Plaintiffs California Association of Sanitation Agencies (CASA) and the City of Vacaville (Vacaville) (collectively, the Municipalities)
In order to provide a legal context for the history of this case, we summarize the statutory and regulatory scheme governing water quality.
"In 1972, Congress enacted amendments (Pub.L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972) 86 Stat. 816) to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.), which, as amended in 1977, is commonly known as the Clean Water Act.... [T]he act established `effluent limitations,' which are restrictions on the `quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents'; these effluent limitations allow the discharge of pollutants only when the water has been satisfactorily treated to conform with federal water quality standards. (33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1362(11).) [¶] Under the federal Clean Water Act, each state is free to enforce its own water quality laws so long as its effluent limitations are not `less stringent' than those set out in the Clean Water Act. (33 U.S.C. § 1370.)" (City of Burbank v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 613, 619-620 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 304, 108 P.3d 862] (City of Burbank).)
The "Clean Water Act" (Federal Water Pollution Control Act; 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.) required the states to adopt and submit to the EPA water quality standards for intrastate waters by April 1973. (33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(2) & (3).) Those standards were to consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for the waters based on those uses. (33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).)
"Part of the federal Clean Water Act is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), `[t]he primary means' for enforcing effluent limitations and standards under the Clean Water Act. [Citation.] The NPDES sets out the conditions under which the federal EPA or a state with an approved water quality control program can issue permits for the discharge of pollutants in wastewater. (33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) & (b).)" (City of Burbank, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 621.)
Shortly after the Clean Water Act was adopted, the Porter-Cologne Act was amended to add the necessary requirements so that California could obtain EPA approval to issue NPDES (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) permits. (§ 13370, subd. (c); Building Industry Assn. of San Diego County v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 866, 875 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 128].) Accordingly, "the waste discharge requirements issued by the regional water boards ordinarily also serve as NPDES permits under federal law. (Wat. Code, § 13374.)" (124 Cal.App.4th at p. 875.)
At issue are three aspects of the Basin Plan: The "tributary language," the incorporation of State Board resolution No. 88-63 setting forth the "`Sources of Drinking Water'" policy, and the plan's "water quality objectives." We discuss each in turn.
The Regional Board initially adopted its Basin Plan in 1975. The Basin Plan defined various "beneficial uses" of surface waters and groundwater. Among those beneficial uses were "Municipal and Domestic Supply" (MUN), which included "usual uses in community or military water systems and domestic uses from individual water supply systems"; and "Cold Freshwater Habitat" (COLD), which "provides a coldwater habitat to sustain aquatic resources associated with a coldwater environment." The 1975 Basin Plan included a table designating beneficial uses for a number of surface water bodies (a later version of which was known as "Table II-1"), and included a footnote stating, "[t]hose streams not listed have the same beneficial uses as the streams, lakes, or reservoirs to which they are tributary." This footnote is referred to as the "tributary rule" or the "tributary footnote." COLD and MUN were designated as beneficial uses of the delta. No designations were specified for Old Alamo Creek and New Alamo Creek, which are tributaries to the delta and two of the water bodies at issue here.
A 1994 Regional Board staff report recommended a modification of the tributary language. The report stated that when the Basin Plan was first adopted, the beneficial use designations were incomplete, listing only 96 of the region's estimated 10,000 waters. According to the report, "The Regional Water Board envisioned that, in the ensuing years, there would be a continuing planning process in which tributaries of the major water bodies would be investigated in some priority fashion, and the beneficial uses of these tributaries would be identified and designated in periodic amendments to the Basin Plan. In the interim, the Regional Water Board knew it would need to make decisions involving waters not named in [the Basin Plan] and for which
The report proposed deleting the tributary footnote and adding new "clarifying language" to the 1995 Basin Plan, describing the proposed language as an attempt "to more explicitly describe how the Regional Water Board applies beneficial uses, in the absence of scientific fact, to waters tributary to the water bodies listed in [the Basin Plan].... This alternative would eliminate much of the confusion caused by the wording of the tributary footnote, without changing its intended meaning." The report continued, "The proposed language eliminates present and future problems of misinterpretation and misuse, and removes a known falsehood from the Basin Plan. This approach allows for collection of information to better determine what beneficial uses need to be protected. It avoids the problems created by applying inaccurate beneficial uses to some water bodies. The proposed language clarifies how the Regional Water Board already interprets the tributary statement in the existing Basin Plan."
In the 1995 Basin Plan, the tributary footnote was deleted and the clarifying language proposed in the 1994 Regional Board staff report was added.
In 2000, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disapproved certain aspects of the 1995 Plan; these aspects included the deletion of the tributary
Despite the EPA's action, the parties agree that under federal regulations, the disapproved 1995 Plan revision remains in effect unless or until the EPA promulgates a more stringent water quality standard, and that the EPA has not done so. (40 C.F.R. § 131.21(c) (2012).)
In 1988, in order to implement Proposition 65, the State Board adopted resolution No. 88-63, the "`Sources of Drinking Water'" policy. The policy provided that "All surface and ground waters of the State are considered to be suitable, or potentially suitable, for municipal or domestic water supply and should be so designated by the Regional Boards [with certain exceptions]." (Fn. omitted.) Among those exceptions were surface waters where "a. The water is in systems designed or modified to collect or treat municipal or industrial wastewaters, process waters, mining wastewaters, or storm water runoff ... ; or, [¶] b. The water is in systems designed or modified for the primary purpose of conveying or holding agricultural drainage waters ...."
In 1989, the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) issued determination No. 8, deciding that the provisions of resolution No. 88-63 were "`regulations' as defined in Government Code section 11342, subdivision (b)" (former § 11342, subd. (b), repealed by Stats. 2000, ch. 1059, § 6.2, p. 8057, ch. 1060, § 7, 8082) and therefore were subject to the requirements of California's Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq.) (APA), that they were not adopted pursuant to the APA's requirements, and that they therefore violated Government Code former section 11347.5, subdivision (a) (now Gov. Code, § 11340.5). The Legislature subsequently amended the Government Code to provide a different process for OAL review of any plans, policies, guidelines or revisions adopted pursuant to the Porter-Cologne Act after June 1, 1992, and exempting them from the rulemaking provisions of the APA. (Gov. Code, §§ 11352-11354.) These provisions also grandfathered in the plans, policies and guidelines adopted prior to June 1992, except for any that were the subject of a civil action as of the effective date of the new statutes. (Gov. Code, § 11353, subd. (c).) Thereafter, OAL approved the 1995 Plan which again incorporated resolution No. 88-63.
The 1995 Plan includes a number of water quality objectives, two of which are at issue here.
Vacaville operates the Easterly Wastewater Treatment Plant (the treatment plant), which discharges effluent to Old Alamo Creek. Old Alamo Creek flows into New Alamo Creek, then into Ulatis Creek and Cache Slough. New Alamo Creek's confluence with Ulatis Creek forms the boundary of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta, and Cache Slough is likewise within the delta. There is evidence that the flows in Old Alamo Creek upstream from the treatment plant consist of storm water runoff during the wet season, agricultural tailwater during the dry season, and discharges from a groundwater remediation project. It is not used directly as a drinking water supply, and indeed, the water quality in the creek does not meet the standards for a municipal water supply and such quality is likely not attainable for the foreseeable future.
Old Alamo Creek is an "effluent-dominated stream," meaning that "stream flow during all or part of the year can be dominated by treated [sewage] effluent." The effluent from the treatment plant is diluted as it moves toward the delta; the dilution ratios can exceed 100 to one in the downstream portions of Cache Slough.
Vacaville operated the treatment plant pursuant to discharge permits issued by the Regional Board. The permit issued in 2001 imposed more stringent requirements than had the previous permits.
Vacaville petitioned the State Board for review of the 2001 permit, and the State Board held an evidentiary hearing and reviewed the permit. (§ 13320; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 2064.) In order WQO 2002-0015, the State Board concluded the Regional Board reasonably interpreted the 1995 Plan language as assigning beneficial uses to tributary streams, and in particular, as assigning MUN, COLD, AGR, and REC-1 uses to Old Alamo Creek. The State Board ruled the Regional Board had properly concluded that MUN was previously designated for Old Alamo Creek through the tributary footnote, and that a Basin Plan amendment was the proper way to change the creek's uses. Recognizing, however, that COLD and MUN were likely inappropriate uses for Old Alamo Creek, the State Board directed the Regional Board to initiate "expeditiously" amendments to the Basin Plan to consider dedesignating those uses.
Vacaville and CASA filed separate petitions for writ of mandate challenging the Boards' actions, and the cases were consolidated.
Before the trial court ruled on the petitions for writ of mandate, the Basin Plan was amended to provide that MUN and COLD uses did not apply to Old Alamo Creek from its headwaters to the confluence with New Alamo Creek.
Specifically, in the causes of action upon which the trial court ruled, the petitioners alleged that the Boards improperly applied the tributary language of the 1995 Plan in determining and reviewing beneficial uses and permit requirements; that the Boards improperly applied resolution No. 88-63 in concluding Old Alamo Creek had a MUN use; that the Basin Plan violated the Water Code in incorporating effluent limitations by reference; and that
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of the Boards. The trial court denied declaratory relief or mandate on the validity of the Basin Plan, concluding that an adequate procedure existed, through the amendment process, for the Municipalities to challenge the designation of the beneficial uses of waters that were tributary to the delta. The court also rejected the Municipalities' contention that the Basin Plan wrongfully incorporated external maximum contaminate levels and pesticide limitations, concluding in part that the Legislature had delegated to the State Department of Public Health the determination of when water is safe to drink. The court concluded that the requirement that certain pesticides not be detectible within the accuracy of analytical methods approved by the EPA or the Regional Board's executive officer constituted not a delegation, but a source of scientific information.
On appeal, the Municipalities ask us to issue a writ of mandate directing the Boards to: "1. Rescind or cease rote application of downstream Beneficial Uses to upstream tributaries under the 1975 Tributary Footnote or 1994 Tributary Statement; [¶] 2. Rescind and cease application of a blanket MUN Beneficial Use to undesignated waterbodies pursuant to the invalidated Resolution 88-63; [¶] 3. Rescind the Chemical Constituents Objective and Pesticide Objective; and [¶] 4. Vacate the Boards' adjudicatory orders, including SWRCB Order No. WQ 2002-0015, to the extent such orders conflict with the rulings of this Court."
"`Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.' [Citation.]" (McGill v. Regents of University of California (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1776, 1785 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 466] (McGill).)
The decision to grant or deny a permit is a quasi-judicial function, and a petition for writ of mandate challenging such a decision is governed by the standards of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1384-1385 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 450] (City of Rancho Cucamonga); § 13330, subd. (d).) Under that statute, the trial court inquires into whether the agency "proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) The trial court exercises its independent judgment, affording "`a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings....' [Citation.] [¶] On appeal, the reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual determinations. [Citations.] The trial court's legal determinations receive a de novo review with consideration being given to the agency's interpretations of its own statutes and regulations. [Citations.]" (City of Rancho Cucamonga, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384; see County of Los Angeles v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 985, 997 [50 Cal.Rptr.3d 619] [we defer to regional board's expertise in construing language not clearly defined in statutes].)
In reviewing an agency's quasi-legislative action, in contrast, "`[a] reviewing court will ask three questions: first, did the agency act within the scope of its delegated authority; second, did the agency employ fair procedures; and third, was the agency action reasonable. Under the third inquiry, a reviewing court will not substitute its independent policy judgment for that of the agency on the basis of an independent trial de novo. A court will uphold the agency action unless the action is arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in evidentiary support. A court must ensure that an agency has adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.' [Citation.] Moreover, absent any indication of arbitrariness or evidentiary or procedural
In a footnote, the Boards appear to suggest that the Municipalities' claims may be barred by the statute of limitations. We may disregard this contention, because it is not raised in a properly headed argument and is not supported by reasoned argument. (Roberts v. Lomanto (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1553, 1562 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 866]; Evans v. Centerstone Development Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 745]; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
The Municipalities challenge the MUN and COLD beneficial use designations of waters that are tributary to the delta, contending that to the extent the Basin Plan establishes "blanket" designations, they are unlawful, and that we should instead construe the Basin Plan to allow case-by-case designation of the uses of unnamed tributary waters as part of the permitting process. We must decide whether the Municipalities are correct, or whether, as the Boards argue, beneficial uses of tributaries were properly established by the tributary
In order WQO 2002-0015, the State Board explained its reasoning in detail, and it is worthwhile to quote it: "Arguably, the 1994 tributary language [(i.e., the tributary language included in the 1995 Plan)] can be read to allow the Central Valley Regional Board to determine beneficial uses in a permit. Nevertheless, the Board concludes that the Central Valley Regional Board's interpretation of the Current Basin Plan is reasonable for several reasons. First, the Central Valley Regional Board's interpretation gives effect to the language. The 1994 tributary language states that the Central Valley Regional Board will exercise its judgment in evaluating whether, presumably, all or some subset of the downstream water's beneficial uses applies to a tributary stream. The language does not actually specify the process that the Central Valley Regional Board will use to assign the uses, i.e., in a permit or through a basin plan amendment. As the language required, the Central Valley Regional Board evaluated Old Alamo Creek's uses on a case-by-case basis for the Vacaville permit. The Central Valley Regional Board included specific findings on the uses and based[]permit provisions accordingly. In particular, the permit included compliance schedules allowing the discharger time to provide information supporting basin plan amendments for uses that appeared to be inappropriate. Under the prior tributary footnote, on the other hand, a downstream water's uses automatically applied to its tributaries. The footnote did not require a case-by-case analysis.
"Secondly, the Central Valley Regional Board's interpretation is consistent with EPA's water quality standards regulations. The water quality standards regulations require a public process with significant public involvement to designate or dedesignate uses. The regulations impose substantive requirements for use designation and dedesignation. The regulations establish a rebuttable presumption that fishable/swimmable uses, such as COLD and REC-1, are attained and require a UAA [(use attainability analysis; see 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(g) (2012))] to not designate or to designate a subcategory of these uses. Permit actions are quasi-adjudicatory and typically do not fulfill either the public participation or the substantive requirements specified in the water quality standards regulations for use designations and dedesignations. Basin planning, on the other hand, is a quasi-legislative process that is well-suited for water quality standards development.
"Making use determinations on a case-by-case basis in permits is fraught with problems. The state already has a permit backlog. Expanding permit actions to include use designations and dedesignations will only further exacerbate the backlog. In addition, this practice will invite EPA objections to individual permits and will further delay the permitting process. While basin plan amendments may be burdensome and time-consuming, designating and dedesignating beneficial uses in permits is potentially more so. Accordingly, the Board concludes that the Central Valley Regional Board's decision to consider use changes through the basin planning process was reasonable." (Fns. omitted.)
Having concluded that the Regional Board's interpretation of the tributary language was reasonable, the State Board went on to state that the Regional Board, nonetheless, had not gone "far enough." "While basin plan provisions assigning a downstream water's uses to its upstream tributaries are valid as a general rule, their application in particular cases can lead to unreasonable results.... At a minimum, where a Regional Board has evidence that a use neither exists nor likely can be feasibly attained, the Regional Board must expeditiously initiate appropriate basin plan amendments to consider dedesignating the use. [¶] Moreover, the Regional Board can require dischargers to the affected waterbody to provide assistance, through data collection, water quality-related investigations, or other appropriate means, to support and expedite the basin plan amendment process [(citing §§ 13267, 13383)]." (Fn. omitted.) The State Board reviewed the evidence and concluded COLD and MUN were likely not appropriate uses for Old Alamo Creek. It therefore directed the Regional Board to initiate appropriate Basin Plan amendments to consider dedesignating those uses.
The State Board concluded that any change in the beneficial use of a water body requires an amendment to the Basin Plan, and we find its reasoning persuasive. As we have explained, the Clean Water Act required states to adopt water quality standards, which included designated uses (the equivalent of the Porter-Cologne Act's beneficial uses) by early 1973. (33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(2), (3)(A), (c)(2)(A); see § 13050, subd. (f).) The 1975 Basin Plan included beneficial uses for a number of surface waters, and provided in the tributary footnote that the unlisted streams had "the same beneficial uses as the streams, lakes, or reservoirs to which they are tributary." This footnote was later replaced by the tributary language of the 1995 Plan; however, the State Board concluded that the tributary footnote "unequivocally designated uses for unnamed tributary streams in the Delta," and the tributary language of the 1995 Plan "cannot be read to dedesignate the uses that had already been designated by the prior footnote."
The Municipalities argue that the "blanket" designations of tributaries lack evidentiary support and are improper because they encompass many streams that in fact do not have the same beneficial uses as the water bodies to which they are tributaries.
We recognize that a MUN or COLD beneficial use may not be appropriate for at least some of the streams covered by the tributary rule, including Old
In the alternative, the Municipalities argue we should interpret the tributary language of the Basin Plan to mean that the beneficial uses of unnamed tributary streams have never been "formally designated," and that the current tributary language (which provides that the beneficial uses of a named body of water generally apply to its tributary streams and that for unidentified water bodies, the beneficial uses will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis) gives the Boards the discretion to determine beneficial uses of unlisted streams on a case-by-case basis when considering a request for a permit.
The interpretation the Municipalities urge is inconsistent with the legal requirements for designating or dedesignating uses. Indeed, the Municipalities fail to consider that the same rulemaking process they wish to avoid would apply, were we to issue a writ rescinding the beneficial use designations adopted by the tributary rule.
The regulations implementing the Clean Water Act provide: "Prior to adding or removing any use, or establishing sub-categories of a use, the State shall provide notice and an opportunity for a public hearing under [part] 131.20(b) of this regulation." (40 C.F.R. § 131.10(e) (2012).)
The Municipalities argue that this interpretation violates their due process rights because "no legal mechanism exists for an interested party to petition a regional board to adopt amendments to existing Basin Plans, or to compel a regional board to act on any amendment.... [¶] ... In short, the remedy that the trial court offers as protective of a permit holder's rights (i.e., the `right' to request a Basin Plan amendment) is illusory." The Municipalities point to the record in this case to prove the point: After the dedesignation of Old Alamo Creek was accomplished by Basin Plan amendment, Vacaville requested that the Regional Board initiate a dedesignation of what they characterize as "the next few ditches" — specifically New Alamo Creek, Ulatis Creek, and the upper portion of Cache Slough — to avoid the further imposition of unreasonable regulations. Vacaville then expended substantial sums of money developing the evidence to support the amendment. Nevertheless, the process was halted by the staff of the Boards; according to a Vacaville employee involved in the process, the State Board's staff indicated the decision was based on policy considerations, not legal or technical reasons. Citing this turn of events as an example, the Municipalities argue they have no legal remedy by which they can effectuate the dedesignation of inaccurate beneficial uses because the Porter-Cologne Act does not confer any right to compel regional boards to adopt basin plan amendments (citing § 13320) and does not confer any right of judicial review for inaction, but only for an action taken (citing § 13330). This argument fails to consider other judicial remedies.
In addition to the tributary language, the Basin Plan also provides that "[w]ater bodies ... that do not have beneficial uses designated in Table II-1 are assigned MUN designations in accordance with the provisions of State Water Board Resolution No. 88-63 which is, by reference, a part of this Basin Plan." The Municipalities challenge the Boards' reliance on resolution No. 88-63, the "`Sources of Drinking Water'" policy, which the OAL disapproved as an improper underground regulation.
The Municipalities contend that in two particulars, the "Water Quality Objectives" portion of the Basin Plan improperly incorporates by reference standards and criteria of other agencies. First, they challenge the requirement that waters designated for MUN use not contain concentrations in excess of the maximum contaminant levels (MCL's) specified in certain tables in title 22 of the California Code of Regulations adopted by the State Department of Health Services (DHS);
The Municipalities first argue the Regional Board adopted the DHS standards without taking into account the necessary factors. Section 13241 requires the Regional Board to consider various factors in setting water quality objectives, including: "(a) Past, present, and probable future beneficial uses of water. [¶] (b) Environmental characteristics of the hydrographic unit under consideration, including the quality of water available thereto. [¶] (c) Water quality conditions that could reasonably be achieved through the coordinated control of all factors which affect water quality in the area. [¶] (d) Economic considerations. [¶] (e) The need for developing housing within the region. [¶] (f) The need to develop and use recycled water." (Italics added.) The Municipalities contend the record contains no evidence the Regional Board considered economic factors before incorporating the provisions governing the minimum standards for protecting an MUN designation.
The Municipalities essentially contend that each and every component part of the Water Quality Objectives must be tied to an economic analysis. They argue, "[t]he [Regional Board] simply incorporated the DPH MCLs, and `detectable' concentration based on later-approved laboratory techniques, without any independent analysis of each of the factors required by Water Code [section] 13241. The [board] did not attempt to determine the cost of compliance, balance public interest factors, or create an implementation plan for these specific WQOs." (Italics added.) But the Municipalities cite no statute or case to support this contention. They point only to Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 733, 737 [63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697], which stands for the unremarkable proposition that "[a]dministrative regulations that violate acts of the Legislature are void...."
The Municipalities do not assert that the Regional Board failed to consider economic factors in adopting the water quality objectives as a whole. And, the Boards make the point that the development of the water quality objectives at issue was not an event, but a process that began in 1971 and continued through the adoption of the 1995 plan. According to the Boards, "the 1975 Basin Plan contains essentially the same water quality objective for `chemical constituents' that incorporates the DHS drinking water standards and essentially the same `non-detectable' chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticide objective that sets forth the analytical methods to be used." They argue, further, that the record of the 1971 interim plan and the 1975 Basin Plan are replete with discussions of the factors required to be considered by section 13241, including economic considerations. We agree. Although the Boards failed to provide specific record cites to support this contention, our review of the hundreds of pages cited does show multiple instances in which economic considerations are discussed. For example, the 1975 plan contains a discussion of the effect of water quality regulation on employment and economic development, an analysis of 17 proposed actions, including the cost of each, and an examination of alternative actions and their comparative costs.
In reply, the Municipalities argue that these pages do not show that the State Board considered the section 13241 factors "for the WQOs at issue." To
What is missing from the Municipalities' analysis is any citation to the record supporting the premise that the challenged WQO's, when adopted, would have had an economic impact that should have been considered under section 13241. As was explained in the chief counsel's memorandum, the regional water board, in making its assessment of the cost impacts of a proposed objective, should "review currently available information ... [and] consider and respond on the record, to any information provided by dischargers or other interested persons regarding the potential cost implications of adoption of a proposed objective. [¶] If the economic consequences of adoption of a proposed water quality objective are potentially significant, the Boards must articulate why adoption of the objective is necessary to ensure reasonable protection of beneficial uses."
Here, there is no threshold showing that there were any adverse economic consequences to the adoption of the WQO's in question, which would have triggered the obligation of the Regional Board to "articulate why adoption of the objective is necessary to ensure reasonable protection of beneficial uses." The Municipalities have not pointed to anything in the record supporting the adoption of the WQO's indicating that the challenged standards would result in any onerous or unusual costs for regulated parties, so there is no basis upon which we can conclude that the absence of a discussion of costs on that subject is statutorily meaningful.
In short, the Municipalities have not satisfied their affirmative obligation to show the Regional Board in fact failed to meet its statutory duty. They do not direct our attention to any staff reports, findings, resolutions, or other documents that would assist us further in determining what factors the Regional Board considered — or failed to consider — either in adopting the WQO's in 1975, or at any point thereafter. Nor do they cite to any portion of the record suggesting that the cost of the WQO's at issue was a matter of concern or dispute. The record in this case is extensive, filling more than 19 boxes and encompassing approximately 178 volumes of documents. It is not our duty to comb the record to find error. (Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1140-1141 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 796].) We shall therefore presume that in adopting the water quality objectives, the Regional Board complied with the law.
The Municipalities rely on California Assn. of Nursing Homes etc., Inc. v. Williams (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 800 [84 Cal.Rptr. 590] (California Assn. of Nursing Homes). The court there considered the validity of a regulation of the Department of Health Care Services (the Medi-Cal agency) prescribing the standards for state payments for the care of Medi-Cal patients in nursing and convalescent homes. (Id. at p. 805.) The regulation incorporated by reference the contents of a document entitled "State Schedule of Maximum Allowances" for long-term care facilities, found in a pamphlet issued by the Department of Finance, which was not included in the California Administrative Code. (Id. at p. 808.) Reimbursement was fixed in accordance with the schedule of maximum allowances in effect at the time services were provided. (Id. at p. 808 & fn. 5.) The schedule of maximum allowances "appear[ed] to be the result of ex parte studies by staff personnel of the Department of Finance." (Id. at p. 813.)
The court concluded the Medi-Cal agency had not complied with public hearing requirements, noting that there was no formal administrative record of the evidence the Medi-Cal administrator relied on in adopting the regulation, and concluding that the failure to assemble an evidentiary record was compounded by the incorporation by reference of the schedule of maximum allowances. (California Assn. of Nursing Homes, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d at pp. 812-813.) The court reasoned that the Medi-Cal agency's "adoption of the [Department of Finance's] fiat without independent consideration of the underlying evidence and without public or judicial access to it transgresses fundamental demands for the adoption of administrative regulations. [¶] Compliance with the public hearing demand precludes promulgation in the inner chambers of government offices, whether of the administering or fiscal agency." (Id. at pp. 813-814, fn. omitted.) The court continued: "There is no procedural barrier prohibiting the enacting agency from adopting by reference a set of standards issued by another agency if supporting evidence is made available at a public hearing, opportunity for refutation is given, the pro and con evidence considered and the evidentiary material assembled in an identifiable record. On the other hand, an attempt to embody by reference
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the Basin Plan's provision that persistent chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides not be present at concentrations detectable within the accuracy of analytical methods approved by the Regional Board's executive officer. The standard is that such pesticides not be detectable. We see no impropriety in leaving the method of determining compliance with this requirement to the executive officer. In Russian River Watershed Protection Committee v. Santa Rosa (9th Cir. 1998) 142 F.3d 1136, 1138, 1141-1143, the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to a regional board's executive officer's selection of a method for measuring waterflow in order to determine compliance with NPDES permits. The appellants apparently contended, as the Municipalities do here, that the executive officer's authority violated section 13223, subdivision (a), which allows a regional board to delegate any of its powers to its executive director except, among other things, the issuance, modification, or revocation of a water quality control plan, water quality objectives, or waste discharge requirement. (142 F.3d at p. 1143 & fn. 2.) The Ninth Circuit rejected the challenge, noting that there were no cases interpreting that statutory provision, but that under federal law, "the establishment of a method of compliance with an NPDES permit does not constitute a modification of the permit." (Id. at p. 1143.) Here, as well, the Regional Board could properly leave to the executive officer the determination of the method of complying with the permit.
The judgment is affirmed without prejudice to any right Vacaville may have to seek further amendments to the Basin Plan or initiate further proceedings.
Reardon, Acting P. J., and Sepulveda, J.,
