NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

McCLENDON, J.

The defendant, Dennis Ray Caruso, Jr., was charged by bill of information with one count of home invasion, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:62.8, and pled not guilty. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged. He moved for a new trial and for a postverdict judgment of acquittal, but the motions were denied. He was sentenced to eighteen years at hard labor, with five years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He moved for reconsideration of sentence, but the motion was denied. He now appeals, contending: (1) the trial court committed reversible error in denying trial counsel's request to withdraw; (2) the trial court committed reversible error in denying trial counsel's motion for mistrial based on the State's untimely disclosure of exculpatory evidence; (3) the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the State to introduce a gruesome photograph into evidence; (4) the jury erred in finding him guilty because the State did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) the trial court erred in denying the motions for a new trial and for a postverdict judgment of acquittal; and (6) the sentence imposed was excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS

The victim, Valerie Thornton Fayad, testified at trial. On January 17, 2011, she lived in a mobile home on Henry O'Neal Drive in Denham Springs. Her friend, Russell Morgan, also lived in the home. At approximately 1:00 a.m., Morgan left with a friend to go out-of-town. Less than an hour later, Joshua White visited the victim at the home. White asked "about pills" and wanted to "hang out and stuff." The victim told White she could not find pills anymore. She testified she stopped distributing pills in November of 2010. White stayed at the victim's home approximately twenty to thirty minutes before letting himself out.

Less than an hour later, a man the victim had never seen before entered the trailer through the unlocked door and sat on the couch. They had a brief conversation wherein she asked him if he was looking for the house next door. The victim thought the man's visit was drug related. She testified there was "traffic going in and out" of the house next door. Thereafter, the victim received a telephone call from White.

While the victim was on the telephone with White, she looked outside and saw a truck with its headlights on and with someone waiting inside. The truck was parked facing away from the neighborhood. As soon as the victim finished talking to White, the man who had entered her trailer attacked her with a billy club. The victim tried to hit the man back with an ashtray but he continued to beat her with the billy club. The man demanded the victim "give him the money," and she threw $200 at him. He then picked up the money and ran out of the door. As a result of injuries from the attack, the victim received fourteen staples in her head. She also suffered broken bones in her arm and hand.

On February 22, 2011, the victim selected the defendant's photograph from a six-photograph lineup as her assailant. She also identified the defendant in court as her attacker.

The defendant testified at trial. He conceded he had a "drug problem." He indicated he had pled guilty to possession of cocaine. He also stated he had "[taken] a diesel tank in West Baton Rouge Parish." He denied attacking the victim. He claimed he was at his father's house in New Orleans at the time of the offense.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE; POSTVERDICT JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

In assignment of error number 4, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because the State failed to corroborate the allegations of the victim with physical evidence. In assignment of error number 5, he argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a postverdict judgment of acquittal and a new trial because the State offered no evidence of the offense other than the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, whose recollection of events and identification of the defendant as her assailant was compromised by her severe head injury.

In reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must consider "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988).

Home invasion is "the unauthorized entering of any inhabited dwelling ... belonging to another and used ... as a home ... by a person, where a person is present, with the intent to use force or violence upon the person of another ...." LSA-R.S. 14:62.8(A).

After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced that any rational trier of fact viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of home invasion. The verdict rendered against the defendant indicates the jury accepted the testimony of the victim and rejected the alibi of the defendant. This court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. The testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to prove the elements of the offense. The trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Lofton, 96-1429 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 1365, 1368, writ denied, 97-1124 (La. 10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1331. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam).

These assignments of error are without merit.

NEW TRIAL

In the remaining portion of assignment of error number 5, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because: (a) the verdict was unsupported by the evidence because the only evidence presented was the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim; (b) "[t]he jury should not have been allowed to consider certain portions of the alleged victim's testimony[;]" and (c) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request to fire his attorney and hire new counsel.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 851, in pertinent part, provides:

The trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Maize, 94-0736 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So.2d 500, 517, writ denied, 95-1894 (La. 12/15/95), 664 So.2d 451.

The defendant presents his arguments concerning assignment 5(a) in assignment of error number 4 and the first portion of assignment of error number 5. He presents his arguments concerning assignment 5(c) in assignment of error number 1. Therefore, we will address the defendant's arguments as to assignments 5(a) and 5(c) in connection with those other assignments of error. Assignment of error 5(b) is not included in any of the other assignments of error.

The defendant fails to provide any argument or statutory or case authority in support of assignment 5(b). Assignments of error not briefed on appeal are considered abandoned. Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4. Moreover, there was no clear abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial. The record indicates that during the testimony of the victim, the following occurred:

Outside the presence of the jury, the defense argued the jury could infer the victim's conversation with Joshua White led to "everything else." The court stated it did not get that inference from the partial response, and denied the motion for mistrial.

The defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's ruling on the objection. The defense's objection to the victim's testimony concerning White was sustained before the victim disclosed White's allegations against the defendant.

This assignment of error is without merit.

MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In assignments of error numbers 1 and 5(c), the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying trial counsel's request to withdraw.

The right to counsel cannot be manipulated to obstruct the orderly procedure of the courts and cannot be used to interfere with the fair administration of justice. While the right to counsel of choice in a criminal trial is guaranteed by the United States and Louisiana Constitutions, there is no constitutional right to make a new choice on the date a trial is scheduled to begin, with the attendant necessity of a continuance and its disrupting implications to the orderly trial of cases. The right to counsel of choice must be exercised at a reasonable time, in a reasonable manner, and at an appropriate stage within the procedural framework of the criminal justice system of which it is a part. Once the day of trial has arrived, the question of withdrawal of counsel rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. The Louisiana Supreme Court has frequently upheld the trial court's denial of motions for continuances or withdrawal of counsel made on the day of trial when the defendant is dissatisfied with his present attorney but had ample opportunity to retain private counsel. State v. Albert, 96-1991 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/20/97), 697 So.2d 1355, 1361.

On the day of trial, October 25, 2011, the following exchange occurred between the State, defense counsel, the defendant, and the trial court:

There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion to withdraw and no clear abuse of discretion in the court's denial of the motion for new trial based on claim number 5(c). The defendant failed to show why a change of defense counsel on the day of trial, and the consequent disruption to the orderly operation of the criminal justice system in this matter, was warranted. On appeal, the defendant claims trial counsel was unprepared for trial. As noted by the State, the only argument offered in support of the motion to withdraw in the trial court was the defendant's statement that he was "just not happy" with trial defense counsel's representation. The record indicates Hobart Pardue, retained counsel, first appeared on behalf of the defendant approximately seven months prior to trial, on March 30, 2011. Under these circumstances, the trial court could conclude, and apparently did conclude, the defendant's claim was disingenuous and a calculated maneuver to obstruct the orderly procedure of the court and to interfere with the fair administration of justice.

These assignments of error are without merit.

FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY MATERIAL

In assignment of error number 2, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial because the State failed to timely disclose Joshua White was initially a suspect in the case.

The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Favorable evidence includes both exculpatory evidence and evidence impeaching the testimony of a witness when the reliability or credibility of that witness may be determinative of the defendant's guilt or innocence, or when it may have a direct bearing on the sentencing determination of the jury. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Regardless of request, favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383). Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. at 1566; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381.

On the day of trial, October 25, 2011, the defendant filed a motion in limine concerning Joshua White. The motion set forth that Joshua White was a potential State witness, but the State had refused to provide his criminal history or any information concerning deals made with him because the State had indicated it would not use him as a witness. The defendant moved to prohibit any introduction into evidence of any statement made by White or any reference thereto. The trial court ruled the content of White's statement was inadmissible because he was not available to testify, but indicated it would allow a "generic statement" by the investigating officer that, based on information that was developed, the defendant became a suspect and his photograph was placed in a photographic lineup.

On October 26, 2011, the State indicated, in preparation for trial, it had met with Detective Bourgeois on the evening of October 25, 2011, and wanted to put "on the record" that White was considered a suspect in the case until the police located him and spoke to him. The defense moved for a mistrial because it had previously asked for all exculpatory evidence, and the State had failed to disclose that White was a suspect. The trial court denied the motion, noting the defense was already aware of White and could cross-examine Detective Bourgeois at trial concerning him.

In the instant case, even assuming, arguendo, that White being a suspect was Brady material, a thorough review of the record reveals the evidence was not "material" such that the defendant would be entitled to any relief. There is no reasonable probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense any sooner, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The State disclosed the evidence prior to any testimony being presented at trial, and thus, the defense was not denied the opportunity to cross-examine any witness concerning White being a suspect. Further, the defense was aware of White and his allegations against the defendant before the State disclosed that White was considered a suspect. Indeed, the defense successfully moved to prevent White's allegations from being referenced at trial. Additionally, Detective Bourgeois testified that White was a suspect because he had been at the scene prior to the incident.

This assignment of error is without merit.

GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPH

In assignment of error number 3, the defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the introduction into evidence of State Exhibit #3 — a photograph of the victim covered in blood.

Photographs which illustrate any fact, shed light upon any fact or issue in the case, or are relevant to describe the person, place, or thing depicted, are generally admissible, provided their probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect. The trial court's admission of allegedly gruesome photographs will be overturned on appeal only if the prejudicial effect of the photographs clearly outweighs their probative value. No error will be found unless the photographic evidence is so gruesome as to overwhelm the jurors' reason and lead them to convict the defendant without sufficient other evidence. State v. Brunet, 95-0340 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/30/96), 674 So.2d 344, 346, writ denied, 96-1406 (La. 11/1/96), 681 So.2d 1258.

At trial, the State offered into evidence four photographs of the victim's injuries. State Exhibit #3 was the only photograph showing the victim's face. The defense objected to the introduction of all of the photographs of the victim's injuries, arguing they would inflame the jury. The trial court overruled the objection, and the defense objected to the court's ruling.

There was no error in the admission of State Exhibit #3. The prejudicial effect of the photograph did not clearly outweigh its probative value. The photograph corroborated the victim's testimony concerning the attack on her. Further, it was highly probative on the element of the offense concerning "the intent to use force or violence upon the person of another." Additionally, it was essential to establish the identity of the victim as the person whose injuries were depicted in the photographs. The State used the photograph to establish that the victim in court was the person depicted in the photographs. State Exhibit #3 was not so gruesome as to overwhelm the jurors' reason and lead them to convict the defendant without sufficient other evidence.

This assignment of error is without merit.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In assignment of error number 6, the defendant argues the sentence imposed was excessive because he was only twenty-five years old and had a history of addiction disorders.

The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth items which must be considered by the trial court before imposing sentence. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. The trial court need not recite the entire checklist of Article 894.1, but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the criteria. In light of the criteria expressed by Article 894.1, a review for individual excessiveness should consider the circumstances of the crime and the trial court's stated reasons and factual basis for its sentencing decision. State v. Hurst, 99-2868 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/3/00), 797 So.2d 75, 83, writ denied, 00-3053 (La. 10/5/01), 798 So.2d 962.

Article I, Section 20, of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. A trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Hurst, 797 So.2d at 83.

As applicable here, whoever commits the crime of home invasion shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more than twenty years; at least five years of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. LSA-R.S. 14:62.8(B)(1) (prior to amendment by 2012 La. Acts No. 370, § 1). The defendant was sentenced to eighteen years at hard labor, with five years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

At sentencing, the trial court noted it had ordered and reviewed a presentence investigation (PSI) report in the matter. The court noted the defendant had a felony conviction in Tangipahoa Parish for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Thereafter, he had been arrested in Iberville Parish and given a deferred two-year sentence. According to the PSI, the defendant had also been convicted in Florida of an offense involving "a felony grade possession of synthetic narcotics." The court noted, following the defendant's second conviction, it had given him the opportunity to participate in a drug-court program, but the defendant had fled and was only reapprehended following a manhunt. The court also considered "the evidence that went before the jury and the evidence on which the jury convicted [the defendant]."

A thorough review of the record reveals the trial court adequately considered the criteria of Article 894.1 and did not manifestly abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence herein. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(A)(1), (A)(2), (B)(1), (B)(6), (B)(10), (B)(12) & (B)(21). Further, the sentence imposed was not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, and thus, was not unconstitutionally excessive.

This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.