NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

McCLENDON, J.

Defendant, Alfred Carter, was charged by grand jury indictment with aggravated rape, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:42.1 He entered a plea of not guilty. Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court subsequently denied defendant's motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant now appeals, alleging two assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS

In the early morning hours of June 25, 1987, T.S.2 (the victim) was awakened by an intruder in her Baton Rouge apartment. The intruder immediately blindfolded T.S., tied her hands, and placed a knife to her throat. Over the course of approximately the next hour, the intruder vaginally raped T.S. three times and also performed oral sex on her at least once. Once the intruder left her apartment, T.S. called her boyfriend, who drove to T.S.'s apartment and called the police. Within a few hours of the incident, T.S. was transported to Woman's Hospital, where a doctor performed a rape kit exam on her.

In 2007, Bart Naugle, a Virginia laboratory technician, performed a DNA analysis on the vaginal washings taken during the victim's rape kit exam. The profile of an unknown male was developed from sperm found in this sample. In January 2012, Baton Rouge Police Department Detective Glenn Eymard received information that defendant's DNA profile matched the unknown male profile from the victim's rape kit. Detective Eymard located defendant in Los Angeles and secured a buccal reference swab of his DNA. Subsequent comparison could not exclude defendant as a major contributor to the DNA profile of the unknown male profile found in the victim's rape kit. Statistical analysis indicated a 1-in-19.2 quintillion chance of finding another unknown, unrelated individual with the same profile. The victim testified at trial that she did not know defendant, nor had she ever had consensual sex with him.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his identity as the person who raped the victim. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to refute the reasonable possibility that the sperm found in T.S.'s vagina was the result of consensual sex between himself and the victim. Defendant suggests that after having consensual sex with him, T.S. was raped by a perpetrator who did not ejaculate.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; LSA-Const. art. I, § 2. In reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821B; State v. Ordodi, 06-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821B, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Patorno, 01-2585 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Wright, 98-0601 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 487, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157 and 00-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732.

In the instant case, defendant does not dispute that T.S. was the victim of an aggravated rape. Rather, he asserts that the State failed to adequately prove his identity as the perpetrator of that offense. As a general matter, when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Smith, 430 So.2d 31, 45 (La. 1983).

Defendant did not testify at trial. Defendant's argument for reasonable doubt regarding his identity as T.S.'s rapist is based largely upon the victim's statements to the police following the incident. Because the victim was asleep and then blindfolded prior to the rape, she was unable to offer any direct evidence concerning the identity of her assailant. However, in the days following her rape, the victim began to grow suspicious of an acquaintance of hers because of what she described as the rapist's distinctive voice or way of speaking. At trial, the victim admitted to suspecting this acquaintance of raping her until she later found out about the results of the DNA test linking defendant to the sperm from her rape kit. Based on the victim's statements following the incident, the police investigated the victim's acquaintance, but ultimately did not find enough probable cause to charge him.

Defendant also points out that the victim initially told the police that she believed her rapist did not ejaculate. Thus, he contends that it is possible that his sperm was deposited as a result of consensual sex that he had with the victim prior to the rape. At trial, the doctor who performed the victim's rape kit examination testified that he would not expect motile sperm to be deposited if the rapist did not ejaculate. However, the doctor did state that it would have been possible for the rapist to ejaculate without the victim's knowledge. The doctor also testified that, based on the motility of the sperm recovered during the rape kit exam, he estimated the sperm was deposited within four to five hours of its recovery.

Taken together, defendant's overall hypothesis of innocence is that he and the victim engaged in consensual sex (wherein he ejaculated) at some point prior to the rape and that the victim was later raped by an acquaintance who did not ejaculate. However, defendant's entire theory is belied by the victim's own testimony that she did not know defendant, much less engage in consensual sex with him.

In his brief, defendant argues that it is possible the victim did not remember having consensual sex with him because she blacked out while taking Quaaludes. During trial, the victim admitted to having abused Quaaludes prior to becoming pregnant with her first child in 1984. However, no evidence was presented at trial to indicate that the victim still used or abused Quaaludes at the time of the incident. Further, when defense counsel attempted to question the victim regarding alcohol-induced blackouts in a broad period of time prior to the incident, the State objected, and the trial court sustained these objections. The trial court instructed defense counsel that he could narrow the scope of the question closer to the time of the incident, but defense counsel did not attempt to continue questioning the victim regarding any potential drug or alcohol induced blackouts.

The verdict rendered against defendant indicates that the jury accepted the victim's testimony that she never had consensual sex with defendant and rejected the defense theory to the contrary. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987). No such hypothesis exists in the instant case. The presence of defendant's highly motile sperm in T.S.'s vagina, when combined with T.S.'s unequivocal claims that she never knew nor had consensual sex with defendant, is strong circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the trier of fact. See State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). The jury heard, and rejected, defendant's theory of consensual sex with the victim. We cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to it. See Ordodi, 946 So.2d at 662.

After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence supports the jury's verdict. We are convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that defendant was the individual who committed the aggravated rape of T.S.

This assignment of error is without merit.

RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

In his second, and final, assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by disallowing the testimony of a substance abuse expert. Defendant contends that this testimony was critical to cast doubt on T.S.'s statement that she never had consensual sex with him.

A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to present a defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI; LSA-Const. art. I, § 16. A defendant is deprived of his defense and a fair trial where the court erroneously excludes defense witness testimony that would have substantially helped the defense. Where the excluded testimony is crucial to the defense theory, a conclusion of reversible error would be well founded. See State v. Everidge, 96-2665 (La. 12/2/97), 702 So.2d 680, 685. However, the fundamental right to present a defense does not require the trial court to admit irrelevant evidence or evidence with such little probative value that it is substantially outweighed by other legitimate considerations. See State v. Coleman, 14-0402 (La. 2/26/16), ___ So.3d ___, ___ (discussing Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006)).

At trial, defendant sought to call J.J. Ferina as a substance abuse expert. Defense counsel explained to the trial court that Mr. Ferina's testimony "would be on the [e]ffects of drug and alcohol abuse, specifically as it relates to blackouts and losing time." The State argued that this testimony was irrelevant because of the lack of evidence of drug or alcohol use by the victim or anyone else in relation to this incident. The trial court agreed with the State that this testimony was irrelevant because there had been "absolutely no evidence of drug use or substance abuse in the immediate time period or around the commission of this alleged offense." The court also found any probative value to be far outweighed by unfair prejudice.

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. LSA-C.E. art. 401. All relevant evidence is generally admissible, and evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. See LSA-C.E. art. 402.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly excluded Mr. Ferina's proposed testimony as irrelevant. As the court stated, and as was discussed earlier, there was no evidence presented at trial regarding any drug or alcohol use by the victim in any period of time relevant to the offense. When defense counsel was given the opportunity to narrow his cross-examination of the victim to ask about drugor alcohol-induced blackouts nearer to the night of the rape, he elected not to do so. Therefore, expert testimony regarding the effects of drugs and alcohol was not relevant where there was no evidence that the victim used either type of substance in close proximity to the incident. Accordingly, the trial court did not violate defendant's right to present a defense by excluding this evidence.

This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.