JOHN H. RICH, III, Magistrate Judge.
After a telephonic hearing held on October 20, 2016, addressing several discovery disputes in this breach of contract action arising out of the parties' settlement agreement, I ordered the parties to submit letter briefs on one issue: the plaintiff's renewed request for a forensic examination of computers owned by the defendant and his corporation, Lockatong Engineering, Inc. Report of Hearing and Order re: Discovery Disputes (ECF No. 30) at 4-5. Neither party requested further oral argument, as invited. Id. at 5. For the reasons that follow, I deny the plaintiff's renewed request for the forensic examination.
The plaintiff asserts that applicable case law directs federal courts to allow forensic examination of an opponent's computers and like devices when there are discrepancies in discovery responses, or when there is a direct connection between the opponent's computers and the claims in the action, and that concerns regarding personal, confidential, or proprietary information "can be adequately addressed through protective orders[,]" one of which is already in effect in this case. Plaintiff's Letter Brief dated October 27, 2016, at 4. The defendant does not cite any authority in support of his position.
A court should not allow a forensic examination of a party's computers in order to help the party seeking the examination to confirm a "highly speculative conjecture" that materials responsive to duly served requests for production have not been produced and are present on those computers. Williams v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 144, 146 (D. Mass. 2005). In order to succeed, the party seeking the examination must present credible evidence that the opposing party is unwilling to produce computer-generated documents or that it has withheld relevant information. Id. Courts should be particularly reluctant to allow such searches where the opposing party has undertaken its own search and forensic analysis and has sworn to its accuracy. Id. "[T]he inquiring party must present at least some reliable information that the opposing party's representations are misleading or substantively inaccurate." Id.; see also Covad Communications Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 5, 12 (D.D.C. 2009).
"[I]t does not automatically follow that every time a litigant alleges that the other party's electronic production is deficient in some regard the appropriate next step is to conduct a forensic examination." Id. at 13. While inconsistencies or improprieties in a party's discovery responses may justify forensic examination of related computers, id. at 12; Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006), there must be a "history of incomplete and inconsistent responses to [the inquiring party's] production requests[,]" Jacobson v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. 05-1338-JTM, 2006 WL 3146349, at *7 (D. Kan. Oct. 31, 2006), before a forensic examination will be allowed. The inquiring party's skepticism that the opposing party has produced all of the documents sought is not sufficient to warrant a forensic examination. Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, No. 05-1157-JTM-DWB, 2006 WL 763668, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2006) (citing McCurdy Group v. American Biomedical Group, Inc., 9 Fed.App'x 822, 831, 2001 WL 536974 at *7 (10th Cir. 2001)).
The gravamen of the complaint in this action
The specific "discrepancies" identified by the plaintiff are the following:
The defendant points out that the plaintiff is not seeking monetary damages, making a forensic examination unfair and not proportional to the needs of the case. Defendant's Letter Brief dated October 27, 2016, at 1. He contends that the request is "wholly inconsistent" with the parties' earlier agreement to limit discovery activities and expense; that deposition testimony of the plaintiff's president and senior vice president "confirms" that the allegations in the complaint are merely speculative; that the plaintiff seeks discovery beyond the terms of the settlement agreement that provides the basis for this action; that the plaintiff's expert's report is flawed; and that the difference between "executive documents," which must be returned pursuant to the settlement agreement, and "operational documents," which need not be returned, has been ignored by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's reply letter brief rejects the defendant's proportionality argument, asserting that the concept favors its request because it has no access to the information that it seeks and the defendant "has not provided a coherent answer" in discovery; the discovery is crucial to its allegations; the defendant has not asserted that any burden or expense would be caused by the forensic examination; and any burden would be mitigated by the confidentiality order in place in this action and "the protocol for the examination." Plaintiff's Reply Letter Brief dated October 31, 2016, at 1. The plaintiff finds it telling that the defendant "refused to execute an affidavit confirming that he no longer retained possession of [the plaintiff's] materials." Id. at 3. It rejects the defendant's claimed distinction between executive documents and operational documents. Finally, it asserts that the defendant has not responded to each of the deficiencies identified by its expert with his deletion or destruction of data.
The defendant's reply addresses each of the alleged inconsistencies in discovery listed by the plaintiff as justification for the requested forensic examination. Defendant's Reply Letter Brief dated October 31, 2016.
As the defendant contends, Defendant's Reply Letter Brief at 2,
With respect to the transfer of emails to Rackspace, the subject of the plaintiff's third point in the list above, I begin with the observation that this action concerns the defendant's return of, or failure to return, "materials [the plaintiff] had given him over the course of their relationship." Complaint at 1 and ¶¶ 13-17. The plaintiff fails to explain how emails on the Lockatong computers and/or in Rackspace constitute "materials that the plaintiff had given" to the defendant. The identical nature of the two is not readily apparent. That being said, the defendant accurately states that he testified that all "executive" emails that he received from the plaintiff were either contemporaneously deleted or otherwise were irretrievable, following the destruction of the old server in the early winter of 2015. Deposition of Robert Roop at 152, 154. Therefore, Landau's testimony that emails transferred to Rackspace would in fact be accessible to Lockatong employees creates no relevant inconsistency in the defendant's discovery responses.
The slight change in the defendant's testimony set out in the plaintiff's fourth point does not constitute a discrepancy justifying forensic examination. A deponent may change or amplify his testimony during a deposition, or even thereafter via an errata page. Such changes or modifications cannot, standing alone, constitute evidence of one or more inconsistencies into which an opponent may conduct further discovery. See generally Glenwood Farms, Inc. v. Ivey, 229 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D. Me. 2005).
As to the fifth point, the defendant contradicts, with a submitted exhibit, the plaintiff's contention that he failed to provide a copy of his administrative assistant's written confirmation of the purge of the plaintiff's materials. Defendant's Reply Letter Brief at 4 & Exh. B. The conflict that the plaintiff sees between testimony about actions taken by Lockatong to delete the plaintiff's materials from its records in the fall of 2014 and in the early winter of 2015 does not exist. See id. at 2.
The plaintiff's sixth point refers to communications sent to Mooney by the defendant regarding insurance reserves. The defendant initially testified that he still possessed letters that he had sent to Mooney in 2014 on this subject and a single response from Mooney. Id. at 4. He amended this response in his deposition errata sheet to indicate that he did not in fact have a copy of Mooney's response. As was the case with the plaintiff's fourth proffered justification for a forensic examination, the mere fact that a deponent alters an answer via the errata sheet, which is the reason for the existence of an errata sheet, does not provide his opponent with an opportunity for further discovery, without more. The defendant states that he has produced in discovery the letters that he sent to Mooney in connection with this issue. Id.
The plaintiff's seventh and final argument is based on the testimony of its expert opining about the possible existence of materials in the defendant's possession that the defendant should have returned pursuant to the settlement agreement. At best, such opinions, if admissible at trial, represent an attempt to rebut any testimony proffered by the defendant to the effect that he and Lockatong have provided all materials covered by the settlement agreement. It does not provide justification for the extraordinary relief being requested by the plaintiff in seeking to examine forensically the defendant's computers.
I do not adopt the defendant's arguments based on the lack of a demand for damages or the parties' agreement to limit discovery. The added burden and expense to the defendant of a forensic examination of all of his and Lockatong's computer devices, however, is obvious. I am troubled by the defendant's apparent refusal to provide the plaintiff with a requested affidavit "confirming that he no longer retained possession of [the plaintiff's] materials[,]" Plaintiff's Reply Letter Brief at 3, but his responses to the plaintiff's discovery requests, including his deposition testimony given under oath, should provide the plaintiff with essentially the same assurance.
In sum, the plaintiff's submissions fall short of meeting the legal standards necessary for the intrusive relief it seeks.
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's renewed request to conduct a forensic examination of the computer devices of the defendant and his company is