Andrews, 524 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2008).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 defines "[t]he statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody." Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 120 (2011). Under AEDPA, a federal habeas court may not grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). "A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law if it `correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case.'" Cobb v. Thaler, 682 F.3d 364, 373 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08). This demanding standard is "met only `in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents.'" Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). The state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness, and they can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Section 2254(d) applies with equal force to a summary denial. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 187 (2011). Where, as here, state courts have offered only summary denials of the petitioner's claim, the prisoner "can satisfy the `unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) only by showing that `there was no reasonable basis' for the" state court's decision. Id. at 188 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). In considering whether any reasonable basis could support the state court's decision, the Court "must determine what arguments or theories could have supported the state court's decision" and then analyze those theories under section 2254(d). Id.
As noted, the Magistrate Judges' Report and Recommendation concluded that the state courts' denial of Floyd's habeas petition constituted an unreasonable application of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny. Under Brady, "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87. Prosecutors must disclose material, favorable evidence "even if no request is made" by the defense, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). To prevail on his Brady claim, Floyd "must show that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to the defense, and (3) the evidence was material to his guilt or punishment." Mahler v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2008).
Floyd did not object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that his Youngblood and actual innocence claims be denied. The Court therefore reviews these conclusions for clear error. It finds none.
Floyd's Youngblood claim fails because he asserts that evidence was destroyed after trial, rather than before. Such a claim is not cognizable on habeas review. See Morris v. Cain, 186 F.3d 581, 585 n.6 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e must find constitutional error at the trial or direct review level in order to issue the writ."); see also Ferguson v. Roper, 400 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Youngblood stated the applicable constitutional principle when potentially useful evidence is lost or destroyed before trial." (emphasis in original)). As to actual innocence, the Fifth Circuit has expressly declined to recognize such a claim. See In re Swearingen, 556 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2009) ("The Fifth Circuit does not recognize freestanding claims of actual innocence on federal habeas review."). Because the Court finds no clear error in the Magistrate Judge's resolution of Floyd's Youngblood and actual innocence claims, these claims are denied.
Floyd alleges that the State withheld six types of evidence in violation of its Brady obligation. As noted, Magistrate Judge Knowles found that fingerprint comparison results pertaining to both the Hines and Robinson murders were material, withheld from the defense, and favorable to Floyd, and that the Louisiana courts' opposing conclusion constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Police found two used whiskey glasses in Hines' apartment, and several bottles of whiskey in Hines' kitchen.
Police found fingerprints on two drinking glasses containing alcohol next to the bed in Robinson's hotel room.
Neither party objected to Magistrate Judge Knowles' finding that NOPD did, in fact, analyze fingerprints found on both the Robinson and Hines scenes prior to Floyd's trial and this analysis excluded Floyd as a potential match.
First, the State did not advance this argument before the Magistrate Judge, and the argument is therefore waived. Warren v. Bank of Am., N.A., 566 F. App'x 379, 381 n.1 (5th Cir. 2014) ("[A] party who objects to the magistrate judge's report waives legal arguments not made in the first instance before the magistrate judge."). In fact, in its initial briefing, the State conceded that "[t]he record supports Floyd's contention that neither the envelopes nor the results of any testing that may have been done on the lifted fingerprints were disclosed to the defense pretrial."
Second, even if the Court were to consider the State's new position, Floyd has met his burden to show that the fingerprint comparison results were withheld. In Floyd's state court habeas proceeding, attorneys for the State conceded that the fingerprint comparison results were not present in the District Attorney's file on Floyd's cases.
David J. Plavnicky, the State's trial attorney, reports "no recollection of ever seeing [the fingerprint envelopes] before or being aware of the information contained in them."
In another affidavit, Kendall Green, who represented the State at Floyd's pre-trial hearings, attests to his belief that he saw the fingerprint analysis results for the first time in 2009.
Finally, Jack Peebles, who served as Assistant District Attorney at the hearing concerning Floyd's motion to suppress his confession, reports no recollection of the fingerprint comparison results and states: "If the fingerprint comparison results were not mentioned in the District Attorney's Office's file, then I believe it is likely that none of the attorneys prosecuting the case were aware of their existence."
To resist the conclusion that the fingerprint comparison results were withheld, the State points to statements made by Walter Sentenn, Floyd's defense attorney during trial and a subsequent hearing. At trial, Sentenn stated: "there is no evidence whatsoever that links [Floyd] in any way to the murders" and "save for incriminating statements . . . . [t]here is no other evidence whatsoever that is inculpatory—whatsoever, that is inculpatory as to Mr. Floyd."
The State's argument confuses evidence tending to exculpate Floyd with the mere absence of evidence tending to inculpate Floyd. In the State's quotations, Sentenn asserts that no evidence found at the scenes tends to inculpate Floyd. This is plainly different from an affirmative argument that the presence of unknown, third-party fingerprints on both scenes tends to exculpate Floyd. The quotes therefore do not support a finding that the State disclosed the fingerprint comparison results.
On the contrary, the conspicuous absence of any affirmative argument based on fingerprint evidence supports, rather than undermines, Floyd's position. Sentenn argued in opening remarks:
Similarly, immediately after saying that "[n]o fingerprints . . . point in any way to . . . John Floyd," Sentenn raised the affirmative exculpatory value of the hair evidence: "In fact, the only evidence introduced at trial was exculpatory as to John Floyd in that it indicated the presence of negroid hair in the bed of the victim wherein both he and the accused are caucasians. No reasonable explanation was proved at trial."
Despite his stated strategy of highlighting evidence tending to "link a different party to the crime"—and his repeated reference to the similarly-probative hair evidence— a review of the trial transcript reveals that Sentenn never elicited testimony regarding NOPD's exclusion of Floyd from the fingerprints found on either scene. Former Assistant District Attorneys Plavnicky,
Lastly, the Court finds no merit to the State's novel suggestion that a prosecutor may withhold fingerprint comparison results that are favorable to the defense because a defendant could request access to the underlying prints and perform his own testing. The State cites no analogous authority, and the Court has identified none. Brady, of course, "does not obligate the State to furnish a defendant with exculpatory evidence that is fully available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence." Cobb, 682 F.3d at 378 (quoting Kutzner v. Cockrell, 303 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2002)). But the State's conception of reasonable diligence stretches the concept beyond its breaking point, and undermines "the Brady rule's purpose of ensuring a fair trial." Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2000).
For these reasons, the Court finds that the State has waived any argument that the fingerprint comparison results were disclosed to the defense. Further, even if the Court were to consider the State's argument, it would conclude that Floyd has met his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the fingerprint comparison results were withheld.
Favorable evidence "is evidence that `is exculpatory or impeaching.'" United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 841 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Barraza, 655 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2011)). Exculpatory evidence is "[e]vidence tending to establish a criminal defendant's innocence." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Boyette v. Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (evidence which "could have helped the defense suggest an alternative perpetrator" was favorable); United States v. Slough, 22 F.Supp.3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2014) ("The meaning of the term `favorable' under Brady is not difficult to discern. It is any information in the possession of the government . . . that relates to guilt or punishment and that tends to help the defense bolstering the defense case or impeaching potential prosecution witnesses.").
In his report, Magistrate Judge Knowles found that "it can hardly be doubted that the fingerprint evidence was `favorable' to the defense."
According to the Crime Scene Technician Report for the Hines scene, NOPD Evidence Technician Seuzeneau dusted several whiskey bottles found in Hines' kitchen for fingerprints.
The Court finds that the fingerprint comparison results from the Hines scene are favorable to Floyd's defense, and that any contrary conclusion would be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. As an initial matter, the Court notes that a fingerprint comparison result that excludes both the defendant and the victim from contributing a print recovered from the scene of a murder would, in most cases, be favorable to the defense for a simple reason: the result suggests that another person was at the scene. This other person is an obvious alternative suspect that the defense may point to as the true killer.
Beyond this general observation, the Court finds that the test results withheld in this case are particularly favorable to the defense. First, Evidence Technician Seuzeneau selected a small number of items on the Hines scene to dust for prints, and these items were all related. This choice suggests that—of all the many surfaces in Hines' home— Seuzeneau or a superior believed it particularly likely that Hines' killer touched the whiskey bottles and glasses. Second, Detective John Dillman, lead detective on the Hines murder, believed that Hines shared a drink with his killer, and this theory was elicited at trial. In his testimony, Dillman pointed to the statement that "We were both drinking" as one of several details in Floyd's confession that matched the Hines murder scene as Dillman observed it.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Floyd has met his burden to show that the fingerprint comparison results from the Hines scene were favorable to his defense.
Police recovered 14 partial fingerprints from Robinson's hotel room—6 from the drinking glass on the nightstand nearest the room's window, and 8 from the drinking glass on the nightstand nearest the door.
Police also recovered prints from Robinson's car and from objects inside it.
The withheld fingerprint evidence from the Robinson scene is similar to the evidence from the Hines scene, and would be favorable to Floyd's defense in the Robinson murder for similar reasons. Floyd was, however, acquitted of the Robinson murder. The Court therefore must consider whether Floyd has met his burden to show that the Robinson-scene prints would be favorable to Floyd's defense in the Hines case. The Court finds that he has.
The fingerprint results from the Robinson scene are favorable to Floyd's defense in the Hines murder for two reasons. First, Floyd confessed to both murders, and the persuasive weight of the two confessions is therefore linked. If Floyd falsely confessed to one murder, it is more likely that his other confession is false as well. Evidence tending to exculpate Floyd from the Robinson murder therefore impugns the reliability of Floyd's confession in the Hines murder. This is particularly true because the two statements are highly similar. As the Court explained in its earlier order:
Cain, 2016 WL 4799093, at *21 (citations omitted). Given this overlap, the Court finds that evidence tending to discredit Floyd's confession to the Robinson murder also undermines Floyd's account of killing Hines. Exculpatory fingerprint results from the Robinson scene are therefore favorable to Floyd's defense in the Hines case.
The second reason that exculpatory evidence from the Robinson scene is favorable to Floyd's defense in the Hines matter is that the significant similarities between the two murders suggest that they were committed by the same person. In addition to their temporal and physical proximity, the two murders featured several overlapping elements. Both victims were gay men, and both were attacked in their bedrooms.
As found by the investigating detectives, the similarity of the two murders suggests that one person committed both crimes. Evidence tending to show that an unknown third party—and not Floyd—killed Robinson therefore also points to the same unknown third party—and not Floyd— as Hines' killer.
For these reasons, the Court finds fairminded jurists could not disagree that the fingerprint analysis results from both the Hines and Robinson scenes are favorable to Floyd under Brady and its progeny. See Bailey v. Lafler, No. 09-406, 2016 WL 5027562 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2016) (granting writ of habeas corpus in case where prisoner was convicted of one of two similar murders and finding that fingerprint analysis from first, uncharged murder was favorable to defense in second).
In addition to the fingerprint comparison results, Floyd asserts that a statement by John Rue Clegg to Detective Dillman was Brady material. Dillman interviewed Clegg in the days following Hines' death.
In an affidavit executed on June 14, 2008, Clegg declares that Dillman's report "does not accurately reflect the information [Clegg] gave Detective Dillman."
Floyd contends that Clegg's new statement shows that Clegg provided Dillman with favorable evidence which was not disclosed to the defense. Floyd argues that Clegg's statement that "Bill's taste was for black men" is favorable both because it suggests that Hines' killer was African American and because Floyd's lawyer could have used it to impeach Detective Dillman's trial testimony that "[Hines] was involved in sexual activities with both black and white males, and he was very indiscriminate and it didn't make a difference."
The Court finds that Floyd has met his burden to show that Clegg told Dillman that Floyd's taste was for black men. Floyd has also met his burden to show that this information was withheld by the prosecution and favorable to his defense. The Court acknowledges that in a previous order it found that Clegg's affidavit was not exculpatory. Floyd v. Cain, No. 11-2819, 2012 WL 6162164, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2012). Upon greater reflection, the Court finds that its previous analysis was flawed. The Court failed to consider the Clegg affidavit in the context of the full trial record, and thereby undervalued its exculpatory effect.
In evaluating the reliability of Clegg's account, the Court considers Clegg's relationship to the parties and his motivation, if any, to lie on Floyd's behalf. See House, 547 U.S. at 551 (crediting post-conviction witness testimony when "the record indicate[d] no reason why [they] would have wanted . . . to help [the defendant]"); Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316 (finding "particularly relevant" newly-obtained affidavits by "black inmates attesting to the innocence of a white defendant in a racially motivated killing"). Clegg was a close friend of Hines', and has no apparent connection to Floyd. The Court therefore finds it highly unlikely that Clegg would execute an untruthful affidavit in support of Floyd's innocence. There is also little doubt that the statement was withheld, as the police report provided to the defense directly contradicts Clegg's affidavit.
Clegg's account also bolsters the defense case, and is therefore favorable Brady material. At trial, both prosecution and defense argued that Hines had been killed by a sexual partner, and this theory was strongly supported by the evidence on the scene. The prosecution argued that Floyd, a white man, killed Hines. Floyd maintained that an African-American man killed Hines, and supported his theory with the African-American pubic hair found in Hines' bed, and the evidence that Robinson had been killed by an African-American man. Clegg's statement to Dillman fully aligns with the defense theory of the case. Clegg's statement that Hines' "taste was for black men" increases the likelihood that Hines' sexual partner, and murderer, was African American. Clegg's statement to Dillman was therefore favorable to the defense.
Under Brady's final prong, Floyd must show that all of the withheld evidence is collectively material. "[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cobb, 682 F.3d at 377 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). In determining materiality, exculpatory evidence must be "considered collectively, not item by item." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. The Supreme Court has further explained that "[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the [undisclosed] evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id. at 434; see also Wearry v. Cain, 136 S.Ct. 1002, 1006 (2016) ("Evidence qualifies as material when there is `any reasonable likelihood' it could have `affected the judgment of the jury.'" (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). Determining materiality under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact. Cobb, 682 F.3d at 377.
Whether exculpatory evidence is material depends largely on its value in relation to the strength of the government's case for guilt. See United States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The materiality of Brady material depends almost entirely on the value of the evidence relative to the other evidence mustered by the state."). Accordingly, when there is "considerable forensic and other physical evidence linking petitioner to the crime," a Brady claim is likely to fail. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 293 (1999). Conversely, if "the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt." Wearry, 136 S. Ct. at 1007 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 113). The Court therefore begins its materiality analysis by considering the prosecution's case against Floyd for the murder of Hines.
As explained more fully in the Court's McQuiggen order, the State's case against Floyd had evidentiary holes. No physical evidence linked Floyd to Hines' murder. Police identified no eyewitnesses and recovered no murder weapon. Instead, the State's case against Floyd rested entirely on Floyd's confession and his boast to Steven Edwards.
At trial, Floyd attacked the validity of his confession both explicitly and implicitly. Floyd explicitly attacked his confession by his own testimony denying the statement's veracity and asserting that he was beaten into confessing by Detective Dillman.
Floyd also presented testimony from Dr. Marvin F. Miller, who was accepted by the trial court as an expert in psychiatry and clinical medicine. Dr. Miller testified that if Floyd was intoxicated, "even subclinically," at the time of his confessions, "this could have made him . . . vulnerable to even minimal coercion."
In addition to explicitly attacking his Hines confession, Floyd implicitly undermined it by pointing to the considerable physical and eyewitness evidence suggesting that an African-American man with Type A blood killed Robinson. This evidence included: (1) a knit cap stained with Type O blood—Robinson's blood type—and containing African-American hairs
The evidence concerning the tissue is particularly probative regarding the reliability of Floyd's confession to the Robinson murder. In his statement, Floyd claimed that Robinson performed oral sex on Floyd shortly before Floyd stabbed Robinson to death.
Floyd, 2016 WL 4799093, at *23.
Thus, Floyd introduced exculpatory evidence at trial that challenged the persuasive weight of the State's only two pieces of inculpatory evidence in the Hines murder: Floyd's confession and his boast to Steven Miller. The Robinson confession and, by extension, the very similar Hines confession, was undermined by the significant evidence tending to establish Floyd's innocence of the Robinson murder. Because Floyd allegedly boasted about both murders, this evidence also implicitly undercut the probative value of Floyd's boast about the Hines murder. Floyd's confession was further attacked with evidence of Floyd's vulnerability to coercion and his own account of the circumstances of his interrogation. In short, the State's case for guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was relatively weak: the prosecution had nothing to corroborate Floyd's inculpatory statements, and the reliability of those statements was vigorously contested by the defense.
Viewed through the lens of the nature of the State's evidence, Floyd has shown more than the required "any reasonable likelihood" that his Brady material could have "affected the judgment" of the trial judge. Wearry, 136 S. Ct. at 1006 (quoting Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154). All of Floyd's new evidence supports Floyd's own account at trial: that his confession is false and that someone else killed Hines. First and foremost, the fingerprint comparison results from the Hines scene directly bolster Floyd's theory by suggesting that an unknown third party killed Hines. This is particularly true because the print was recovered from a whiskey bottle in Hines' kitchen, and Detective Dillman's trial testimony and Evidence Technician Seuzeneau's actions confirm that the trained investigators who viewed the scene believed it likely that Hines shared a drink with his killer.
The fingerprint comparison results from the Robinson scene also support Floyd's theory. The results suggest that an unknown person was in Robinson's car and hotel room before Robinson's death. The prints were, as in the Hines case, recovered from items that Robinson's killer were likely to have touched.
As the Court has repeatedly noted, exculpatory evidence in the Robinson case is relevant to the Hines case. First, because the two murders are strikingly similar, evidence suggesting that an unknown person—not Floyd—killed Robinson also suggests that the same unknown person—not Floyd—killed Hines. Second, such evidence tends to contradict Floyd's inculpatory statements in the Robinson case. Because the inculpatory statements in the two cases are similar, the same evidence suggests that Floyd's confession and boast regarding the Hines murder are false as well.
Finally, Clegg's statement to Detective Dillman lends additional force to Floyd's materiality argument. Floyd was convicted on the theory that he murdered Hines during a sexual encounter. The physical evidence on the Hines scene, while revealing no trace of Floyd, supported this theory. Clegg's account, which speaks directly to Hines' sexual preferences, is therefore probative. Like the fingerprint evidence, it matches Floyd's theory that Hines was killed by someone else. More specifically, it suggests that Hines was killed by an African-American man. In that way, the affidavit dovetails with evidence from both scenes, including the African-American pubic hair recovered from Hines' bed and the physical evidence and witness statement from the Robinson scene.
Considering the full trial record, the Court finds that the withheld fingerprint results are—standing on their own—material to Floyd's guilt, and that no reasonable application of clearly established federal law could support a contrary conclusion. Even if the prints alone were not enough, Clegg's statement to Detective Dillman provides additional exculpatory evidence. This result is compelled by the persuasive force of the withheld evidence in the context of the limits in the State's case against Floyd. Compare United States v. Sumner, 171 F.3d 636, 637 (8th Cir. 1999) (exculpatory fingerprint analysis immaterial where "[i]n addition to [the victim], two other witnesses testified that Sumner attacked [the victim] and left with her car"), with Bailey, 2016 WL 5027562, at *12 (exculpatory fingerprint evidence material where "the strength of the State's case against Bailey was relatively weak").
Finally, the Court's materiality analysis is also informed by Floyd's acquittal in the Robinson case. In acquitting Floyd, the trial judge appeared to find that the inculpatory evidence at issue—Floyd's confession and other statements—could not eliminate reasonable doubt of Floyd's guilt in the face of exculpatory, primarily physical, evidence. This suggests a "reasonable likelihood" that additional exculpatory physical evidence found at the Hines scene, such as the fingerprints at issue, could have "affected the judgment" of the trial judge in the Hines case as well. Wearry, 136 S. Ct. at 1006 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Floyd has met his burden to show that the State withheld favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady and its progeny. Because the Court finds the Louisiana state courts' contrary decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the Court does not consider Floyd's alternative argument that it may review the findings with less deference.
For the foregoing reasons, John D. Floyd's petition for habeas corpus relief is GRANTED. The State of Louisiana is hereby ordered to either retry Floyd or release him within 120 days of this order.
In its objection, the State insists that the Court erred in its McQuiggen order by crediting the trial testimony of these State experts. In support, the State points to "factual conflicts" between reports prepared by Sison and Daniels and their testimony. R. Doc. 89 at 36. The State's argument fails for several reasons. First, the State may not raise new arguments in its objection. Warren, 566 F. App'x at 381 n.1. Second, there is no factual conflict. Rather, as the State concedes, the reports simply "contain[] no mention" of the test results. R. Doc. 89 at 36. Third, to the extent the absence requires explanation, Daniels provided one during a pretrial hearing. Floyd Ex. 73 at 189 ("[The report] does not indicate what the swab came out. . . . I do my own typing so I would have to type all that again . . . ."). Fourth, the Court—unlike, it appears, the State—finds it unlikely that two State-aligned experts flubbed or fabricated the results of separate, routine blood tests at a pretrial hearing, and then both made the same error again at trial.
