RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
This matter was tried before the Court, sitting without a jury, on June 27, 2016. Having considered the testimony and evidence presented at trial, arguments of counsel, the applicable burden of proof, the pre-trial and post-trial briefing and the applicable law, the Court issues the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This case arises out of Plaintiff's claims that Sergeant Christopher Metz sexually assaulted Plaintiff and used excessive force against Plaintiff while incarcerated at Louisiana State Penitentiary on March 13, 2013. On December 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Defendant's conduct amounted to excessive force and sexual assault in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Defendant submitted an Answer denying the allegations; however, he failed to plead qualified immunity — an affirmative defense. Plaintiff later filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability, which went unopposed by Defendant. (R. Doc. 36). The Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 10, 2015. (R. Doc. 44). The case proceeded to a bench trial on June 27, 2016.
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment by prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must allege two elements, one subjective and one objective. First, the prisoner must show that the conduct was objectively "harmful enough" or "sufficiently serious" to reach constitutional dimensions. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 20 (1992). Analysis of the objective prong is context specific and "depends upon the claim at issue." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Although not "every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action," the Eighth Amendment is offended by conduct that is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Id. at 9-10. Actions are repugnant to the conscience of mankind if they are "incompatible with evolving standards of decency" or involve "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. at 10. Second, the subjective prong requires the prisoner to show that the defendant acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Id. at 8. In other words, the inmate must show there was no penological justification for the application of force and that it was instead applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Id. at 6, 8.
In the sexual assault context, an inmate does not need to show "penetration, physical injury, or direct contact with uncovered genitalia" to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 257 (2d Cir. 2015). Rather, a prison officer's "intentional contact with an inmate's genitalia or other intimate area" on one or multiple occasions, "which serves no penological purpose and is undertaken with the intent to gratify the officer's sexual desire or humiliate the inmate, violates the Eighth Amendment." Jamison v. United States, 2016 WL 7670690, at *7 (W.D. La. Sept. 26, 2016); see also Crawford, 796 F.3d at 258 ("[N]o amount of gratuitous or sexually-motivated fondling of an inmate's genitals — even if limited in duration or conducted through the inmate's clothes . . . — is permitted by the Constitution."); Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012) ("An unwanted touching of a person's private parts, intended to humiliate the victim or gratify the assailant's sexual desires, can violate a prisoner's constitutional rights whether or not the force exerted by the assailant is significant."); Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012) ("sexual contact between a prisoner and a prison guard serves no legitimate role and is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society"); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003) ("prison guards conducted the strip search in a manner designed to demean and humiliate Calhoun, and we therefore conclude that he sufficiently stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment").
At trial, Plaintiff demonstrated that Defendant exposed his penis, forcibly grabbed Plaintiff's head while Plaintiff was kneeling, and made multiple demands for oral sex from Plaintiff, before shoving a broomstick down Plaintiff's pants and in between his uncovered butt cheeks in an attempt to penetrate Plaintiff's anus with the broomstick. The unjustified conduct proven at trial is unquestionably "repugnant to the conscience of mankind" and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment. See Crawford, 796 F.3d at 257; see also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff sufficiently alleged a violation of the Eighth Amendment when asserting that prison official "grabbed [inmate], turned her around forcibly, pushed her against the bars, and began grinding his exposed penis into her buttocks"); Williams v. Prudden, 67 F. App'x 976, 977 (8th Cir. 2003) (Plaintiff-inmate "sufficiently state[d] an Eighth Amendment claim by alleging that [correction's officer] forcibly ground his pelvis against her, grabbed her breast, verbally demanded sexual favors, made physical sexual advances, and attempted to force himself upon her."); Calhoun, 319 F.3d at 938, 940 (prison officers violated the Eighth Amendment where they invited female officers to watch strip search of male inmate, during which the spectators laughed at the inmate, made sexual comments about him and pointed "sticks" at the inmates anal area).
The Court recognizes that this is a fact specific inquiry and not all unwanted or unnecessary touching, even if malevolent, will constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.
Finally, the Court cannot conceive of any penological justification for this type of force or otherwise see how it could have been applied by Defendant in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. See Wood, 692 F.3d at 1050 ("sexual conduct between a prisoner and a prison guard serves no legitimate role"). Indeed, Defendant did not present any justification — penological or otherwise — and the evidence does not show any prison disturbance that would have prompted the use of any force. Moreover, after Plaintiff ran away from Defendant's exposed genitals, Defendant found a broom and then followed Plaintiff into the bathroom, where the subsequent events took place away from any witnesses. The lack of justification, as well as the place and manner in which the force was applied satisfies the Court that Defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America, 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Where no legitimate penological purpose can be inferred from a prison employee's alleged conduct . . . the conduct itself constitutes sufficient evidence that force was used maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."). The force here satisfies the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment as it was applied "maliciously and sadistically" for the purpose of arousing or gratifying Defendant and humiliating Plaintiff. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7.
As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has demonstrated that the sexual assault by Defendant violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The Court will discuss damages at the end of this opinion.
Plaintiff has proven that after refusing Defendant's sexual advances, later that day, Defendant threw Plaintiff to the ground and sat on top of him. (R. Doc. 36-1 at 1); (R. Doc. 36-4 at 2). Defendant did not make any sexual threats or demands during this encounter and Plaintiff did not suffer any physical injury as a result of this conduct.
In the context of an excessive force claim, "the core judicial inquiry" is not whether a "certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). While a serious injury must not occur for a court to find excessive force, the "absence of serious injury" remains relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); see also Grider v. Bowling, 785 F.3d 1248, 1252 (8th Cir. 2015) ("The degree of injury suffered in an excessive-force case is certainly relevant insofar as it tends to show the amount and type of force used."). Nonetheless, the "Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force." Gaddy, 559 U.S. at 37-38. For example, an inmate complaining of a "push or shove that causes no discernable injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim." Id. at 38.
The Eighth Amendment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition "de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). Plaintiff has not established any physical injury caused by the conduct and has not put forth evidence establishing the level of force exerted. Simply put, the fact that Defendant threw Plaintiff to the ground and sat on top are him is insufficient to find excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages for both physical and emotional injuries, as well as punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs. (R. Doc. 1). Section 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that an inmate may not recover "for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). A physical injury, according to the Fifth Circuit, means "`more than de minimis, but need not be significant.'" Ashley v. Perry, 2015 WL 9008501, at *5 (M.D. La. Dec. 15, 2015) (quoting Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also Luong v. Hatt, 979 F.Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997) ("A physical injury is an observable or diagnosable medical condition requiring treatment by a medical care professional."). A "sexual act" is defined as "penetration, however slight," of the "anal or genital opening of another" or contact between the mouth and the anus or genitals of another. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2) (defining "sexual act"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) ("sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18)").
The Court has already determined that Plaintiff did not suffer any physical injuries as a result of Defendant's sexual assault. Moreover, the sexual assault in this case did not involve "penetration, however slight" of Plaintiff's "anal . . . opening," nor did it involve contact between the mouth and the anus or genitals. Therefore, the absence of a physical injury or sexual act precludes the recovery of compensatory, mental or emotional damages. See Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 2014) (in the absence of physical injury, §1997e(e) precludes the recovery of compensatory damages, including emotional damages); Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2007) (compensatory damages are not available for constitutional violations in the absence of physical injuries).
Nonetheless, even where compensatory damages are not available, an inmate deprived of his or her constitutional rights remains entitled to nominal and punitive damages. See Louisiana ACORN Fair Housing v. LeBlanc, 211 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2000) ("our circuit has adhered to the general rule that a punitive award may stand in the absence of actual damages where there has been a constitutional violation); Hutchins, 512 F.3d at 197-98 ("recognize[ing] that § 1997e(e) does not bar . . . recovery of nominal or punitive damages"); Washington, 695 F.3d at 644 (same); Ashley, 2015 WL 9008501, at *6 (acknowledging that the "Fifth Circuit has recognized, however, that a prisoner may recover nominal or punitive damages, despite a lack of physical injury, if he can successfully prove a constitutional violation").
Nominal damages "are not compensation for loss or injury, but rather recognition of a violation of rights." Calhoun, 319 F.3d at 941. An award of punitive damages rests on the Court's "discretionary moral judgment" as to the punishing and deterring effect punitive damages might have against a defendant who acted with evil intent or callous indifference. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 50-52 (1983). When a court finds a violation of the Eighth Amendment, it likewise makes "the threshold finding of evil intent or callous indifference needed to warrant punitive damages, because the threshold standard for [an Eighth Amendment violation] — that the force was applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm — is substantially indistinguishable from the threshold standard for punitive damages." Cooper v. Morales, 535 F. App'x 425, 432 (5th Cir. 2013).
As such, the Court finds Plaintiff entitled to an award of $1.00 in nominal damages and $1,000.00 in punitive damages. The Court finds that such an award is appropriate based on the vulnerable status of the victim and the nature of the constitutional violation at issue. Such an award serves "to punish the defendant for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1977)). The Court has also considered the lack of physical harm, the somewhat isolated nature of the incident, and the need for a punitive damages award to further a legitimate purpose, but not constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property. Cf. Carrington v. Easley, 2011 WL 2132850, at *5 (E.D.N.C. May 25, 2011) (awarding $5,000 in punitive damages when defendant forced inmate to strip naked, grabbed inmate's penis and attempted to perform oral sex on inmate); Glenn v. Cole, 2010 WL 2303028, at *3 (E.D. Ca. June 7, 2010) (awarding $1.00 in nominal damages to inmate unconstitutionally put at risk of harm based on actions of defendant, but without injury, and $2,000 in punitive damages), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3746055 (E.D. Ca. Sept. 17, 2010).
Plaintiff has also sought attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (R. Doc. 1), which allows the award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in civil rights cases, including suits brought under § 1983. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 832-33 (2011). The Court finds that reasonable fees should be awarded in this case.
For the reasons given above, judgment is entered in favor of Defendant as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff's excessive force claim is therefore
Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim of sexual assault in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court
Plaintiff is
