MARK J. DINSMORE, Magistrate Judge.
On November 21, 2019, the Court held an ex parte telephonic hearing on Plaintiff's counsels' Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance by Attorneys, for which the Court ordered Plaintiff Henry Maye to appear by telephone.
[Dkt. 39 at 1-2 (emphasis in original).]
On November 25, 2019, Plaintiff Henry Maye called the Magistrate Judge's chambers and spoke with his Courtroom Deputy, Geeta DeVellen. Mr. Maye stated that he is out of the country and did not plan to appear for the November 26, 2019 telephonic status conference. The Magistrate Judge's Courtroom Deputy reminded Mr. Maye that he previously failed to appear as ordered for the November 21, 2019 ex parte hearing and, since Mr. Maye is now responsible for the litigating this matter, the Court would still be expecting Mr. Maye to call in to participate as ordered on November 26, 2019. Mr. Maye was further told that if he were to simply call to the Magistrate Judge's chambers on November 26, 2019, just as he had done on November 25, 2019, the Magistrate Judge's staff would be happy to connect Mr. Maye into the Court's teleconference line to assist in facilitating Mr. Maye's participation in the November 26, 2019 telephonic status conference. On November 26, 2019, the Court held a telephonic status conference. Defendants appeared by counsel; Plaintiff Henry Maye again failed to appear as ordered.
A district court has the inherent authority to impose sanctions on [a party] for the "willful disobedience of a court order." See Trzeciak v. Petrich, No. 2:10-CV-358-JTM-PRC, 2014 WL 5488439, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2014) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991)). This power is governed "not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Barnhill v. U.S., 11 F.3d 1360, 1367 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation omitted). A court's inherent powers are to be used "to reprimand the offender" and "to deter future parties from trampling on the integrity of the court." Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2003). The sanction imposed by a court "should be proportionate to the gravity of the offense." Montaño v. City of Chicago, 535 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2008).
The standards set for counsel are expected of pro se litigants. "Although pro se litigants get the benefit of more generous treatment in some respects, they must nonetheless follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants." Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 549 (10th Cir. 2000). "Trial courts generally do not intervene to save litigants from their choice of counsel, even when the lawyer loses the case because he fails to file opposing papers. A litigant who chooses himself as legal representative should be treated no differently." Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). Therefore, while pro se litigants are given some leniency as to the substance of their pleadings, all litigants must follow the same procedural requirements. This includes notifying the Court of any address change, monitoring case updates on the docket, and appearing before the Court when ordered. Pro se litigants are held to the same procedural requirements as legal counsel.
Plaintiff Henry Maye has repeatedly failed to comply with the Court's orders by failing to appear as ordered for the November 21, 2019 ex parte hearing [Dkt. 39] and the November 26, 2019 telephonic status conference [Dkt. 40]. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff Henry Maye's claims in this matter be dismissed for Plaintiff's repeated failures to comply with the Court's orders.
Any objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation shall be filed with the Clerk in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), and failure to timely file objections within fourteen days after service of this Order shall constitute a waiver of subsequent review absent a showing of good cause for such failure.
SO ORDERED.