JULIE A. ROBINSON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Damian Mayes's Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1). In his motion, Petitioner, who is proceeding pro se, seeks relief on the grounds that the district court erred in allowing a police detective to vouch for the complaining witness's credibility, an erroneous jury instruction caused a misstatement of the State's burden of proof, the district court abused its discretion during consideration of a dispositional departure, there was prosecutorial misconduct, and there was a failure to impeach the State's witnesses. The Government has responded (Doc. 10). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule. After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, the Court denies Petitioner's motion without need for a further evidentiary hearing.
The Court reviews petitioner's challenges to state court proceedings pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").
A state court's decision is "contrary to" an established federal law if the state court reaches a different result than the Supreme Court has "done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts" or "if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law" set forth in Supreme Court cases.
A federal court must presume the state court's factual findings, including credibility findings, are correct in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Because Mayes proceeds pro se, the Court must construe his pleadings liberally and apply a less stringent standard than what is applicable to attorneys.
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a federal habeas court must presume that the state courts' factual findings are correct.
On November 29, 2008, Officer James Pfannenstiel responded to a 911 call in Newton, Kansas. At the house, Officer Pfannenstiel spoke to F.W.L., Sr., who reported that when he arrived home before he made the 911 call, he observed Petitioner performing oral sex on a person he initially though was his fiancée's son. When F.W.L., Sr. went inside, he determined Petitioner was instead performing oral sex on his eleven-year-old son, F.W.L., Jr. When police arrived at the scene, Petitioner was no longer present.
Officer Pfannenstiel spoke with F.W.L., Jr., and asked "if [Petitoner] had touched him somewhere on his body where it's not okay to touch." In response, F.W.L., Jr. stated Petitioner touched him on his privates. Officer Pfannenstiel then asked F.W.L., Jr., "[i]f [Petitioner] had touched his mouth to his privates." F.W.L., Jr. responded by shaking his head affirmatively, and Officer Pfannenstiel stopped questioning him.
On December 3, 2008, Officer Brad Celestin conducted a Finding Words forensic interview with F.W.L., Jr. During the interview, F.W.L., Jr. stated that while he was playing video games, Petitioner kept putting his hand on F.W.L., Jr.'s penis. In addition, F.W.L., Jr. stated Petitioner also put F.W.L, Jr.'s penis in his mouth.
Detective Craig Douglass interviewed Petitioner at the Newton Police Station regarding the alleged incident. Detective Douglass learned that Petitioner, a 33-year-old elementary school paraprofessional, had known F.W.L., Sr.'s fiancée, S.B., for around seven years. Petitioner said he went to the house that night to babysit F.W.L., Jr. and S.B.'s two sons and that he spent most of the night in the bedroom shared by F.W.L., Jr. and one of S.B.'s sons.
Petitioner indicated he was with the boys on the bedroom floor, watching movies and playing video games. Petitioner told Detective Douglass that at one point, F.W.L., Jr. was "lying down on the floor all sprawled out" in just a pair of shorts "in somewhat of a suggestive position," so he covered F.W.L., Jr. with a comforter. Petitioner started to say something about either F.W.L., Jr. lying on top of him or him lying on top of F.W.L., Jr., but corrected himself to say he was lying beside F.W.L., Jr.
When Detective Douglas s asked whether there was any touching or physical contact between Petitioner and the boys that night, he said that while wrestling with the boys, S.B.'s son kept trying to grope his crotch. According to Petitioner, the boys suggested they wrestle naked because it was hot in the house, but he did not allow them to do so. Petitioner also stated that at one point, F.W.L., Jr. said, "[i]f you touch it, it gets hard." When Detective Douglass asked if there could have been any accidental contact with the boys that F.W.L., Jr. could have perceived as inappropriate, Petitioner indicated there was none that he could recall.
Petitioner told Detective Douglass that S.B. came home around 2 or 2:30 a.m. After telling him to turn off the TV and to shut the door when he left, S.B. went upstairs. Around 3 or 3:30 a.m., F.W.L., Sr. came home, and Petitioner heard banging on the bedroom door and a male voice yell to get out. Petitioner assumed it was F.W.L., Sr. but he only saw S.B.'s other son in the living room when he left the house.
On June 30, 2009, the State filed a criminal complaint against Petitioner charging him with one count each of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and aggravated criminal sodomy. The district court held a three-day jury trial, commencing on November 17, 2010. At trial, Officer Pfannenstiel, Officer Celestin, and Detective Douglass testified on the State's behalf. F.W.L., Jr. and F.W.L., Sr. testified regarding the events on November 29, 2008.
Further, the defense showed the jury a video recording of Officer Celestin's Finding Words interview with F.W.L., Jr. During the State's redirect examination of Officer Celestin, the prosecutor asked him how many forensic interviews he had conducted since receiving Finding Words training. Officer Celestin answered that he had done somewhere around 80 to 100 such interviews with minors. The following exchange then occurred:
After that, the prosecutor had no further questions, and defense counsel did not bring the issue up again on recross-examination.
For its case, the defense called Petitioner's wife to testify regarding the telephone calls between her, S.B., and Petitioner. She also testified about cell phone calls she received from Petitioner on the night of the alleged incident.
After weighing the evidence presented by the parties, the jury found Petitioner guilty on both charges. Following the trial, Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial, a motion for judgment of acquittal, and a motion for durational departure. At a March 1, 2011 hearing, the district court denied Mayes's motion for a new trial and motion for judgment of acquittal. The district court granted Mayes's motion for a downward durational departure, but denied his request for a downward dispositional departure. Mayes was thus sentenced to a term of 214 months imprisonment.
Petitioner appealed, alleging (1) the district court erred in allowing testimony of Officer Celestin allegedly vouching for the minor victim's credibility, (2) the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights with its jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt, (3) the district court abused its discretion when denying Petitioner's motion for a dispositional departure, and (4) there was prosecutorial misconduct during the closing arguments. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions on April 12, 2013.
Petitioner sought review of the Kansas Court of Appeals' decision in the Kansas Supreme Court. His petition for review alleged only three issues: (1) error in allowing the testimony of Officer Celestin regarding the complaining witness's credibility, (2) violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment based on the jury instructions, and (3) abuse of discretion relating to the dispositional departure. Petitioner did not raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. The Kansas Supreme Court denied review on August 29, 2013.
Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition in this Court on September 10, 2014.
A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), the petitioner has exhausted the available state court remedies.
Even when the claim is considered exhausted because it is too late to pursue relief in state court, it may be subject to dismissal under the doctrine of procedural default.
Petitioner's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and impeachment of the State's witness are both barred from review as procedurally defaulted claims. Neither claim exhausted all state court remedies. Petitioner raised his allegation of prosecutorial misconduct only to the Kansas Court of Appeals and not the Kansas Supreme Court. Petitioner did not raise his allegation of impeachment of the State's witness to either the Kansas Court of Appeals or the Kansas Supreme Court. Under K.S.A. 60-1507(f)—providing a one-year time limit for filing K.S.A. 60-1507 motions—and the Kansas Supreme Court Rule 183(c)(3)—preventing claims of trial error from being raised in K.S.A. 60-1507 motions—Petitioner can no longer raise these abandoned issues in the Kansas state courts as they are procedurally barred under state law.
Moreover, Petitioner does not establish the Court should review his procedurally defaulted § 2254 claims by demonstrating cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or that failure to consider the claims results in a miscarriage of justice. No external factors such as discovery of new evidence, a change in law, or interference by state officials that prevented Petitioner from complying with the state procedural rules exist in this case.
Similarly, Petitioner does not demonstrate that denial of review of these § 2254 claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Under the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, to excuse a procedural default, the petitioner must supplement her constitutional claim with a colorable showing of actual innocence.
Therefore, as Petitioner does not demonstrate either a cause for the defaulted claims and actual prejudice, or actual innocence under the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, this Court finds his § 2254 claims of prosecutorial misconduct and impeachment of the State's witness are procedurally barred, and not subject to review by this Court.
Petitioner's remaining arguments under § 2254 consist of erroneously admitted testimony from Officer Celestin, a misstatement of the reasonable doubt jury instructions, and an abuse of discretion in denying a dispositional departure. Each of these claims lacks merit, as discussed in turn.
Petitioner argues that the district court erred in allowing Officer Celestin to testify F.W.L., Jr. was not behaving in a manner consistent with a child who had been coached during his interview. To the extent this claim relies on state-law principles, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review.
To find a violation of due process based on state evidentiary rulings, the court must find the rulings were so grossly prejudicial
Here, this Court finds that in light of all the evidence, allowing Officer Celestin's testimony did not render the trial fundamentally unfair because due to other evidence and witnesses, Officer Celestin's testimony did not drive jury's verdict. The jury had an opportunity to listen to F.W.L., Jr.'s testimony and view the Finding Words interview at trial.
Petitioner alleges the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when it allowed a verdict of guilty upon proof of any element of the charged offense, rather than each element of the charged offense. The Court rejects this argument.
Under federal law, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense.
Petitioner fails to establish the existence of a likelihood that the jury misunderstood the jury instructions and convicted him based on insufficient proof. At trial, the pertinent jury instruction stated:
Petitioner bases his argument of a misstatement of the reasonable doubt instruction on the Pattern Instruction Kansas ("PIK") Committee abandoning the use of the phrase "any" of the claims required to be proved in jury instructions, and replacing it with "each" of the claims required to be proved, and the use of any not being found in other state's pattern instructions.
The use of any instead of each does not result in a misstatement of the State's beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof. The Kansas Supreme Court has found that the older version of PIK 52.02, which contains the language used to instruct the jury in this case, is an appropriate statement on reasonable doubt.
Petitioner alleges that the district court abused its discretion during its consideration of a dispositional departure by considering evidence concerning Petitioner's orientation and sexual desire. To the extent this claim relies on state-law principles, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review.
During trial, the State presented testimony of a witness who testified that Petitioner told him a busboy—appearing to be between the ages of fourteen and sixteen— "was kind of cute," that Petitioner said "[sixteen] is legal," and that "once a boy gets to [eighteen] that's getting too old . . . ."
While the district court allowed this testimony, the court's ruling did not rely on this testimony when deciding the issue of departure. Instead, the court specifically stated:
Therefore, a review of the district court's decision regarding the downward dispositional departure does not suggest the court based its decision on Petitioner's alleged sexual attraction to males. Instead, the district court considered the severity of the crime and the impact it had on the victim when denying a dispositional departure.
The lack of evidence to support a claim that the court improperly considered Petitioner's homosexuality when denying his probation request deprives the claim of evidence that would allow this Court to find the district court erroneously denied a dispositional departure and in doing so violated Petitioner's Constitutional rights. As such, this dispositional departure was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires the federal district court reviewing a habeas petition to "issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." Under U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the court may issue a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." A petitioner must demonstrate either that "reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong" or that issues in the petition are "adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."
The Court concludes it should not issue a certificate of appealability. Nothing suggests the Court's rulings in this case are debatable or incorrect, and no record authority suggests the Tenth Circuit would resolve this case differently. Thus, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.