WHIPPLE, C.J.
This matter is before us on appeal by the plaintiff/appellant, Venetia Gros, from a judgment of the trial court awarding her damages in accordance with a jury verdict. For the reasons that follow, we amend, and as amended, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On the afternoon of June 19, 2006, plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident with the defendant, Gregory G. Osborn, who was operating a state-owned vehicle while in the course and scope of his employment with the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Culture, Recreation, and Tourism ("the State"). At the time of the accident, plaintiff was traveling in an easterly direction on La. Hwy. 70 in Assumption Parish, and Osborn, who was driving a 2001 Dodge Caravan, was traveling west on La. Hwy. 70. As Osborn's vehicle approached plaintiff's vehicle, he crossed the center line hitting the left side of plaintiff's vehicle, shattering her side mirror and window. Osborn told the investigating officer that he was talking on his cell phone at the time of the accident and that he did not realize he had crossed the center line. As a result of the accident, plaintiff sought treatment at the Emergency Department of Assumption Community Hospital in Napoleonville, Louisiana, for complaints of neck and lower back pain, as well as for abrasions on her left hand.
On June 14, 2007, plaintiff filed suit against Osborn and the State, as his employer, contending that as a result of the accident, she sustained bodily injuries, including but not limited to injuries to her head, neck, back, shoulder, legs, and hips.
The matter was tried before a jury on September 12 and 13, 2012. The defendants did not dispute liability at trial. After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict, finding that Osborn had caused the June 19, 2006 accident, and awarding plaintiff damages as follows:
On October 30, 2012, the trial court signed a written judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict.
It is well-settled that a judge or jury is given great discretion in its assessment of quantum for both general and special damages.
The role of an appellate court in reviewing such awards is not to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the trier-of-fact.
Review of the amounts awarded by the jury for general and special damages is subject to the "abuse of discretion" standard of review.
Notably, reasonable persons frequently disagree regarding the measure of damages in a particular case.
In reviewing a jury's factual conclusions with regard to special damages, an appellate court must satisfy a two-step process based on the record as a whole: there must be no reasonable factual basis for the trial court's conclusion, and the finding must be clearly wrong.
In a personal injury suit, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving the causal connection between an accident and the resulting injuries.
With these principles in mind, we must review the evidence of record and determine whether the jury's damage awards are contrary to the evidence or constitute an abuse of the jury's discretion.
Plaintiff first contends that the jury erred in awarding $7,500.00 for past medical expenses, when her past medical expenses totaled $23,601.76. Plaintiff further contends that the jury erred in awarding only $7,000.00 for her future medical expenses, where the cost of her anticipated surgery is $69,200.76 or, alternatively, where the cost of conservative care, is approximately $150,000.00. According to plaintiff, her past and future medical expenses were necessitated by the accident for treatment for injuries she sustained in the accident.
The State counters that the jury did not err in its assessment of such damages as plaintiff was unable to prove that the June 19, 2006 accident caused the past and future medical expenses she submitted, especially in light of her prior complaints of the same symptoms.
A tort victim may ordinarily recover medical expenses, past and future, that he incurs as a result of an injury.
Generally, the effect and weight to be given medical expert testimony is within the broad discretion of the factfinder.
A tortfeasor is liable only for damages caused by his negligence; he is not liable for damages caused by separate, independent, or intervening causes. Hence, plaintiff herein had the burden of proving that her injuries were not the result of such separate, independent or intervening causes.
Plaintiff testified that as a result of this accident, she sustained injuries to her neck and back and that she suffers from headaches. Plaintiff initially sought treatment at the Assumption Community Hospital Emergency Department on the night of the accident, for complaints of neck and low back pain. She followed up with treatment from Dr. William Cherry, who prescribed medication and therapy, which plaintiff contends did not provide much relief. Dr. Cherry eventually ordered an MRI, which showed lumbar and cervical bulging discs. Dr. Cherry ultimately discharged her to the care of an orthopedist. Plaintiff was then seen by Dr. F. Allen Johnston, an orthopedic surgeon in Baton Rouge, for her complaints of neck and low back pain. At the time plaintiff presented to Dr. Johnston, she advised that she was taking Lortab, Soma, Synthroid, Premarin and Toprol. After examination and review of her x-rays, Dr. Johnston's office note stated that he "asked her to please wean off of the Lortab 10s that she was on" and "g[a]ve her 20 Lortab 7.5s." He further recommended a gentle regimen of physical therapy for strengthening her neck and back three times a week for four weeks. Plaintiff did not return to Dr. Johnston, but instead, sought treatment with Dr. Charles Billings, an orthopedist at Tulane University Hospital and Clinic. Dr. Billings opined that plaintiff suffered from cervical and lumbar strain with underlying disc disease. Dr. Billings recommended that plaintiff "be managed conservatively with a formal physical therapy program, analgesics, and restriction in activities." Plaintiff testified that she did not continue treatment with Dr. Billings, stating that he did "much of nothing" for her.
Next, plaintiff saw Dr. Morteza Shamsnia, her treating neurologist, who referred her to Dr. Bradley J. Bartholomew, a neurosurgeon, who became her treating physician. Dr. Bartholomew recommended that she undergo injections for her lower back or surgery on her cervical spine, but plaintiff decided to forego the injections and opted for surgery.
Dr. Bartholomew testified that based on the history provided to him by plaintiff, he related plaintiff's need for surgery to the June 19, 2006 automobile accident. However, Dr. Bartholomew further testified that he would be required to change his opinion if plaintiff's history of prior neck and back treatment were different from what he had been told by plaintiff.
Dr. Shamsnia testified that he also believed that surgery would alleviate plaintiff's abnormalities and improve her pain and sensory symptoms. He further opined that given her history and complaints, her injuries were more than likely related to the automobile accident of June 19, 2006. However, in forming his opinion, Dr. Shamsnia stated that he did not have access to plaintiff's prior medical records. Dr. Shamsnia further testified that plaintiff relayed to him that all of her complaints began after the June 19, 2006 accident herein.
Dr. Luke Allen Corsten, a neurosurgeon, performed an independent medical examination of plaintiff. After reviewing MRI screens of plaintiff's cervical and lumbar spine, he opined that plaintiff was suffering from chronic degenerative disc disease, and that there were not necessarily any signs of acute trauma. He felt that the changes he saw had developed over a long period of time, in fact, many years. Dr. Corsten was not in favor of surgery and recommended a course of conservative treatment, such as physical therapy, massage therapy, chiropractic therapy, acupuncture therapy, or steroid injections.
At trial, plaintiff acknowledged that prior to the instant accident, she was involved in several other accidents wherein she sustained injuries for which she sought medical treatment. Plaintiff testified that as a result of these previous accidents, she suffered from neck and back pain as well as headaches. In particular, plaintiff explained that she sustained neck and tailbone injuries for which she sought treatment after she slipped on water in a store and fell in 2004.
Although plaintiff admitted that she suffered from neck and back pain and chronic headaches in the past, she testified that her pain symptoms were different after the instant accident. She contends that the type of headache she suffers from since the accident at issue herein differs from the type she previously experienced. Plaintiff further contends that since the accident herein, she experiences numbness in her hand, which causes her to drop things. With reference to plaintiff's complaints of numbness in her hand, however, Dr. Shamsnia stated that plaintiff had carpal tunnel syndrome in her right hand, which required surgery to correct and that if she were dropping objects from her right hand, it was due to the carpal tunnel syndrome. Moreover, plaintiff admitted to suffering from numbness in her fingers as early on as 2000, for which she sought treatment at Chabert Medical Center.
On cross examination, counsel for the State questioned plaintiff about her prior accidents and resulting injuries, as well as numerous other emergency room and hospital visits where she presented with complaints of neck and back pain and headaches. In doing so, the State attempted to prove through plaintiff's medical records that her post-accident complaints were substantially similar to the complaints she suffered from prior to the instant accident. When confronted with the medical records evidencing these visits, plaintiff basically denied having any recollection of presenting for treatment of these complaints. Although plaintiff testified that she did not intentionally attempt to conceal her previous neck and back injuries from her treating physicians, Dr. Shamsnia and Dr. Barthlomew, (both of whom opined that based on the medical history she provided, her back and neck complaints were related to the June 19, 2006 automobile accident herein), plaintiff acknowledged that she did not recall whether she told Dr. Bartholomew that she had suffered with back and neck pain before the instant accident. Further, Dr. Shamsnia candidly testified that he did not look at any of plaintiff's medical records to determine her condition prior to the instant accident. Hence, the State argues, because plaintiff failed to disclose her pre-existing injuries to her physicians, she ultimately failed to prove which treatment was attributable to the aggravation of her previous neck and back injuries.
On review, we first observe that the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that the jury was faced with differing views concerning the origin of plaintiff's neck and back pain, and that in reaching its verdict, the jury was ultimately required to do so based on the evaluation of conflicting expert testimony and the determination of the credibility of the witnesses. The evidence in the record, including plaintiff's voluminous medical treatment history, supports a finding that plaintiff's pain and injuries existed prior to the instant accident, and that those pre-existing injuries were merely aggravated by the accident herein. Mindful that a plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of the injuries and a causal connection between the injuries and the accident at issue,
As such, we are unable to find that the jury's awards of damages were unreasonable, considering the evidence of record. Given the vast discretion afforded the jury in its weighing and evaluation of expert testimony and in its credibility determinations, we find no error in its implicit determination that plaintiff's treatment and recommendation for surgery were not necessitated by the June 19, 2006 accident and that any injuries sustained therein were an aggravation of her pre-existing injuries. Thus, we find no error in the jury's decision to award $7,500.00 for past medical expenses and $7,000.00 for future medical expenses.
These assignments of error lack merit.
In these assignments of error, plaintiff contends that the jury's awards of $20,000.00, for pain and suffering, including bodily injury, mental anguish, inconvenience and disability, and $2,500.00, for loss of enjoyment of life, are abusively low.
Considering our determination above that, based on the conflicting medical evidence, plaintiff's significant medical history, and the credibility determinations which the jury was required to resolve and make, the jury properly determined that plaintiff's treatment and the recommended surgery were not necessitated by the June 19, 2006 accident, and that any injuries sustained therein were an aggravation of her pre-existing injuries, we are unable to say that the jury abused its discretion in its general damage award of $20,000.00.
Moreover, with regard to plaintiff's argument that the amount awarded for loss of enjoyment of life is abusively low, we note that such awards are made for detrimental alterations in a plaintiff's life or lifestyle or the inability to participate in the activities or pleasures of life that were enjoyed prior to an injury.
Thus, we also find no merit to these assignments of error.
In her final assignment of error, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in failing to name the defendant, Gregory Osborn, in the written judgment signed on October 30, 2012.
Gregory Osborn, along with his employer, the State, were named as defendants in plaintiff's petition for damages filed herein. In its answer, the State admitted that Gregory Osborn was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Counsel for the State of Louisiana represented Gregory Osborn throughout the proceedings below. The jury specifically found that Gregory Osborn was at fault and that his fault was a cause of the accident herein, as indicated on the jury verdict form.
The omission of a party from the written judgment is a substantive error.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2164 permits an appellate court to "render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal." As such, we agree that the trial court erred in omitting Gregory Osborn's name from the written judgment, as he was found to be at fault in causing the accident, which resulted in injuries to plaintiff. Thus, we deem it just and proper to amend the October 30, 2012 judgment of the trial court to include the named defendant, Gregory Osborn.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the October 30, 2012 judgment of the trial court, entered in accordance with the jury's verdict, is hereby amended to cast defendant, Gregory Osborn, in judgment as follows:
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed, as amended. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $1,947.50 are to be assessed equally among the parties.
