NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

DIXON, JUDGE.

Appellant, James Edwards Cornelius, was convicted in the Bullitt Circuit Court of first-degree fleeing or evading police. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Finding no error, we affirm.

In the early morning hours of October 9, 2010, Officer Dennis Creason observed a white Ford Contour driven by Appellant cross the center line of Kentucky Highway 1526 in Bullitt County. After following the vehicle for a short time and observing Appellant's erratic driving, Officer Creason activated his lights and siren. Instead of stopping, however, Appellant proceeded on to I-65 North. Officer Creason illuminated his spotlight and could see two silhouettes in the vehicle. While on I-65, Appellant's vehicle reached speeds of 100 miles per hour. Eventually, another officer, Lieutenant Neil Bowden, joined in the pursuit as the vehicles exited west on to the Watterson Expressway. Eventually, Appellant exited off of the expressway and was slowed down by denser traffic. Several times Appellant veered his vehicle into Officer Creason's lane, almost striking his cruiser. Eventually, Appellant stopped on Camden Road, where Officer Bowen observed the passenger get out and flee down the sidewalk. After being forcibly removed from his vehicle, Appellant claimed that his passenger, "Trey," had hit him in the face with a gun and had forced him to keep driving. Police never identified or located the passenger.

On December 1, 2010, a Bullitt County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one count of first-degree fleeing and evading police, two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment (as to each officer), resisting arrest, reckless driving, and failure to produce an operator's license. On June 28 and 29, 2011, a trial was held in the Bullitt Circuit Court. Prior to the trial commencing, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss one of the wanton endangerment charges (relating to Lt. Bowen). The trial court subsequently also granted Appellant's directed verdict motions on the charges of resisting arrest, reckless driving, and no operator's license. At the close of evidence, the jury acquitted Appellant on the other count of wanton endangerment but convicted him of first-degree fleeing and evading police. The trial court thereafter sentenced him to two years' imprisonment. This appeal ensued. Additional facts are set forth as necessary.

Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree fleeing and evading charge. Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove the elements of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 520.095(1)(a)(4), which requires proof that "[b]y fleeing or evading, the person is the cause, or creates a substantial risk, of serious physical injury or death to any person or property." It is Appellant's position that at no time during the vehicular pursuit was anyone at a substantial risk of injury or death. We disagree.

In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict,

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991); Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1983). On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187 (citations omitted).

The Commonwealth introduced evidence that while traveling on I-65 and the Watterson Expressway, Appellant's vehicle reached speeds near 100 miles per hour. Further, while the incident did occur in the early morning hours, Officer Creason testified that there were, in fact, other vehicles on the roadways that were forced to get out of the way of Appellant's vehicle. Finally, there was testimony that after exiting the expressway, Appellant veered his vehicle into Officer Creason's lane, nearly striking the cruiser and causing it to move over into oncoming traffic.

We conclude that under the evidence as a whole, taking it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, it would not have been clearly unreasonable for a jury to find Appellant guilty of first-degree fleeing and evading. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187. Certainly, the Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence to withstand a directed verdict and it became a question for the jury as to whether Appellant's driving, in fact, was such that it created a substantial risk of injury or death. Thus, the trial court properly denied his motion for a directed verdict on that charge.

Appellant next argues that he was entitled to a dismissal of all changes due to prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, during Officer Creason's testimony, an issue arose concerning whether the officer had taken and logged in Appellant's cell phone and $115 at the time of his arrest.1 At some point, Officer Creason commented that all of the actions he took on the night in question were contained in his report. Defense counsel, assuming that Officer Creason was referring to the uniform citation, handed him the document to refute his statement. However, Officer Creason responded that, in fact, he had prepared a report other than the uniform citation. A bench conference followed wherein the Commonwealth claimed that it had no knowledge of the report. The trial court ordered a recess to allow the Commonwealth to confer with Officer Creason, who thereafter located his five-page report. The Commonwealth and defense counsel agreed that neither had been provided or was even aware of the report.

When the proceedings resumed, defense counsel moved to dismiss all remaining charges based upon the discovery violation. The trial court recognized that the case had presented several unusual discovery issues. Nevertheless, in denying Appellant's motion to dismiss, the trial court stated,

Defense counsel, however, immediately objected to a mistrial. The trial court responded that if Appellant wished to continue the trial, he would have to waive all objections concerning the report. Defense counsel conferred with Appellant before informing the trial court that Appellant wanted to continue the trial.

Despite having rejected the trial court's offer of a mistrial, Appellant now contends that when the trial court announced it was going to sua sponte declare a mistrial, it implicitly made a finding that Appellant could not receive a fair trial and that there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. Further, because the manifest necessity was created by what Appellant characterizes as prosecutorial misconduct, any further prosecution of Appellant should have been barred. See Tinsley v. Jackson, 771 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. 1992).

Contrary to Appellant's statements in his brief, the trial court did not, in fact, find that the Commonwealth had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court noted that neither the Commonwealth nor defense counsel was aware that Officer Creason's report existed. Notwithstanding, we believe that this issue is rendered moot because Appellant waived all objections to the discovery violation.

Appellant's agreement to withdraw his objection to the challenged evidence in return for the benefit of not having the mistrial declared effectively waived any further complaint on appeal. This is not a case where the trial court disagreed with Appellant as to whether a discovery violation had occurred. Instead, the trial court ruled that the discovery violation called into question the credibility of Officer Creason and the Commonwealth, and warranted a mistrial. Yet, defense counsel stated on the record, that as a matter of trial strategy she wanted the jury to be aware of the Commonwealth's conduct rather than giving the Commonwealth additional time to remedy the violation before a retrial.

"`In the absence of exceptional circumstances, a defendant is bound by the trial strategy adopted by his counsel . . . . The defendant's counsel cannot deliberately forego making an objection to a curable trial defect when he is aware of the basis for an objection.'" West v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989) (quoting Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Ky. App. 1977)); see also Meece v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 627, 656 (Ky. 2011). We are of the opinion that such is exactly what occurred in this matter and, thus, Appellant has waived the right to complain of the issue on appeal.

For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment and sentence of the Bullitt Circuit Court are affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.