NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

LAMBERT, JUDGE.

In this appeal from a judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, Ronald Hill contests the order of the Fayette Circuit Court denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police officers during an interview. Because we agree with Hill that the circuit court did not support its ruling with sufficient factual findings, either in writing or orally, we must vacate the final judgment and remand this matter for the circuit court to make specific findings to support its ruling.

Hill and three other co-defendants were indicted by the Fayette County grand jury on December 1, 2009, in a thirteen-count indictment. Hill was charged with eleven of the thirteen counts, which arose from incidents that took place on September 9 and September 30, 2009. He was charged with two counts of first-degree burglary pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 511.020; three counts of first-degree robbery pursuant to KRS 515.020; first-degree rape pursuant to KRS 510.040; first-degree wanton endangerment pursuant to KRS 508.060; second-degree fleeing and evading police pursuant to KRS 502.100; two counts of third-degree criminal mischief pursuant to KRS 512.040; and for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun pursuant to KRS 527.040. The September 3rd incidents involved break-ins at the residences of Hispanic families and the sexual assault of a female in one of the homes. The September 30th charges arose from Hill's actions during his apprehension by detectives from the Lexington Police Department. Hill was found to be indigent, and the court appointed a public defender to represent him.

Hill filed a pro se motion to suppress statements he made to detectives on September 30, 2009, arguing that he was not fully advised of his Miranda1 rights when they began questioning him and that he was coerced into giving them a statement because he was under duress. Hill requested an evidentiary suppression hearing, which was held on May 27, 2010.

The first witness to testify at the suppression hearing was Detective Matt Brotherton of the Lexington Police Department, Homicide Unit. He and Detective Matthew Sharp had been discussing a case Detective Sharp was working on involving a series of robberies and assaults. One of the suspects was Hill, who had been the victim of a recent crime; he had been shot in the hand at a bar. The investigation of that shooting had been assigned to Detective Brotherton. The two detectives went to Hill's address on the morning of September 30, 2009, to discuss the shooting incident and to attempt to ask him more questions about the earlier break-ins. The detectives began recording the conversation as soon as Hill answered the door.2 They entered the home with Hill's permission, and before any discussion began, the detectives went over the pre-printed form which included Miranda warnings. Detective Brotherton stated that he opted to read Hill his Miranda rights to err on the side of caution as they were at Hill's home. They spoke for less than an hour at Hill's kitchen table, but he was never placed under arrest or handcuffed. Hill never asked for an attorney. Regarding the robberies, Hill did not acknowledge any involvement, but then admitted to being involved in one of the robberies where he and another person broke into an apartment armed with pistols, stole several items, and sexually assaulted the woman in the apartment. There were three other individuals in the apartment — the woman's father and her two children — and both sexually assaulted the woman while the other held her father at gunpoint.

Because Hill was being cooperative, the detectives asked Hill to accompany them to police headquarters to look at photographs of the crimes and further discuss the robberies. Hill changed his clothes and the three proceeded to the police cruiser. Hill was not handcuffed, and he asked if he was going to jail that day. Detective Brotherton said he needed to think about the rest of his life. At that point, Hill said he did not want to go to jail and began to run. The detectives chased him on foot, and Detective Sharp apprehended him. Hill was arrested and taken to headquarters, where the detectives re-Mirandized him and questioned him again. This interview was also recorded but was not offered as evidence during the hearing. In the second interview, Hill talked about a second home invasion with three other men, where they broke into a residence and stole several items. The second statement did not substantially differ from the statements Hill made at his kitchen table, but he added information about the second incident. Detective Brotherton stated that he did not threaten Hill or use physical force on him. The only force used was when Hill was apprehended.

On cross-examination, Detective Brotherton admitted that they did not reference the Miranda warning when they transitioned to the discussion about the robberies and assault cases and that Hill was a suspect when they arrived at his residence.

Detective Matthew Sharp testified next. He is a detective with the Lexington Police Department, Personal Crimes Section, Robbery/Homicide. Detective Sharp was a member of a task force that the police department had created in response to a series of robberies that had been occurring in a particular area of the city and which targeted Hispanic couples. Hill's name came up as being involved in the incidents. Detective Sharp first came into contact with Hill when he performed a traffic stop in mid-September of that year, but they were unable to discuss the incidents because Hill was with other people. Detective Sharp did put Hill on notice that he would be questioned about the robberies. A few days later, he discussed this with Detective Brotherton. Detective Sharp's testimony related to the interview conforms to Detective Brotherton's testimony, and we shall not repeat it here. On cross-examination, Detective Sharp said they had decided Detective Brotherton would talk to Hill first about the shooting, and then Detective Sharp would question him about the robberies, but that they did not reference back to the Miranda warnings when they began talking about the robberies.

Hill did not call any witnesses to testify. At the conclusion of the testimony, Hill argued that he was not properly Mirandized when the detectives questioned him about the robberies because his rights were only mentioned in conjunction with the crime of which he was a victim. Under the totality of the circumstances, including his being "trapped" in his own home, Hill asserted that his confession was involuntary. However, Hill could not identify any cases to support this argument. The Commonwealth argued that Hill had been on notice since at least September 21st that he was a suspect in the robberies, and that the detectives were not under any duty to Mirandize Hill because he was not in custody at all; Hill was at his own kitchen table and could have told the detectives to leave.

After noting that Hill had made allegations of improper police conduct, the court stated that Hill had failed to present any evidence that his statements were involuntary and that the testimony from the detectives established that his statements were voluntary and consensual. The court then indicated that it would listen to the rest of the audio recording introduced into evidence. The court permitted the parties to brief the issue and scheduled a status hearing for the future.

In his brief, Hill continued to argue that the Miranda warning given by detectives at his residence was not sufficient to properly advise him of his rights because it was given in the context of the discussion with him as the victim of a crime, not as a suspect. Because the detectives misrepresented their reason for the visit in order to gain access to his residence, Hill contends that his confession was involuntary. In its brief, the Commonwealth argued that no Miranda warning was required for the conversation at Hill's residence because he was not in custody, and there was no authority to support Hill's argument that the detectives had to re-Mirandize him after the topic shifted to the break-ins.

At the status hearing on August 6, 2010, the court stated that it had reviewed the law related to the suppression motion and that the law did not support suppression of Hill's statements. The court concluded that the detectives did not have to re-Mirandize Hill when they questioned him about the robberies. The court then entered a written order on August 9, 2010, denying the motion to suppress.

The following year, Hill moved to enter a guilty plea, conditioned on his right to appeal the suppression ruling entered the previous August. The court accepted the plea following a hearing and entered a judgment in accordance with the plea agreement on October 24, 2011. As a result of the plea agreement, the court found Hill guilty of one count of second-degree robbery (amended from first-degree robbery) under Count 2 of the indictment and recommended a five-year sentence; first-degree robbery under Count 4 with a recommended sentence of ten years; first-degree rape under Count 6 with a recommended sentence of ten years; and of being a felon in possession of a firearm (amended from handgun) with a recommended sentence of one year. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for a total of ten years, but consecutively to his sentences in two earlier cases, bringing the total to fifteen-years' imprisonment. The other seven charges were dismissed. This appeal now follows.

On appeal, Hill continues to argue that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress based upon violations of his Miranda and Fifth Amendment rights. He also argues that the circuit court erred because it failed to include written findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order denying his motion to suppress. The Commonwealth contends that the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress, that Hill failed to request written findings and conclusions, and that the court made sufficient oral findings to support its ruling.

Our standard of review from a denial of a motion to suppress is well-settled in the Commonwealth and involves two inquiries. First, we must determine whether the circuit court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. If so, those findings are conclusive. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78; Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998). If not, the factual findings must be overturned as clearly erroneous. Farmer v. Commonwealth, 169 S.W.3d 50, 53 (Ky. App. 2005). Second, we must perform a de novo review of those factual findings to determine whether the lower court's decision is correct as a matter of law. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2001); Garcia v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Ky. App. 2006); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky. App. 2000).

Hill's second argument, which we shall address first, relates to the circuit court's failure to include any factual findings supporting its decision to deny the motion to suppress. RCr 9.78 provides as follows:

In order to properly review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, there must be factual findings entered into the record. "The provisions of RCr 9.78 are mandatory[,]" Moore v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 426, 433 (Ky. 1982), and one of these provisions is the entry of findings of fact by the trial court. Because this is a mandatory part of RCr 9.78, a defendant is not required to request that such findings be made.

The Commonwealth appears to concede that the circuit court failed to make any written findings supporting its denial of the motion to suppress. However, it notes that case law has permitted oral findings to provide the necessary basis for an appellate court's review: "Although we agree that written findings greatly facilitate appellate review, and we recognize that it is sometimes difficult to discern the basis for a trial court's ruling from on-the-record free-form analysis, we do not believe this is a case where we are `left in the dark' as to the basis for the trial court's ruling." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 100 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2002).

See also Commonwealth v. Alleman, 306 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Ky. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 418, 178 L.Ed. 2d 326 (U.S. 2010) ("we see no reason why oral findings made from the bench, as long as otherwise adequate, cannot satisfy the due process requirement of Morrissey, at least where, as here, we possess a video record that is sufficiently complete to allow the parties and us to determine `the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation.' Romano, 471 U.S. at 612, 105 S.Ct. 2254; Barth, 899 F.2d at 201."). We agree with this statement of the law, but we also agree with Hill that in the other cases cited by the Commonwealth in support of this argument, the courts appear to have entered findings into the record sufficient to provide for meaningful review.

Because the circuit court did not enter any written findings in conjunction with its order, we must determine whether the court made sufficient oral findings to provide this Court with the ability to meaningfully review its ruling. Our review of the video recordings reveals that the only oral statement the circuit court made was to the effect that based upon the detectives' respective testimony, Hill failed to establish that his confession was involuntary or coerced. This is a conclusory statement, not a factual finding. The court also indicated that it would review the audio recording of the interview before issuing a decision. At the status hearing when the court made its oral ruling to deny the motion, the court simply stated that the cited case law did not support Hill's argument, and did not make any factual findings related to the hearing or the contents of the audio recording. Accordingly, there are no factual findings for this Court to review to determine whether the circuit court properly denied Hill's motion to suppress, and we must vacate this order.

Because of our resolution on this issue, we shall not address the merits of the circuit court's decision. The court shall be required to enter a new order on remand.

For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment of conviction and order denying the motion to suppress are vacated, and this matter is remanded to the Fayette Circuit Court for entry of a new order including findings of fact supporting its ruling on the motion to suppress.

ALL CONCUR.