NICKELL, Judge.
Jurors convicted Wendell Groves of two crimes—criminal attempt to commit theft by deception over $500 but less than $10,000,
At a McDonald's restaurant on October 20, 2011, a man approached Groves—homeless, broke and drug addicted—offering him an opportunity to make money. All he had to do was go to a bank and cash a check for $2,342.18 drawn on Maysville Auto Sales (Auto Sales). In return, Groves would receive $500.00. Groves agreed and the man left for about thirty minutes with Groves's identification card and upon his return, gave Groves a printed check bearing the name "Wendell Grove"
The man and two others drove Groves to a U.S. Bank branch in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Groves handed the check and his identification card to the teller. When presented with the check, due to the amount exceeding $1,000.00, the bank's branch manager discovered Auto Sales—a U.S. Bank customer—had already issued a check bearing that same number to a different payee. A telephone call confirmed Auto Sales had not authorized issuance of a check to Groves. Upon being told Auto Sales disputed the check, Groves left the bank leaving both the check and his identification card.
Groves returned to the man and his two companions with news that he had not successfully cashed the check. The man and his friends drove away— leaving Groves in the parking lot.
About seven months later, on May 16, 2012, Groves was one of seven homeless men
A jury trial, resulting in conviction and an enhanced sentence of ten years, occurred on March 11-12, 2013. On June 4, 2013, Groves received shock probation. Groves now appeals his conviction of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to prove he intended to "defraud, deceive or injure another" by possessing and presenting the check drawn on Auto Sale's account. We disagree and affirm.
Our resolution of this case is based on Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Ky. 1991), wherein the Supreme Court of Kentucky clarified the standard for denying a directed verdict motion and reviewing that decision on appeal.
In the case sub judice, there is more than a "scintilla of evidence" that Groves criminally possessed a forged instrument with intent to defraud. Thus, the trial judge properly determined a reasonable juror could fairly find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is particularly true in light of Groves's own testimony that he knew he had no business with a check from Auto Sales, he knew he was not supposed to have the check, and he signed and attempted to pass the check intending to receive $500.00 for his actions. He even acknowledged on cross-examination that in a prior court proceeding he had stated, "I was in possession of the check. I was wrong."
Groves hangs his hat on his own testimony that he did not know the check was fake, but yet in the next breath said he knew he "didn't earn a penny of the amount" and he knew he wasn't supposed to have the check. Groves appears to assert that unless he specifically testified he knew the check was fake, granting a directed verdict was mandatory. We disagree.
Were the law as Groves suggests, a criminal defendant could thwart prosecution simply by invoking his right to remain silent. Furthermore, just because Groves testified he did not "know" the check was counterfeit, jurors were not required to believe him to the exclusion of all other proof.
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996).
The Commonwealth introduced the Auto Sales check listing "Wendell Grove" as payee and bearing his endorsement on the back. The endorsement matched Groves's signature on his identification card. The bank manager identified Groves as the man who tried to cash the check. A video of the transaction was introduced. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict arguing the Commonwealth had not met its burden, but said no more. The trial court found reasonable jurors could find guilt and denied the motion.
Groves was the sole witness offered by the defense. At the close of his testimony, defense counsel renewed the directed verdict motion arguing the Commonwealth could not prove intent due to Groves's testimony. We view the proof differently.
Groves endorsed the check. He then presented the check for payment —with the intention of receiving $500.00 for his role in the scheme—knowing he had not earned any money and had no business having the check drawn on Auto Sales in his possession. In our eyes, these facts are sufficient to prove intent. We, therefore, agree with and affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court's denial of a directed verdict.
ALL CONCUR.