ORDER & REASONS

LANCE M. AFRICK, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant New Orleans Tourism Marketing Corporation's ("NOTMC") motion1 to dismiss plaintiff Larry Philpot's ("Philpot") complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the motion is denied.

I.

Accepting the facts in Philpot's complaint as true, they are as follows: Philpot is a freelance photographer who specializes in taking photographs of musicians during live performances.2 He earns his living by licensing his photographs to others.3 On October 4, 2009, Philpot took a photograph of Willie Nelson performing in St. Louis.4 On September 5, 2012, he registered the photograph with the United States copyright office as part of a collection of photographs.5

Philpot first displayed the Willie Nelson photograph (the "photograph") on the internet on May 31, 2011.6 He offered the photograph through a website called Wikimedia "for distribution, public display, and public digital performance under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license."7 The license provides that anyone may use the photograph provided they follow certain parameters, including attributing the photograph to its creator.8 On Wikimedia, Philpot provided a description for the photograph that included his name and website. He also specified, "You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work)."9 Additionally, the photograph contains metadata that both identifies Philpot as the creator of the photograph and indicates that the photograph is copyrighted.10

On an unspecified date, NOTMC posted the photograph on a website that it owns and operates.11 According to Philpot, although NOTMC displayed his photograph, the photograph was not attributed to him in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons license.12 Philpot alleges that, as a result, NOTMC infringed his copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 501 by "publishing, copying, and displaying the [photograph]."13 He alleges that he did not discover the infringements until October 1, 2015.14 Philpot also contends that NOTMC violated 17 U.S.C. § 1202 by allegedly improperly removing and altering the copyright information in the photograph's metadata.15

II.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may dismiss a complaint or part of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to set forth well-pleaded factual allegations that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). The complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547)).

A facially plausible claim is one in which "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. If the well-pleaded factual allegations "do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," then "the complaint has alleged—but it has not `show[n]'—`that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original).

The Court will generally not look beyond the factual allegations in the pleadings to determine whether relief should be granted. See Hicks v. Lingle, 370 F. App'x 497, 498 (5th Cir. 2010); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In assessing the complaint, however, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and liberally construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). "Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint `on its face show[s] a bar to relief.'" Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 F. App'x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986)).16

III.

NOTMC moves for the dismissal of Philpot's complaint, contending (1) that both of Philpot's claims are time-barred and (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief for copyright infringement because Philpot does not hold a valid copyright registration for the photograph.

A.

"A statute of limitations may support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where it is evident from the plaintiff's pleadings that the action is barred and the pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling or the like." Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003). It is not evident from Philpot's complaint that his action is time-barred. To the contrary, based solely on the face of the complaint, Philpot's claims are timely.

The parties do not dispute the relevant statute of limitations. Pursuant to the Copyright Act, both of Philpot's claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) ("No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued."). The Fifth Circuit applies the discovery rule to copyright actions; therefore, under the Copyright Act, "a . . . claim accrues `when [the party] knew or had reason to know of the injury upon which the claim was based.'" Jordan v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 354 F. App'x 942, 945 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pritchett v. Pound, 473 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2006)); see also Groden v. Allen, 279 F. App'x 290, 294 (5th Cir. 2008).17 Philpot alleges that he discovered the copyright infringements on October 1, 2015, and he filed this lawsuit on October 1, 2018—exactly three years later. NOTMC argues that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Petrella v. MGM, 572 U.S. 663 (2014), calls into question the applicability of the discovery rule in copyright actions.18

In Petrella, the Supreme Court held that the equitable doctrine of laches ("unreasonable, prejudicial delay in commencing suit") could not bar a copyright infringement claim under the Copyright Act. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 667, 679. However, the Court explicitly passed on the question of whether the discovery rule may nevertheless be invoked in a copyright action.19

Without further guidance, this Court will apply the discovery rule in accordance with Fifth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Design Basics, LLC v. Forrester Wehrle Homes, Inc., 305 F.Supp.3d 788, 792-93 (N.D. Ohio 2018); Energy Intelligence Grp., Inc. v. CHS McPherson Refinery, Inc., 300 F.Supp.3d 1356, 1366 (D. Kan. 2018); Mitchell v. Capitol Records, LLC, 287 F.Supp.3d 673, 678 (W.D. Ky. 2017); Design Basics LLC v. J & V Roberts Invs., Inc., 140 F.Supp.3d 1266, 1282-82 (E.D. Wis. 2015). The Court also notes that, although the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed Petrella's effect on the use of the discovery rule in copyright actions, it has discussed and applied the rule since Petrella was decided. See, e.g., Graper v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 756 F.3d 388, 393 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2014) (summarizing the discovery rule as the "proper inquiry" to determine when a claim has accrued under the Copyright Act); Aspen Tech., Inc. v. M3 Tech., Inc., 569 F. App'x 259, 264 (5th Cir. 2014) (explicitly noting that the discovery rule applies to copyright infringement claims).

NOTMC also argues that, even if the rule applies, Philpot has not alleged any reason why he could not have discovered the alleged infringements sooner.20 But under the federal pleading standards, "a plaintiff typically is not required to plead, in the complaint, facts that negate an affirmative defense." Jaso v. Coca Cola Co., 435 F. App'x 346, 352 (5th Cir. 2011). While discovery may reveal information that forms the basis for summary judgment on the issue of the timeliness of Philpot's claims, the Court has before it a motion to dismiss. A statute of limitations defense only supports dismissal at this stage of the litigation if the plaintiff's claims are clearly time-barred based on a review of the pleadings.21

Philpot alleges that he discovered the infringements on October 1, 2015. Pursuant to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, and for the purposes of resolving the present motion, the Court accepts that fact as true. Consequently, the complaint is sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge based on a statute of limitations defense. See EPCO Carbon Dioxide Prods., Inc., 467 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Although dismissal under [R]ule 12(b)(6) may be appropriate based on a successful affirmative defense, that defense must appear on the face of the complaint."); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1308 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[R]aising the limitations defense in a motion to dismiss may easily be premature because facts tolling the running of the statute do not necessarily appear in the complaint.") (citation omitted).22

B.

Having concluded that Philpot's complaint is not facially barred by the statute of limitations, the Court must determine whether Philpot's copyright infringement claim must nonetheless be dismissed based on NOTMC's assertion that Philpot does not hold a valid copyright registration.23 Under the Copyright Act, some form of registration is a prerequisite for filing a lawsuit in federal court. 17 U.S.C. § 411(c) (providing, with limited exceptions that are inapplicable here, that "no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title").

Philpot's complaint alleges that the photograph was registered as part of a collection on September 5, 2012, and he attached a copyright registration certificate with that date to his complaint.24 The certificate refers to a work titled, "2009 Musician Photos."25 NOTMC argues that the certificate is invalid. Relevant here, section 411 provides:

According to NOTMC, Philpot filed his copyright registration application for a collection of unpublished works.26 NOTMC contends that the registration is, therefore, inaccurate because the photograph had already been published when Philpot filed his application, having posted it to Wikimedia for licensing under the Creative Commons license.27 NOTMC argues that Philpot knew the application was inaccurate and that the inaccuracy, if known to the Register of Copyrights, would have caused it to deny Philpot's application.28

To state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." Vallery v. Am. Girl, L.L.C., 697 F. App'x 821, 823 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). Philpot alleges in his complaint that he registered the photograph as part of the collection subject to the certificate at issue.29 Accepting the facts in the complaint as true, the certificate of registration attached to the complaint encompasses the photograph. See, e.g., Smith v. Goodell, No. 14-1010, 2015 WL 500893, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2015) (Brown, J.) (accepting as true the plaintiff's allegation that she had a valid copyright registration). Furthermore, "[a] certificate of registration, if timely obtained, is prima facie evidence both that a copyright is valid and that the registrant owns the copyright." General Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th Cir. 2004); 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). Philpot's complaint is sufficient to overcome NOTMC's Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.

IV.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is DENIED.