PEATROSS, J.
Defendant, Cochran Construction Company ("Cochran"), appeals a judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiff, Delores Thomas, for injuries sustained while Ms. Thomas was shopping at a County Market store and a light fixture fell and struck her on the head. The trial court found Cochran to be 100 percent at fault for Ms. Thomas' injuries. Also before us is an Exception of Prescription filed by Cochran as an original matter in this court and referred by the court to the merits of the appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we find that the claim of Ms. Thomas against Cochran has prescribed; and, therefore, we sustain the Exception of Prescription, dismiss with prejudice the action against Cochran and vacate the judgment of the trial court in favor of Ms. Thomas.
On June 2, 2004, Ms. Thomas was shopping at a County Market grocery store in Shreveport when a metal light fixture fell from the ceiling and struck her on the head. The store was undergoing construction in the produce area which entailed the demolition of a wall near where the light fixture fell. On June 1, 2005, Ms. Thomas filed suit against the grocery store,
Cochran responded with an Exception of Prescription in which it argued that Ms. Thomas' claim against Cochran was filed more than a year after the accident. Ms. Thomas opposed the exception, arguing that her petition related back to the timely filing of the original lawsuit against the store because the store and Cochran were solidary obligors. The minutes of court reflect that the parties agreed to refer the exception to the merits of the case. The matter proceeded to trial in 2009; and, as previously stated, the court found Cochran to be 100 percent liable for Ms. Thomas' injuries. The record does not contain a ruling by the trial judge on Cochran's Exception of Prescription; and, therefore, the exception will be considered by this court as having been tacitly overruled. Ms. Thomas did not take a protective appeal of the judgment dismissing County Market from the suit, and the judgment finding no
Cochran now appeals the judgment in favor of Ms. Thomas and, as stated, has re-urged the Exception of Prescription in this court.
As previously stated, suit was timely filed against County Market, but not against Cochran. Cochran argues that Ms. Thomas' claim against it has prescribed because (1) the judgment finding no fault on the part of the store (and finding Cochran 100 percent liable) is now final since none of the other parties appealed (Ms. Thomas failed to take a protective appeal); and therefore, (2) the lawsuit against Cochran was untimely because Ms. Thomas did not timely file suit against any obligor who has any fault for her injuries.
Opposing the exception, Ms. Thomas argues that County Market and Cochran are solidary obligors; and, thus, prescription was interrupted with the timely filing against County Market.
Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescriptive period of one year, which commences to run from the date the injury is sustained. La. C.C. art. 3492. Under article 3462, prescription is interrupted by the commencement of suit against the obligor in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue. Further, the interruption of prescription by suit against one solidary obligor is effective as to all solidary obligors. La. C.C. arts. 1799 and 3503. A suit timely filed against one defendant, however, does not interrupt prescription as against other defendants not timely sued, where the timely sued defendant is ultimately found not liable to the plaintiff since no joint or solidary obligation would exist. Levingston v. City of Shreveport, 44,000 (La.App.2d Cir.2/25/09), 4 So.3d 942, writ denied, 09-0673 (La.5/15/09), 8 So.3d 586. In the similar case of Adams v. Dupree, 94-2353 (La.App. 4th Cir.10/12/95), 663 So.2d 433, writ denied, 95-2750 (La.1/26/96), 666 So.2d 676, our brethren in the fourth circuit explained:
In the case sub judice, because the timely sued defendant, County Market, was not found to be liable for the accident and no appeal was taken from that judgment, prescription against Cochran was not interrupted and Ms. Thomas' suit against it has prescribed, unless some other basis exists to revive the suit, such as an avenue for relation back under La. C.C.P. art. 1153. See Renfroe v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Development, 01-1646 (La.2/26/02), 809 So.2d 947.
In that regard, La. C.C.P. art. 1153 provides for the relation back of pleadings:
Ray v. Alexandria Mall, Through St. Paul Property & Liability Ins., 434 So.2d 1083 (La.1983).
Cochran is a wholly new and unrelated defendant. Further, it is not disputed that Cochran did not have notice of the suit until after expiration of the prescriptive period. The criteria of article 1153 and Ray, supra, are not met in this case. The claim of Ms. Thomas against Cochran has prescribed.
For the foregoing reasons, the Exception of Prescription filed by Cochran Construction Company is sustained and the claim of Delores Thomas against Cochran Construction Company is dismissed with prejudice. The judgment in favor of Delores Thomas and against Cochran Construction Company is vacated. Costs of appeal are assessed to Delores Thomas.