NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

KELLER, JUDGE.

Intrepid USA Healthcare Services (Intrepid) appeals from the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) opinion and award on reopening finding Erlinda G. Murphy (Murphy) to be totally and permanently disabled. Having reviewed the record and the arguments of counsel, we affirm.

FACTS

Murphy, who is fifty-eight years of age, has eight years of formal education, which she received before immigrating to the United States from the Philippines. Murphy speaks English well and can read a newspaper but has difficulty writing. In the past, Murphy has worked as a nurse's aide in several nursing homes and for Intrepid, a home health-care provider. Murphy's job with Intrepid required her to provide in-home care to patients and to assist patients with cleaning, cooking, and shopping. On March 18, 2004, Murphy suffered a work-related back injury when she fell leaving a patient's home. After a course of conservative care, Murphy underwent a lumbar fusion on March 9, 2005. She attempted to return to full-duty work in mid-August 2005, but was only able to do so for approximately one week. Murphy has not worked since then and, sometime before May 2006, Murphy applied for social security disability benefits, which she now receives.

During the initial litigation of this claim, Murphy testified that, following the injury, she suffered from back pain with radiation into her left leg and foot. Those symptoms partially abated following the surgery; however, they returned. In her May 2006 deposition, Murphy testified that her pain was a nine on a scale of ten and that she had difficulty sitting, standing, and walking for more than thirty minutes at a time. Murphy also alleged that the injury caused her pre-existing depression to worsen.

In addition to her own testimony, Murphy filed medical records/reports from Dr. El-Kalliny and Dr. Patel. Dr. El-Kalliny opined, in pertinent part, that Murphy had a 23% whole body impairment and he restricted her from: lifting more than twenty-five pounds; sitting for more than three hours; standing/walking for more than six hours; and frequently crouching, stooping, crawling, etc. Furthermore, Dr. El-Kalliny stated that Murphy could not return to her work as a nurse's aide. Dr. Patel indicated that Murphy suffered from chronic pain syndrome with features of bipolar disorder, and he assigned Murphy a 25% psychological impairment.

Intrepid filed reports/records from Dr. Shraberg and Dr. Stephens. Dr. Shraberg made a diagnosis of adjustment disorder of adult life with anxious, depressed mood and indicated that Murphy had no impairment or restrictions related to her psychological condition. Dr. Stephens made a diagnosis of chronic back and leg pain, assigned Murphy a 20% impairment rating, and agreed with Dr. El-Kalliny's restrictions.

Based on the preceding evidence, the parties settled Murphy's claim. Pursuant to the settlement, Intrepid paid Murphy a lump sum of $92,697.33 for an agreed-to permanent partial disability of 21.5%, and $2,500.00 in exchange for Murphy's waiver of benefits related to her alleged psychological injury.

Following settlement, Murphy's condition worsened and Dr. El-Kalliny preformed fusion surgery at L4-5 in May 2008.1 On January 22, 2010, Murphy filed a motion to reopen her claim, asserting that her impairment rating had increased and that her post-2008 surgery restrictions foreclosed her from performing any work activity.

During litigation on reopening, Murphy testified that, before her 2008 surgery, she had pain in her legs and feet and could "hardly walk." Following that surgery, her leg and back pain decreased somewhat but, by the time of the formal hearing, had returned to near pre-2008 surgery levels. Murphy testified that she continues to have difficulty sitting, standing, and walking for any length of time. Because of her symptoms, Murphy has not attempted to return to work since 2005 and does not believe she has been capable of working since then.

In addition to her testimony, Murphy filed the records/report of Dr. El-Kalliny and the report of Dr. Bilkey. Dr. El-Kalliny stated that, as a result of her second surgery, Murphy had a 25% impairment, and he restricted her from sitting/standing/walking for more than fifteen minutes without changing positions as well as to lifting a maximum of fifteen pounds. Dr. El-Kalliny also stated that, based on her condition, Murphy could not work an eight-hour day even within his restrictions. Dr. Bilkey assigned Murphy a 27% whole person impairment and restricted her to lifting five pounds with no twisting, climbing, or pushing.

Intrepid filed the report of Dr. Stephens on reopening. Dr. Stephens indicated that Murphy had improved a "little," and he stated that he would not alter the restrictions he imposed earlier. However, Dr. Stephens did increase Murphy's impairment rating to 25%.

Based on the preceding, the ALJ determined that Murphy had a 21.5% permanent partial disability at the time she settled her claim. In doing so, the ALJ relied on Murphy's testimony that she could not return to work as a nurse's aide and Dr. El-Kalliny's failure to "opine at that time she was incapable of working for an eight hour period (as he has in this reopening)."

Furthermore, the ALJ determined that Murphy's condition had worsened and her disability had increased to the point that she is now permanently totally disabled. In making this finding, the ALJ relied on Murphy's testimony that her condition is worse than when she settled her claim as well as Dr. El-Kalliny's statement that Murphy cannot work an eight-hour day.

Intrepid filed a petition for reconsideration, which the ALJ denied. Intrepid then appealed to the Board, and the Board affirmed. It is from the Board's well-written opinion that Intrepid now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As the claimant, Murphy had the burden of proof before the ALJ. Because she convinced the ALJ that her claim had merit, the question on appeal is whether the ALJ's opinion was supported by substantial evidence. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky. App. 1984). Evidence is substantial if "it has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men." Blankenship v. Lloyd Blankenship Coal Co., Inc., 463 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky. 1970).

This Court will only reverse the Board when it has overlooked or misconstrued controlling law or so flagrantly erred in evaluating the evidence that it has caused gross injustice. Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). In order to review the Board's decision, we must review the ALJ's decision because the ALJ, as fact-finder, has the sole authority to judge the weight, credibility, substance and inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985). In reaching her decision, the ALJ is free to choose to believe or disbelieve parts of the evidence from the total proof, no matter which party offered it. Brockway v. Rockwell International, 907 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. App.1995). With these standards in mind, we address the issue raised by Intrepid on appeal.

ANALYSIS

A party may reopen a previously resolved claim upon showing a change of disability or worsening or improvement of impairment. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.125. The percentage of disability recited in a settlement agreement "represents a compromise and might or might not equal the worker's actual occupational disability at the time; therefore, additional benefits are authorized at the reopening of the settled claim only to the extent of an actual increase in the worker's occupational disability." Whittaker v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky. 1999). Thus, before the ALJ can determine if a claimant's disability has increased, she must first determine the percentage of disability that existed at the time of settlement. To do so, the ALJ must, as she did here, review the evidence relied on by the parties in reaching their settlement. See Commercial Drywall v. Wells, 860 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Ky. App. 1993).

Intrepid argues that Murphy was totally disabled at the time she entered into the settlement agreement and that there was no evidence of substance to support the ALJ's finding to the contrary. We disagree.

During the initial litigation, Murphy testified that she was not able to return to work. Furthermore, she filed for social security disability benefits and made no attempt to return to work, indicating that she believed she was totally disabled at that time. However, the medical evidence presented prior to settlement indicated that, while Murphy could not return to her past work as a nurse's aide, she could perform a wide range of sedentary and light work.

Based on Murphy's self-assessment of her ability to return to work, the ALJ could have found that she was totally disabled at the time of settlement. However, in light of medical evidence to the contrary, Murphy's testimony did not compel such a finding. As noted by the Board, the medical evidence supported the ALJ's reasoned and reasonable conclusion that "Murphy retained transferable skills at the time of the original settlement which qualified her for other fulltime, gainful employment elsewhere." We discern no reversible error in the ALJ's findings or in the Board's opinion. Therefore, we affirm.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board's well-written and comprehensive opinion.

ALL CONCUR.