NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
HIGGINBOTHAM, J.
Defendant, Cornell Martin, Jr., was charged by bill of information with one count of armed robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64. He pled not guilty and, after a jury trial, was found guilty of the responsive offense of simple robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:65. The trial court imposed a sentence of seven years at hard labor. The state filed a habitual offender bill of information, alleging that defendant had been previously convicted of possession of cocaine under St. Tammany Parish docket number 372687. Defendant admitted to the contents of the habitual offender information, and the trial court adjudicated him a second-felony habitual offender. The trial court then vacated defendant's seven-year sentence for simple robbery, and it imposed a habitual offender sentence of fourteen years at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Defendant now appeals, alleging two assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.
FACTS
On approximately November 13, 2010, Ya-Shua Broomfield was getting his hair cut at a barber shop on Voters Road in Slidell when a woman entered the store and announced that she and her husband, defendant, were selling televisions. Broomfield and another woman both expressed interest, but Broomfield allowed the other interested customer to first pursue the purchase. When Broomfield found out that the other customer no longer wanted to buy the televisions, he asked his barber to get in touch with defendant. Broomfield spoke to defendant about the televisions, and they first made arrangements to buy and sell the televisions at the barber shop. However, both Broomfield and defendant had difficulties in meeting on that day, so they agreed to conduct the sale in the parking lot of the Sears at Northshore Square Mall in Slidell on November 16, 2010.
On November 16, 2010, Broomfield met defendant in the Sears parking lot around 7:30 p.m. Defendant exited his vehicle, which Broomfield observed was too small to fit the two televisions he believed he was going to buy, and asked Broomfield if he had brought the $600.00 that they agreed would be the purchase price for the televisions. Broomfield asked to see the televisions, and defendant asked Broomfield to see his money. When Broomfield refused to hand over his money without seeing the televisions, two men exited defendant's vehicle, and one pointed a gun at Broomfield. While the gun was pointed at him, Broomfield gave the men his wallet, which contained the $600.00, his debit card, his social security card, and a couple of gift cards. Broomfield also gave the men his keys, and one of the men who arrived with defendant took Broomfield's cell phone from his car. The man with the gun then told Broomfield to come closer, but defendant told the man not to shoot Broomfield. Defendant and the two other men then got into their car and left the scene. After calling the police, Broomfield was able to identify defendant in a photographic lineup.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #1
In his first assignment of error, defendant alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of simple robbery. Specifically, defendant argues that the state failed to prove that he had any intent to rob Broomfield or that defendant was an active participant in the robbery.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See La.Code Crim. P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.
Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by the use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:64(A). Simple robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, but not armed with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:65(A).
The parties to crimes are classified as principals and accessories after the fact. La. R.S. 14:23. Principals are all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime. La. R.S. 14:24. The law of principals states that all persons involved in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, are equally culpable. However, the defendant's mere presence at the scene is not enough to "concern" an individual in the crime. A principal may be connected only to those crimes for which he has the requisite mental state. State v. Hampton, 98-0331 (La. 4/23/99), 750 So.2d 867, 880, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S.Ct. 504, 145 L.Ed.2d 390 (1999). The state may prove a defendant guilty by showing that he served as a principal to the crime by aiding and abetting another. Under this theory, the defendant need not have actually performed the taking to be found guilty of a robbery. State v. Smith, 513 So.2d 438, 444-45 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987). Further, a defendant convicted as a principal need not have personally held a weapon to be found guilty of armed robbery. State v. Dominick, 354 So.2d 1316, 1320 (La. 1978).
Armed robbery and simple robbery are general intent crimes. In general intent crimes, the criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction is shown by the very doing of the acts which have been declared criminal. State v. Payne, 540 So.2d 520, 523-24 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 546 So.2d 169 (La. 1989).
In his brief, defendant asserts that the state's case showed only that he was present when the robbery took place. Defendant further asserts that his primary focus had been to sell the televisions to Broomfield.
At trial, Broomfield testified that defendant pulled up to their agreed meeting place in a car which was too small to carry the two large televisions he believed he was buying, in addition to the three men who occupied the vehicle. While Broomfield admitted that defendant did tell the armed perpetrator not to shoot, he also stated that defendant did not appear surprised to see, or fearful of, the gun.
Detective Robert Chadwick, III, of the Slidell Police Department, also testified at trial. Detective Chadwick interviewed defendant after his arrest on the night of the incident. During his first interview, defendant was read his Miranda1 rights, and he told Detective Chadwick that he did not intend to sell Broomfield any televisions that night, and he instead intended to take his $600.00. Defendant stated that his accomplice "Jay" had the gun. Detective Chadwick testified to these statements at trial because of a malfunction which caused defendant's first interview to record video only.
At trial, the state played for the jury a second interview that was conducted at a later date when Detective Chadwick realized that the audio portion of the recording of his first interview of defendant had malfunctioned. During this statement, defendant stated that his accomplice Corey Rankins, not himself, was going to be the person to sell the televisions to Broomfield and that he thought they were going to retrieve the televisions from elsewhere. Defendant also mentioned during this statement that he received $100.00 as part of the robbery.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented at trial supports the jury's verdict of guilty of simple robbery. Defendant does not controvert the fact that a robbery occurred. Instead he argues that he never had the intent to participate in any robbery, and he simply wished to sell Broomfield some televisions. However, defendant's statements from his first interview, as related at trial by Detective Chadwick, specifically highlight his intent to rob Broomfield of his $600.00. Further, a determination of whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conclusion that defendant intended to do so while he or his accomplice was armed with a dangerous weapon is not necessary due to the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of simple robbery only.
When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987). The jury's verdict reflected the reasonable conclusion that, based on the eyewitness testimony and defendant's statements, he had the intent to rob Broomfield instead of selling him televisions. On appeal, the reviewing court does not determine whether another possible hypothesis suggested by a defendant could afford an exculpatory explanation of the events. State v. Mitchell, 99-3342 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 83. See State v. Juluke, 98-0341 (La. 1/8/99), 725 So.2d 1291, 1293 (per curiam).
In reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See Ordodi, 946 So.2d at 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam).
This assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR #2
In his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Specifically, he argues that his habitual offender sentence of fourteen years at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, which is the statutory maximum, is excessive. Defendant further argues that his action in keeping his accomplice from shooting Broomfield should have made him eligible for a more lenient sentence.
Under the clear language of La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1(E), failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence precludes a defendant from raising an objection to the sentence on appeal. One purpose of the motion to reconsider sentence is to allow the defendant to raise any errors that may have occurred in sentencing while the trial judge still has jurisdiction to change or correct the sentence. The defendant may point out such errors or deficiencies, or may present argument or evidence not considered in the original sentencing, thereby preventing the necessity of a remand for resentencing. State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La. 1993) (per curiam).
Defendant's failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence precludes him from raising an objection on appeal. See State v. Felder, 2000-2887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 360, 369, writ denied, 2001-3027 (La. 10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1173. Therefore, defendant's arguments concerning his habitual offender sentence are not properly before this court for the first time on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.
CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
